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Chapter I
Introduction
Most corporations face one fundamental challenge: Corporate insiders take invest-
ment decisions, but may pursue objectives diﬀerent to those that provide funding.
Funding the corporation can be viewed as a nexus of ﬁnancing contracts between
these groups of decision makers. These ﬁnancing contracts can be designed to
mitigate the problems that result from the separation of investment and ﬁnancing
decisions. However, designing ﬁnancing contracts as a response to these problems
is only indicated if the counterparties in fact each take advantage of the chances
they have to pursue their own interests. Hardly any study even considers the
converse case, namely that the counterparties trust each other and deliberately act
trustworthily.
My ﬁrst research objective is to distinguish between environments in which
corporate decision makers show high levels of mutual trust and environments with
low levels of trust. I can show that the separation of investment and ﬁnancing
decisions determines the design of ﬁnancing contracts in countries that are culturally
characterized by low trust. In contrast, this separation plays only a subordinate role
in countries of high trust. From these results, I conclude that trustas an aspect
of the cultural tradition of a countryshapes corporate ﬁnancial structures.
Consequently, ignoring trust can lead to misinterpretations of the observed ﬁnan-
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cial structures. More serious than just misinterpretations are subsequent misleading
recommendations on the design of ﬁnancing contracts: On the premise of distrust,
the appropriate advice to the providers of capital may be to control the investment
decisions by corporate insiders. Tight control, in turn, prevents trust from rising.
Therefore, this recommendation may end up self-fulﬁlling the premise of distrust,
and prevents trust from unfolding its beneﬁts. My second research objective is
to explore in detail the conditions under which shareholders optimally provide
managers with large amounts of cash, based on mutual trust. I show that trust
excels in the long run.
The idea of viewing corporate funding as a nexus of ﬁnancing contracts leads
over to my third research objective. Corporations devote a lot of time to the design
of these contracts, which may indicate by its own the importance to study how
corporate funding is provided. More fundamental is the closely related question of
whether funding is provided at all. This question puts real economic activity at
stake.
My third research objective is to examine the link between corporate ﬁnancing
contracts and the level of real economic activity. In studying this link, I acknowledge
that country-speciﬁc ﬁnancial systems set the framework both for the design of
speciﬁc forms of ﬁnancing contracts and for the amount of ﬁnancing made available
to corporations. On the other hand, both the needs for the speciﬁc form and
for the amount of ﬁnancing areat least partlydictated by industry necessities.
Therefore, I analyze the impact of country-level ﬁnancial systems on industry growth
rates.
These three research objectives are addressed in three self-contained chapters.
Chapter 2 deals with the question why the corporate choice of capital structure
widely diﬀers across European countries. According to my results, an important
piece in this capital structure puzzle is trust.
Theoretical and empirical studies so far have identiﬁed two categories as deter-
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minants of corporate capital structure, numerous ﬁrm characteristics (such as ﬁrm
size or collateral value of assets), and some country-level characteristics (such as
legal rights of investors). However, the identiﬁcation of country-level characteristics
is still in its infancy. The traditional determinants do not bring light to all aspects
of that puzzle. I deem trust as a major key to the understanding of cross-country
diﬀerences in capital structure: The level of trust canin partidentify which
traditional determinants are predominant for a particular country.
Broadly accepted determinants are, among others, derived from theories that
perceive the choice of capital structure as an optimal response to agency prob-
lems and problems of asymmetric information. These determinants rely on the
assumption that the parties choosing the corporate ﬁnancial structure operate in an
environment of low trust. At the same time, there is the empirical observation that
certain countries experience higher levels of trust than others. Consequently, it is
doubtful to what extent these characteristics also dominate in countries with high
levels of trust.
I conduct an empirical analysis based on a large sample of listed and unlisted
ﬁrms across 24 European countries. Complementarily, I use survey data on the
levels of trust within these countries. I ﬁnd empirical evidence that the determi-
nants related to agency problems and problems of asymmetric information are only
of subordinate importance in countries that are culturally characterized by high
levels of trust. These results encourage the conclusion that trust is a missing link
between the established theories and the puzzling cross-country diﬀerences in capital
structure.
Chapter 3 is motivated by twoprima facie inconsistentobservations regard-
ing corporate cash holdings: In the context of company valuation, corporate cash
holdings tend to have a negative marginal contribution to ﬁrm value as they are
supposedly wasted to some extent. Yet, there is still a considerable number of ﬁrms
with inexplicably high amounts of cash on their balance sheets. Observing both
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phenomena at the same time is striking. It can be rationalized by a model, though,
which is set up in chapter 3. The analysis of this model allows the conclusion that
the value of corporate cash holdings depends on the time horizon of the manager's
directing the ﬁrm. In addition and in contrast to previous studies, I show that
large cash holdingseven with negative marginal contribution to ﬁrm valuecan
be optimal if there is mutual trust between a shareholder and a manager.
The one-period version of my model conﬁrms the traditional view that a
shareholder has essentially two options if ﬁnancing with standard debt contracts is
not available: either restraining the cash at the manager's discretion or controlling
the manager's investment decision. The main new insight of my model is that
mutual trust can substitute for corporate control. In a long-term shareholder-
manager relationship, entrusting large amounts of cash to the manager is to the
shareholder's best advantage. Even if a part of these cash holdings is wasted, trust
outperforms control mechanisms that are costly to implement.
Therefore, control may be good, but trust can even be better. The traditional
recommendation to either restrain cash or control the manager's investment deci-
sion is incomplete: Control can destroy trust and, hence, even decrease ﬁrm value.
Chapter 4 analyzes the idea that a ﬁnancial system promotes economic growth by
reallocating capital to industries where it can be used more productively (so-called
capital reallocation hypothesis). My analysis originates from discordance between
two traditional attempts to operationalize this idea. The discordance consists in the
ways to identify industries that beneﬁt from a ﬁnancial system: on the one hand,
any industry with positive growth opportunities; on the other hand, only industries
thatfor technological reasonsdepend on external ﬁnancing. There is empirical
support for both ways, but any endeavor to bring them in accordance has failed.
This study establishes a link between both approaches.
For this purpose, I develop a model that links ﬁndings from the microeco-
nomic literature on corporate ﬁnancing to the macroeconomic literature on eco-
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nomic growth. The basis for this model is the corporate choice to ﬁnance growth
opportunities either by internal or by external sources. I assume that shareholders
cannot perfectly control the managers' investment decisions, thereby making internal
ﬁnancing diﬃcult. The ease of external ﬁnancing, on the other hand, depends on
the development of the ﬁnancial system in the respective economy.
The analysis yields the conclusion that both approaches to the capital realloca-
tion hypothesis implicitly conﬁne themselves to diﬀerent ﬁnancing needs: on the one
hand, short-term ﬁnancing of temporary and stochastic growth opportunities at a
steady-state in an industry growth cycle; on the other hand, long-term ﬁnancing of
persistent and deterministic growth opportunities at an early stage in an industry
growth cycle.
My theoretical analysis provides the foundation for formulating separate em-
pirical tests of the two attempts to operationalize the capital reallocation hypothesis.
Only separate tests reveal the mechanisms through which a ﬁnancial system can
promote economic growth. Detailed insights into these mechanisms are crucial to
anyone who takes actions of ﬁnancial development. Only those that are aware which
facets of a ﬁnancial system foster growth in which type of industry can go for the path
to sustained economic growth in the future. Advances in the details that connect
ﬁnancial development to economic growth will likely even gain in importance in the
future: Increasing international integration of ﬁnancial systems will likely change
the relative importance of the channels through which a national ﬁnancial system
can promote national economic growth.
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Chapter II
Does Culture Explain Cross-Country
Diﬀerences in Capital Structures?
An Empirical Study of the Impact of
Trust on the Corporate Choice of
Capital Structure Across European
Countries
1 Introduction
The empirical literature has identiﬁed striking diﬀerences in the use of debt and
equity ﬁnancing in diﬀerent countries. Firms in Italy, for instance, are reluc-
tant to use equity. Firms in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium use moderate
leverage, while ﬁrms in the U.K. use low leverage (De Bondt, 1998). Such well-
known discrepancies in capital structures appear as well among the 24 Western and
Eastern European countries investigated in this study: average levels of leverage
diﬀer considerably across countries (the standard deviation is 24% and Italy has the
highest leverage). Even though these stylized facts have been widely known for a
long time, a convincing theoretical explanation with supporting empirical evidence
is still missing.
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In this paper, I propose that a missing piece in this puzzle is trust. I deﬁne
trust as the prior belief that in a relationship one party is cooperative because it
expects a certain fairness and cooperation from the other even in a one-time event
(cf. La Porta et al., 1997). Survey evidence shows that trust diﬀers systematically
across countries. Part of these diﬀerences can be explained by persistent cultural
attributes, such as religious attitudes. In accordance with Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2006), p. 23, I deﬁne culture as customary beliefs and values.1 I ﬁnd
that diﬀerences in the levels of trust explain in part why ﬁrms across Europe decide
on capital structure so diﬀerently. My results indicate that ﬁrms choose signiﬁcantly
lower levels of leverage in countries with high trust (the so-called level eﬀect). In
addition, trust aﬀects the way in which certain ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence leverage:
There are studies documenting that agency problems and problems of asymmetric
information drive the corporate choice of capital structure. There is also empirical
literature that recognizes to what extent a particular ﬁrm exhibits such problems.
However, the results of these studies are incomplete without reference to trust. I
discover that ﬁrm characteristics related to these problems have a weaker impact
on capital structure in countries with high trust as compared to countries with low
trust (the so-called correlation eﬀect).
These conclusions result from analyzing a large sample of listed and unlisted
ﬁrms from the AMADEUS database. Complementarily, I use data on the levels of
trust across countries that has been collected by the World Value Studies.
I ascribe the leverage of an individual ﬁrm to those ﬁrm characteristics that
the literature on corporate capital structure has related to agency problems or
problems of asymmetric information, such as ﬁrm age, the proportion of intangible
assets, growth opportunities, and proﬁtability. In addition, I test the impact of the
interactions between these ﬁrm characteristics and the level of trust that prevails
1In contrast to Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006), p. 23, I do not refer merely to those beliefs
and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to
generation. This latter restriction, I indicate as the persistent component of beliefs and values.
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in the country in which the respective ﬁrm is located. The results show that trust
inﬂuences the level of leverage (level eﬀect). In addition, trust aﬀects the way in
which certain ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence leverage (correlation eﬀect).
In order to show the level eﬀect, I estimate ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects in a regression
of leverage on a selection of ﬁrm characteristics and treat them as a kind of core
leverage for the ﬁrm. This core leverage is statistically signiﬁcantly lower, by 1.96
percentage points, if the level of trust in the respective country increases by one
standard deviation, which, for example, is equivalent to the diﬀerence in trust-levels
between Portugal with 17% and Bulgaria with 31%. The correlation eﬀect of trust
is mirrored in the interactions between relevant ﬁrm characteristics and trust. For
instance, in most countries older ﬁrms show lower leverage because they are able
to substitute (debt-like) external funds with (equity-like) internal funds. If trust
reduces the costs of external ﬁnancing, these ﬁrms have a smaller incentive to use
internal funds. An increase in ﬁrm age and trust by one standard deviation has
a joint eﬀect of 2.06 percentage points on ﬁrm leverage. The interactions between
trust and other relevant ﬁrm characteristics (intangible assets, growth opportunities,
proﬁtability) as well have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on leverage with the
predicted signs.
My results are robust to controls for other factors of inﬂuence, such as legal or
ﬁnancial institutions in a particular country. Even if I control for measures of the
degree of ﬁnancial development in a country, measures of creditor protection along
with contract enforceability, inﬂation, gross domestic product, and corporate tax
rates, the impact of trust on the core leverage of a ﬁrm, as well as the impact of trust
on the way in which certain ﬁrm characteristics aﬀect leverage, stays statistically
signiﬁcant with the expected signs.
Furthermore, I address endogeneity concerns: I account for the issue of reverse
causality by including predetermined values of trust and other institutional variables.
Concerning the issue of omitted variables, I apply an instrumental-variable approach
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to separate the persistent, culturally inherited, exogenous variation in trust from the
component that might be endogenously determined by current economic conditions.
This exogenous component of trust is neither caused by the contemporaneous choice
of capital structure, nor by omitted institutions at the country level. As an instru-
ment, I use religious upbringing because there are studies that show that religious
views and practices have a relatively persistent impact on trust over time (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003).
In summary, my study shows that trust is an important driver of the corporate
capital structure. In particular, it clariﬁes the role of the cultural dimension of trust
in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in capital structure along two dimensions: On
the one hand, country-level trust can explain why average levels of leverage diﬀer
across countries. On the other hand, country-level trust can explain why certain
ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence leverage diﬀerently across countries. The literature on
corporate capital structurewithout such a reference to trustfails to convincingly
explain these two patterns in an international context.
My work is related to three lines of research. The ﬁrst strand that relates
to my work explains the corporate choice of capital structure exclusively by ﬁrm
characteristics. There are numerous studies that derive and empirically test such
factors of inﬂuence at the level of an individual ﬁrm.2 Following these studies,
variations in capital structure across countries can only be explained by cross-
country diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics. In summary, approaching the puzzling
diﬀerences in international capital structure exclusively at the ﬁrm level is not
suﬃcient. In particular, it leaves an important question unanswered: Why do
some ﬁrm characteristics impact leverage so diﬀerently across countries as found
by Rajan and Zingales (1995)?3 In addition, the explanation at the ﬁrm level raises
2Among others, Frank and Goyal (2009) and Harris and Raviv (1991) summarize ﬁrm charac-
teristics traditionally used in the empirical literature on corporate capital structure.
3While the empirical literature on corporate capital structure has restrained itself to such a ﬁrm-
level approach and to U.S. data, for a long time, within the last 15 years, a number of studies have
extended the evidence on capital structure to the international scope. These international studies
explicitly compare the corporate choice of capital structure in various countries. While early studies
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the question of why ﬁrm characteristics vary systematically across countries.
Another, more recent strand of the literature suggests that cross-country diﬀeren-
ces in capital structure are due to diﬀerent institutions at the country level. Rigorous
tests of this suggestion have only been possible since data on institutions have
become available for a broad range of countries, in particular following the emergence
of the law and ﬁnance literature advanced by La Porta et al. (1998). Subsequent
studies analyze both developed and developing countries, rarely including Eastern
European countries. Despite general support for traditional ﬁrm characteristics,
they uncover substantial cross-country diﬀerences, both in the levels of leverage and
in the impact of the traditional ﬁrm characteristics on leverage (e.g., Booth et al.,
2001; De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen, 2008; Giannetti, 2003; Hall, Hutchinson, and
Michaelas, 2004). Such persistent diﬀerences suggest that important factors at the
country level are at work.4 Many of these studies indeed pin down the impact of
certain institutions on ﬁrm leverage. From her results, (inter alia) Giannetti (2003)
concludes that ﬁnancial development, the quality of accounting standards, creditor
protection, and law enforcement inﬂuence capital structure by mitigating agency
problems. Acknowledging that certain ﬁrm characteristics describe whether agency
problems and problems of asymmetric information are important for a particular
ﬁrm, De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) and Giannetti (2003) do not only test
the direct impact of institutions on leverage. They also test whether interactions
between such ﬁrm characteristics and institutions inﬂuence leverage.5
of international scope merely perform an out-of sample test of the ﬁrm characteristics identiﬁed in
US samples, Rajan and Zingales (1995) are among the ﬁrst to transfer the single-country approach
to a multi-country approach: For the then G-7 states, they ﬁnd overall support for traditional ﬁrm-
level factors of inﬂuence, but also considerable cross-country diﬀerences. Aggarwal and Jamdee
(2003) replicate their study with more recent data and improved methods, but only ﬁnd partial
support for the relevance of the ﬁrm-level factors, identiﬁed in U.S. studies, and moreover they
uncover considerable cross-country diﬀerences.
4In the sample by Fan, Titman, and Twite (2008), country dummies increase the adjusted R²
by 8 percentage points.
5While most studies analyze diﬀerences in capital structure across countries applying econo-
metric regression analysis, there are two studies at the European level that follow the survey
approach that Graham and Harvey (2001) use for the U.S.: Bancel and Mittoo (2004) survey
ﬁnancial managers from 16 European countries and ﬁnd substantial variation within Europe. The
survey by Brounen, de Jong, and Koedijk (2004) ﬁnds surprising similarities between the U.K.,
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With the help of cross-country diﬀerences in institutions alone, these studies
of international scope cannot explain the observed diﬀerences in capital structure
across countries. After all, these studies still do not fully answer the question of
why ﬁrm characteristics impact leverage so diﬀerently across countries, nor do they
provide satisfying reasons for systematic diﬀerences in institutions across countries.
The third strand related to this study has discovered culture (in general) and
trust (in particular) as drivers of economic outcomes.6 While there is a number
of studies ascribing economic outcomes to culture, the literature that links cul-
ture and speciﬁcally the corporate choice of capital structure is still in its infancy.
However, such a link is important because cultural diﬀerences across countries may
be the root both of the observed cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics
and institutions, and of the cross-country diﬀerences in the way in which these
factors impact leverage. The ﬁrst category of studies in this area shows that average
levels of leverage diﬀer across so-called cultural realms. In an early study, Sekeley
and Collins (1988) ﬁnd dissimilarities in capital structure among cultural realms,
such as Western Europe, Anglo-America, and Latin-America. Park (1998) and,
more recently, Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000) cluster countries according to
their uncertainty avoidance, one of several cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede
(1980). They ﬁnd evidence that the average levels of leverage diﬀer according to
this cultural dimension. These studies mainly conﬁrm that there are diﬀerences
in capital structure among countries. However, they do not speciﬁcally test how
culture inﬂuences capital structure, nor do they convincingly control for other factors
of inﬂuence. The second category of studies shows a relation between culture and
certain drivers of capital structure at the ﬁrm level and at the country level. Hilary
and Hui (2009) establish that religiosity (as a persistent aspect of culture) is linked
to lower risk aversion, at least in Western societies (cf. Miller and Hoﬀmann, 1995;
Miller, 2000). They ﬁnd evidence that religion speciﬁcally impacts the choice of
the Netherlands, Germany, and France, despite large diﬀerences in institutions.
6Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) summarize the literature on trust and economic outcomes.
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business risk. The magnitude of business risk, in turn, aﬀects the choice of corporate
capital structure. Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that religion impacts the
quality of a country's creditor protection, which is relevant for the corporate choice
of capital structure also. Tabellini (2010) ﬁnds a correlation between cultural aspects
(such as respect for others or conﬁdence in individual self-determination) and the
current degree of economic development within Europe. Studies within this latter
category indicate a speciﬁc channel through which culture impacts capital structure,
namely by changing ﬁrm characteristics or institutions that drive the corporate
choice of capital structure. However, this approach does not provide a satisfactory
explanation for the cross-country capital structure puzzle either. In particular, these
studies still do not explain why ﬁrm characteristics impact leverage diﬀerently in
diﬀerent countries.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to investigate the eﬀect
of the cultural dimension of trust both directly on the levels of leverage (level
eﬀect) and indirectly on the way in which certain ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence
leverage (correlation eﬀect).7 I extend the literature on corporate capital structure
by simultaneously considering traditional ﬁrm characteristics and institutions at
the country level on the one hand and cultural aspects on the other. The cultural
dimension of trust has the potential to reconcile the observed empirical puzzles in
cross-country capital structures with the established theories.
In this study, I proceed as follows: In Section 2, I present my hypotheses about
the impact of trust on corporate capital structure. Section 3 presents the data and
the methods used in the empirical test. Section 4 interprets the results. Section 5
carries out robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
7Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok (2002) pursue a similar research objective using, instead of trust, the
cultural dimensions of conservatism (values important in close relationships) and mastery (of a
social environment through self-assertion). These cultural dimensions by Schwartz (1994) build
upon those by Hofstede (1980). However, they do not test whether the interaction between tradi-
tional factors of inﬂuence and cultural variables have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on leverage,
maybe because their cultural dimensions are too vague to formulate more speciﬁc hypotheses.
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2 Hypotheses
In this section, I derive propositions about the impact of the level of trust in a
country on capital structures of ﬁrms in that country.
2.1 Traditional Theories of Capital Structure and Trust
2.1.1 The Impact of Agency Problems and Problems of Asymmetric
Information on Corporate Capital Structure
A ﬁrm's decision to ﬁnance its operations with equity-type internal funds as opposed
to equity- or debt-type external funds determines its capital structure. The choice
between external debt and external equity ﬁnancing has direct consequences for a
ﬁrm's static capital structure. In contrast, the choice between internal and external
ﬁnancing only indirectly predicts a ﬁrm's static capital structure. This is the case,
for example, if ﬁrms predominantly use debt to ﬁnance an external funding deﬁcit
because ﬁrms have only limited access to external equity ﬁnancing.8
Both forms of external ﬁnancing rely on cooperation, the ﬁrm's assurance not
to expropriate the investor's assets, and its dependence on factors that facilitate
or impede such cooperation, such as agency problems and problems of asymmetric
information (Harris and Raviv, 1991, survey these factors in detail). These problems,
therefore, aﬀect both the choice between external debt and external equity ﬁnancing
and the choice between internal and external ﬁnancing.
In regard to the ﬁrst decision between external debt and external equity, agency
8More directly than for a ﬁrm's static capital structure, the choice between internal and external
ﬁnancing has implications for a ﬁrm's dynamic capital structure. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
suggest as an adequate test to regress changes in leverage on a proxy for a ﬁrm's external funding
deﬁcit. However, due to data restrictions I do not directly compute an external funding deﬁcit (as
deﬁned in Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Retained earnings are necessary in order to directly
compute a ﬁrm's funding deﬁcit. In the AMADEUS database, this balance-sheet item is included
in the broader category of other shareholder funds, an item that is not consistently deﬁned across
countries. In addition, using the item other shareholder funds may create data selection biases as
the coverage of this item diﬀers across countries. Furthermore, for a considerable number of ﬁrms
there is only little time-series information (while there is abundant cross-sectional information).
Therefore, I link the choice between external and internal funding to a ﬁrm's static capital structure.
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costs are linked to external equity and external debt to diﬀerent degrees. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) distinguish between two types of conﬂicts that lead to such agency
costs. Conﬂicts between shareholders and managers of the ﬁrm constitute agency-
related beneﬁts to debt ﬁnancing and are prominent if ownership and control of the
ﬁrm are separate: The managers bear the costs of proﬁt enhancement activities,
but do not gain all the beneﬁts; leverage resolves this conﬂict because it increases
ceteris paribusthe manager's equity share in the ﬁrm. Conﬂicts between equity
and debt holders constitute agency-related costs to debt ﬁnancing and arise if default
risk becomes substantial: equity holders have an incentive to invest in riskier projects
with an upside potential.
The second decision between internal and external ﬁnancing regards the costs of
asymmetric information. These costs create a wedge between the costs of equity-type
internal and debt- or equity-type external ﬁnancing because insiders may exploit
their superior information to the detriment of outsiders. From asymmetric informa-
tion between insiders and outsiders, Myers and Majluf (1984) derives the pecking-
order theory of ﬁnancing. According to this pecking-order theory, capital structure
is driven by a ﬁrm's desire to ﬁnance new investments, ﬁrst with internal equity, then
with external low-risk debt, andas a last resortwith external equity. Whether
high costs of external ﬁnancing increase or decrease leverage, depends, among other
things, on a ﬁrm's access to external ﬁnancing. If ﬁrms are restricted to using
external debt ﬁnancing (due to limited access to equity markets for instance), then
the choice between internal and external ﬁnancing ultimately materializes through
the choice between equity and debt.9 In addition, according to Ross (1977) leverage
is valuable in the presence of asymmetric information because it serves as a credible
signal to convey insider information about investment prospects.
Overall, a basis of standard economic theory is the assumption that managers
9Of course, the ﬁrm characteristic of being listed is not a perfect indicator of a ﬁrm's access
to external equity ﬁnancing. There are other forms of external equity, such as venture capital or
private equity. Still, listed ﬁrms should typically have easier and cheaper access to external equity
ﬁnancing than unlisted ﬁrms.
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are not fully trustworthy from the point of view of the investors: They exploit any
discretion to pursue their own interests. On the other hand, investors are distrustful
in the sense that they anticipate this behavior.
2.1.2 The Role of Trust in Mitigating Agency Problems and Problems
of Asymmetric Information
However, these standard economic arguments disregard trust. Trust on the side of
the investors and trustworthiness on the side of the managers aﬀect the optimal
choice between debt and equity.
According to La Porta et al. (1997), trust has two meanings in economic
theory: First, in repeated game theory, trust is the prior belief that an opponent is
cooperative; a higher prior belief makes cooperation more likely. Second, trusting
people cooperate even in one-time situations; this suggests that people expect certain
fairness and cooperation even if they do not see their opponents again. Trust
is especially important for economic activities that rely on an opponent's mere
assurance not to expropriate someone else's assets. In high-trust environments,
people have to spend less to protect themselves from expropriation (Knack and
Keefer, 1997). Reputation or the possibility of future punishment (for instance, via
law suits) can establish cooperation even at low levels of trust (La Porta et al.,
1997).10 Notably, if the results of surveys on trust indicate that people are trusting,
in most cases they are also trustworthy themselves (Glaeser et al., 2000).11
In summary, people in high-trust environments are more likely to expect as well
as to actually experience cooperative behavior.
10Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) see trust as the opening through which culture enters the
economic discourse: Zak and Knack (2001) show a theoretical and empirical link between trust and
overall economic growth. La Porta et al. (1997) pin down the impact of trust on the performance
of large organizations. Knack and Keefer (1997) investigate the interrelation between trust, civic
cooperation and economic performance.
11The correlation between trust and trustworthiness is not surprising from an evolutionary point
of view: A group of trusting principals will be worse oﬀ than their distrusting counterparts if
they interact with dishonest agents. Therefore, only in an environment with a suﬃciently large
fraction of honest agents are trusting principals better oﬀ than distrusting principals and a culture
of mutual trust can evolve.
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2.1.3 From Common Beliefs Within a Country to Corporate Decisions
In order to explain how diﬀerent levels of trust across countries impact the corporate
choice of capital structure in those countries, it is necessary to clarify why a belief
at the country level can have any relevance in corporate decisions.
Common and Individual Beliefs. In standard economic theory, it is individual
beliefs that matter for individual decisions, rather than the beliefs that are common
to the inhabitants of a particular country. Such common beliefs and values, which I
deﬁne as culture, potentially impact economic decisions by shaping the beliefs and
values of individuals. Country borders are not a perfect, but reasonable, separation
of cultural realms, at least with respect to diﬀerences in the levels of trust across
Europe. Table II.1 shows that trust varies greatly across European countries, with a
minimum trust value of 5%, a maximum trust value of 64% and a standard deviation
of 14% in the sample of this study. By deﬁning cultural borders as country borders,
I ignore cultural diversity within one country as well as cultural proximity across
countries. Country borders are still the adequate choice for the purpose of this
study because I want to show that the puzzling diﬀerences in capital structure
across countries can be traced back, at least partly, to cultural diﬀerences.
[Insert Table II.1 about here.]
Therefore, I propose that although trust is ﬁrst and foremost the prior belief of
an individual that some opponent is cooperative (cf. deﬁnition by La Porta et al.,
1997), a certain proportion of trust can reasonably be assumed to be common to
the inhabitants of a certain country, shaped, e.g., by common religious roots.
Individual Beliefs and Corporate Decisions. Given that individual beliefs are
partly determined by common beliefs within a country, such individual beliefs still
primarily determine individual decisions, and not directly corporate decisions. Of
course, as Hilary and Hui (2009), p. 1 state, ﬁrms do not make decisions, people
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do and what they do outside work is likely to aﬀect the ways they make these
decisions inside work. To the extent that culture shapes managers' beliefs and
preferences, culture impacts corporate decisions if the managers have the discretion
to let their own beliefs and values inﬂuence corporate decisions. Cronqvist, Makhija,
and Yonker (2009) provide evidence that unobserved personal characteristics of
managers impact the personal mortgage andat the same timethe corporate
leverage decision. This impact supports the assumption that there is some discretion
for managerial beliefs and values to impact corporate decisions.12
Culture may of course impact beliefs and values of some individuals, and impact
corporate decisions of some managers more than those of others. Even if a manager
is less prone to cultural biases than the average person, local cultural norms can
matter for decisions by managers even though their own beliefs and values may not
be aﬀected at all: According to the social identity theory (Tajlef and Turner, 1979,
among others), much of an individual's personal identity is derived from social group
membership such as nationality, ethnicity, religion and occupation. Individuals tend
to conform to the beliefs and preferences that are dominant within these groups.
This conformity supports the assumption that corporate culture is linked to the
local cultural environment in general (Hilary and Hui, 2009). Speciﬁcally: Rational
managers make corporate decisions as trustees for the stakeholders of the ﬁrm, i.e.,
for customers, suppliers, investors, politicians, and employees. Rational, proﬁt-
maximizing managers cater to the cultural biases of these stakeholders.
In summary, culture in general and trust in particular can impact corporate
decisions through two channels: The managers decide as individuals, inﬂuenced by
their own cultural upbringing that determines whether they are more or less trusting
12Of course, one could ask whether product market competition from other cultural environments
allows cultural biases to impact corporate decisions at all. To the extent that such culturally
oriented corporate decisions are ineﬃcient and destroy ﬁrm value, culture may have a weaker impact
on corporate decisions because, otherwise, ﬁrms could be driven out of the market. Despite global
product market competition, cultural biases could be important at least for corporate decisions that
do not dramatically impact ﬁrm proﬁtability: as regards the corporate choice of capital structure,
it is not even clearfrom a theoretical perspectivewhether leverage matters for proﬁtability or
rather is irrelevant in the sense of Modigliani and Miller (1958).
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and trustworthy. Alternatively, even though the cultural environment may not aﬀect
the managers' own beliefs, their decisions reﬂect their roles as trustees on behalf of
the stakeholders of the ﬁrm who are more or less trusting and trustworthy according
to their cultural environment.
Through both channels, the eﬀect of the particular cultural norms in one country
on a ﬁrm that operates in multiple cultural environments is less clear-cut than the
eﬀect on a ﬁrm that operates within only one cultural environment.13
Hypothesis 1. The impact of country-level trust on corporate capital structure
is weaker for multinational ﬁrms.
2.2 The Level Eﬀect
Trust can directly impact the level of corporate leverage. I denote this aspect as the
level eﬀect of trust.
The literature on corporate capital structure has connected agency problems
and problems of asymmetric information to capital structure without reference to
trust. However, trust is relevant for this connection because it facilitates coopera-
tion even without ﬁrm reputation or formal control and punishment mechanisms.
Consequently, these problems are less important for corporate capital structures in
high-trust countries than in low-trust countries.
Concerning the choice between external debt and equity, trust mitigates agency
costs that are associated to a diﬀerent degree with both types of ﬁnancing contracts.
Debt contracts typically schedule ﬁxed interest payments and amortization, but con-
tain only few control rights. Equity holders as the residual claimants, in contrast,
rely less on contract speciﬁcations. They typically do not specify ﬁxed repayments,
but have more control rights than debt holders. Trust on the side of investors and
13Similarly, Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that, at the macroeconomic level, a country's
openness to international trade mitigates the inﬂuence of religion on creditor rights.
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trustworthiness on the side of managers mitigate agency problems: Trustworthy
managers, on the one hand, do not expropriate the investors' assets. Trusting
investors, on the other hand, do not have to adopt costly control mechanisms because
they have the prior belief that the manager of the ﬁrm cooperates, even without
formal control. Therefore, high levels of trust shift the optimal choice of corporate
capital structure towards equity contracts with less speciﬁed repayments and more
room for asset expropriation as compared to debt contracts. In addition, Ross
(1977)'s signaling power of debt in the presence of asymmetric information between
insiders and outsiders is less important for companies in high-trust countries.
Hypothesis 2. Firm leverage decreases with trust.
2.3 The Correlation Eﬀect
The correlation eﬀect concerns the impact of trust on the relation between corpo-
rate leverage and those ﬁrm characteristics that are related to agency problems or
problems of asymmetric information.
The empirical literature has identiﬁed numerous ﬁrm characteristics that explain
corporate capital structure. Frank and Goyal (2009) and Harris and Raviv (1991)
give a comprehensive summary of ﬁrm characteristics typically used in empirical
studies on corporate capital structure. One set of ﬁrm characteristics explains
corporate leverage by indicating the extent of agency problems and problems of
asymmetric information in a particular ﬁrm. These ﬁrm-level factors are important
for my study because I argue that country-level trust mitigates these problems.
Because I use the same data source and similar methods as Giannetti (2003), I
follow her in my selection of ﬁrm characteristics that represent the extent of agency
problems and problems of asymmetric information. In particular, I use ﬁrm age,
the proportion of intangible assets, growth opportunities, and proﬁtability. These
factors cover the main areas that Frank and Goyal (2009) and Harris and Raviv
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(1991) associate with agency problems or problems of asymmetric information.14
In order to formulate hypotheses about the impact of country-level trust on the
way in which these ﬁrm characteristics impact leverage, I present the eﬀect of these
ﬁrm characteristics on leverage alone, according to the literature on corporate capital
structure.
Firm Age. Firm age can impact leverage in two manners. According to the
substitution-hypothesis, ﬁrms are able to accumulate proﬁts over time. Therefore,
old ﬁrms face smaller external funding deﬁcits than young ﬁrms and, hence, are able
to substitute expensive (debt- or equity-type) external funds with (equity-type)
internal funds (substitution eﬀect). This substitution eﬀect only has an indirect
impact on leverage: If ﬁrms have limited access to external equity ﬁnancing (e.g.,
unlisted ﬁrms), they are more likely to use external debt ﬁnancing to cover an ex-
ternal ﬁnancing deﬁcit. In that case, substituting (debt-type) external with (equity-
type) internal funds decreases leverage. Giannetti (2003) ﬁnds such a negative, but
statistically weak coeﬃcient of ﬁrm age, predicted by the substitution-hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.a. Firm leverage decreases with ﬁrm age.
Hypothesis 3.b. The substitution eﬀect of ﬁrm age is stronger for the subsample
of unlisted than for listed ﬁrms.
According to the reputation-hypothesis, old ﬁrms with long credit histories are
able to build up the reputation of being a good borrower and decrease the risk
premium of debt (reputation eﬀect). This eﬀect may be relevant only for suﬃciently
mature ﬁrms implying a non-linear relation between age and leverage (cf. the
reasoning in Diamond, 1991; Giannetti, 2003).
14Using a sample of predominantly unlisted ﬁrms, I have to omit those ﬁrm-level factors that are
only available for listed ﬁrms, such as market-to-book value or dividend payments. Furthermore,
some factors fall prey to data restrictions, e.g., advertising expenses, R & D or a measure of free
cash ﬂow. Although these factors are reported in principle, their coverage substantially diﬀers
across the countries of my studies and, hence, their inclusion would lead to data selection biases.
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Hypothesis 4. Firm leverage increases with squared ﬁrm age.
Intangible assets. Intangible assets are associated with a low liquidation value.
Compared to ﬁrms where funds have already been committed to investment in place
(high proportion of tangible assets), a low liquidation value increases the agency
costs of debt. Therefore, ﬁrm leverage is expected to decrease with the proportion
of intangible assets (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Williamson, 1988). Previous empirical
studies generally conﬁrm that intangible assets are negatively related to leverage
and that tangible assets are positively related to leverage (Bradley, Jarrell, and
Kim, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Hypothesis 5. Firm leverage decreases with the proportion of intangible assets.
Growth opportunities. High growth opportunities increase a ﬁrm's demand for
external ﬁnancing as internal funds are scarce. Provided moderate costs for external
ﬁnancing, ﬁrms that face high growth opportunities will increase external ﬁnancing.
Unlisted ﬁrms with limited access to equity markets have to rely predominantly on
external debt ﬁnancing. Therefore, at least for these ﬁrms, growth opportunities
should be positively related to leverage. However, in particular for the subsample
of listed ﬁrms that are characterized by the separation of ownership and control,
there can also be two countervailing eﬀects to this positive correlation. In ﬁrms
with low growth opportunities, managers are inclined to waste large cash inﬂows on
unproﬁtable projects, rather than to pay out cash dividends, and debt can serve as
a disciplinary device; these agency-related beneﬁts of debt (in the sense of Jensen,
1986) are lower in ﬁrms that face high growth opportunities. In addition, ﬁrms with
high growth opportunities face high agency costs of debt because their investment
choice is relatively ﬂexible (Giannetti, 2003; Titman and Wessels, 1988). These two
countervailing forces suggest a negative correlation between proxies for growth and
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leverage, which some empirical studies observe (Kim and Sorensen, 1986).
Hypothesis 6.a. Firm leverage increases with growth opportunities.
Hypothesis 6.b. The positive eﬀect of growth on leverage is stronger for the
subsample of unlisted than for listed ﬁrms.
Proﬁtability. Past proﬁts enable ﬁrms to accumulate internal funds. According to
Myers and Majluf`s pecking-order theory, proﬁtable ﬁrms should substitute expen-
sive (equity- or debt-type) external funds with less expensive (equity-type) internal
funds. At least for unlisted ﬁrms with limited access to external equity ﬁnancing,
this substitution will decrease leverage.
Hypothesis 7.a. Firm leverage decreases with proﬁtability.
Hypothesis 7.b. The negative eﬀect of proﬁtability on leverage is stronger for the
subsample of unlisted than for listed ﬁrms.
Given the hypothesized impact of these ﬁrm characteristics on leverage, I formu-
late hypotheses about the inﬂuence of country-level trust on the way in which these
ﬁrm characteristics impact leverage.
As proposed before, agency problems and problems of asymmetric information
should be less important in environments with high rather than low levels of trust.
Therefore, the impact of the above ﬁrm characteristics on the corporate choice of
capital structure should be weaker in high-trust than in low-trust countries. Accor-
dingly, the interaction terms between trust and the ﬁrm characteristics of age, the
proportion of intangible assets, growth opportunities and proﬁtability should be sta-
tistically signiﬁcant explanatory variables in the leverage regression. In particular,
I test the following hypotheses:
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Firm Age. Trust reduces the costs for external ﬁnancing due to asymmetric infor-
mation between insiders and outsiders and, hence, it reduces the need to substitute
external with internal funds. Therefore, for the subsample of unlisted ﬁrms, the
negative eﬀect of age on leverage is weaker in high-trust countries: Unlisted ﬁrms
with limited access to external equity predominantly substitute debt-type external
funds with internal equity as they become older if trust in the respective country is
low.
Hypothesis 8.a. Firm leverage decreases less with age if trust is higher.
Hypothesis 8.b. The correlation eﬀect of age is stronger for the subsample of
unlisted than for listed ﬁrms.
Intangible assets. Trust mitigates the agency costs of debt that are particularly
high for ﬁrms with low collateral value due to a high proportion of intangible assets.
Trust substitutes for collateral and, therefore, reduces the negative correlation bet-
ween the proportion of intangible assets and leverage.
Hypothesis 9. Firm leverage decreases less with the proportion of intangible
assets if trust is higher.
Growth opportunities. Trust can mitigate the premium for external ﬁnancing.
Therefore, in countries characterized by high levels of trust, ﬁrms can better ﬁ-
nance growth opportunities from external sources. This easier access to external
ﬁnancing in high-trust countries should increase leverage for those ﬁrms that rely
predominantly on external debt ﬁnancing, i.e., for unlisted ﬁrms. In addition, for
listed and unlisted ﬁrms, trust mitigates the agency costs of debt that are particu-
larly severe for ﬁrms with high growth opportunities. Therefore, debt ﬁnancing of
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growth opportunities is more attractive in high-trust countriesboth for listed and
for unlisted ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 10.a. Firm leverage increases more with growth opportunities if trust
is higher.
Hypothesis 10.b. The correlation eﬀect of growth is stronger for the subsample
of unlisted than for listed ﬁrms.
Proﬁtability. Low-trust countries are associated with high costs in external ﬁ-
nancing due to asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. Therefore,
in these countries, proﬁtable ﬁrms have a particularly strong incentive to substitute
external with internal funds. Especially for unlisted ﬁrms with limited access to
external equity, such a substitution of predominantly debt-type external funds with
equity-type internal funds should decrease leverage.
Hypothesis 11.a. Firm leverage decreases less with proﬁtability if trust is higher.
Hypothesis 11.b. The correlation eﬀect of proﬁtability is stronger for the sub-
sample of unlisted than for listed ﬁrms.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Firm-Level Data
At the ﬁrm level, I use information on balance sheets and income statements of
individual ﬁrms from the AMADEUS (Analyze Major Database from European
Sources) database, collected by Bureau van Dijk. I use yearly accounting data
for the ten-year period of 19982007. The ﬁnal sample includes the following 24
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Western and Eastern European countries with suﬃcient relevant accounting infor-
mation: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), the Czech Republic (CZ),
Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary
(HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), the Netherlands (NL),
Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), the Slovak Republic
(SK), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES), Switzerland (CH), the United Kingdom (GB).
This database has several advantages over more commonly used databases.
It covers not only large-listed, but also small-unlisted ﬁrms. This coverage of
small-unlisted ﬁrms is important for testing the impact of national culture on the
corporate choice of capital structure because national culture may particularly aﬀect
this group. Consequently, I deﬁne leverage in terms of book values of equity and
debt because for the majority of ﬁrms, market values are not available.
In addition, the AMADEUS database provides ownership information. This
information allows a distinction between the groups of national and multinational
ﬁrms, for which national culture may have a distinct impact on leverage (cf. Hypo-
thesis 1). Whether separation of national and multinational ownership is relevant,
of course, depends on the extent to which the owners are involved in corporate
decision making. For the majority of privately held ﬁrms in AMADEUS, such an
involvement seems to be at least plausible.15
Also, the database has broad coverage in Eastern Europe, which is important
for my study given its pan-European focus.
However, there are some concerns with respect to the AMADEUS database that
I try to address. Bureau Van Dijk standardizes balance sheet information with the
stated objective of achieving uniformity and enabling cross-border analysis. There
15There are other plausible deﬁnitions of a multinational ﬁrm as well: Ramirez and Tadesse
(2007) deﬁne multinationality as a sales-side concept and ﬁnd a weaker impact of national culture
on corporate cash holdings for ﬁrms with exposure to diﬀerent cultures and business practices.
Alternatively, with suﬃciently detailed data, one could look at the cultural background of in-
dividual managers that are responsible for the corporate choice of capital structure. Deﬁning
multinationality as an ownership concept, this study emphasizes the (equity) investors' perspective:
A ﬁrm with owners from only one cultural background will let beliefs, shared within this cultural
realm, inﬂuence capital structure more than a ﬁrm with owners from multiple cultural backgrounds.
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is still not a completely uniform classiﬁcation of leverage components, which is of
particular importance for my study. Some countries do not separate ﬁnancial liabili-
ties from other long-term liabilities, which include provisions, and other countries do
not distinguish between long-term and short-term debt. Therefore, in order to avoid
country-speciﬁc classiﬁcation biases I base my analysis on the broad classiﬁcation
of total leverage, i.e., total liabilities divided by total assets.
Some countries do not report certain ﬁrm characteristics. If that concerns crucial
ﬁrm characteristics (such as the year of incorporation of the ﬁrm), a country that
does not report such a ﬁrm characteristic (in this case Slovenia) has to be ex-
cluded. If that only refers to characteristics of secondary importance, the respective
ﬁrm characteristics are excluded. There is, for instance, only little information on
depreciation in Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Latvia. Consequently, if I include
depreciation as a measure of non-debt tax shield in the analysis, then I create a
country-selection bias. Therefore, diﬀerently from Giannetti (2003), I do not control
for non-debt tax shield.
Given that AMADEUS has broad coverage throughout Europe even for small-
unlisted ﬁrms, the quality of the data will naturally depend both on the quality
of the accounting standards in the particular country and on the size of the ﬁrm
(because this usually determines disclosure requirements). I address these problems
in three ways:
 Even though I explicitly want to include small ﬁrms, I impose minimum size
requirements. I use the top ﬁrm sample that includes all ﬁrms that satisfy one
of three size requirements: more than 150 employees, more than 15 million
¿ operating revenue, or more than 30 million ¿ total assets (for the U.K.,
Germany, France, and Italy), and for all other countries, 100, 10 million, and
20 million ¿, respectively.
 The accounting standards of countries are likely to converge in the advent of
an accession to the EU (Day and Taylor, 2005). Therefore, I only take current
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EU member states (plus Switzerland and Norway) to minimize concerns about
diﬀerences in international accounting data.
 I winsorize the data at the 1% level to avoid that the results are driven by
certain erroneous data points.
Table II.2, Panel A deﬁnes all the ﬁrm-level variables in this study in detail. Table
II.3 compares the number of ﬁrms in the original AMADEUS sample with the
number of ﬁrms that satisfy the requirements to be included in the ﬁnal sample
of this study. Table II.4 presents the statistics on leverage and ﬁrm characteristics
across countries.
[Insert Table II.2 about here.]
[Insert Table II.3 about here.]
[Insert Table II.4 about here.]
3.2 Country-Level Data
At the country level, I use cultural data on trust, and religious upbringing, as well
as data on institutions as control variables.
Cultural data has been collected in four waves of surveys by the World Value
Studies (WVS), from 19811984 (ﬁrst wave) to 19992004 (fourth wave). My
measure of trust aggregates the answers of inhabitants j of a particular country
c to the following survey question: Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
If an individual answers that most people can be trusted, the answer is coded as
1. If the individual answers that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people,
the answer is coded as 0. The measure of trust at the country level is deﬁned as
the average over the individual trust-answers within one country for all four waves
(1981-2004): trustc =
1
J
j=J∑
j=1
trustj. Consequently, 0 ≤ trustc ≤ 1.
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For example, the measure of 34% for Germany indicates that 34% of the German
respondents answer yes to the question whether, generally speaking, they would
say that most people can be trusted. Table II.5 presents the trust-values across
countries, as well as the mean and standard deviation of country-level trust over all
24 countries in this sample.
[Insert Table II.5 about here.]
In addition to trust, I use data on the religious upbringing of individuals within a
country. The variable raised measures the percentage of people that have been raised
religiously in a particular country. Table II.2, Panel B summarizes the deﬁnitions
of the cultural variables. Table II.1 shows the minimum, maximum, and standard
deviation of these cultural variables.
This study is restrained to Western and Eastern European countries: Europe
oﬀers great cultural variation and economic proximity. Table II.1 documents that
the cultural variation within the sample is relatively large: Compared to the entire
WVS sample, which includes more than 80 countries world-wide, the variation in
my European subsample of only 24 countries (measured as the standard deviation or
as the distance between the minimum and maximum observation) is still reasonably
high.
In addition to cultural data, I use several measures of the degree of ﬁnancial
development as well as on general economic conditions of a country from the World
Development Indicators, provided by the World Bank. These measures are available
on a yearly basis for most countries and for most years.
Data on creditor protection and law enforcement is taken from the working paper
version of Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Their index on creditor rights
follows that by La Porta et al. (1998), but is also available for Eastern European
countries: It ranges from zero (weak creditor rights) to four (strong creditor rights)
and integrates the following aspects: (1) restrictions to ﬁle for reorganization; (2)
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ability of secured creditors to seize their collateral after approval of the reorganiza-
tion petition; (3) pay-out preference for secured creditors in the case of liquidation;
(4) management retaining administration of property pending the resolution of the
reorganization. In addition, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) provide cross-
country data on contract enforcement, measured as the number of days needed to
resolve a payment dispute through the courts.
Table II.2, Panel B deﬁnes the legal rules, measures of the degree of ﬁnancial
development and of general economic conditions at the country level. For all country-
level factors, I use average values over all sample years (19982007) where data is
available in the baseline regression, but provide robustness tests with predetermined
country-level variables in Subsection 5. Table II.5 presents the respective values of
these variables across countries, as well as the mean and standard deviation over all
24 countries in this sample.
3.3 Methods
I follow Giannetti (2003) in applying a two-stage procedure to measure the direct
eﬀect of trust on the core leverage of a ﬁrm (level eﬀect), and to measure the
correlation eﬀect, i.e., the indirect eﬀect of trust on the way in which certain ﬁrm
characteristics impact leverage.
At the ﬁrst stage, I regress corporate leverage on the selected ﬁrm characteristics
and the interactions between these ﬁrm characteristics and the country-level measure
of trust. I employ a panel regression that exploits the time-series as well as the cross-
sectional variation in the data. For each ﬁrm i, I estimate ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects (αi).
16
Estimating ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects has the advantage that I control for time-invariant
diﬀerences across ﬁrms that are not observed. Thus, the core leverage of a ﬁrm
(αi) captures its average internal funding capacity that depends on the historical
16A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the random eﬀects estimator is consistent
at the 1% signiﬁcance level. In addition, the null hypothesis that the individual ﬁxed eﬀects are
jointly nonsigniﬁcant is rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level (F-test).
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proﬁts of the ﬁrm even before it has entered the data set. Further, ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects
control for eventual data problems due to potential cross-country diﬀerences in the
deﬁnitions of balance sheet items in AMADEUS. Even if there are cross-country
biases in the way in which certain items are treated, they are unlikely to vary over
time. In addition, according to empirical evidence on corporate capital structure,
ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects explain a large proportion of a ﬁrm's leverage that is unrelated
to agency problems and problems of asymmetric information, for which I need to
control. In particular, ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects capture a ﬁrm's industry classiﬁcation.17
The interactions between relevant ﬁrm characteristics and trust describe the
time-variant eﬀects of trust on corporate leverage. These eﬀects indicate the chan-
nels through which trust impacts leverage, namely by weakening the impact of ﬁrm
characteristics that are related to agency problems and problems of asymmetric
information. In the baseline speciﬁcation, I explain ﬁrm leverage with the ﬁrm
characteristics of age, the proportion of intangible assets to total assets, growth
opportunities, and proﬁtability as well as with the interaction between these ﬁrm
characteristics and trust. In addition, I control for size and squared ﬁrm age (to
account for non-linearity), estimating the following regression:
leverageit =
ageit + age²it + intangit + growthit + profitit + sizeit
+ trustc ∗ ageit + trustc ∗ intangit + trustc ∗ growthit + trustc ∗ profitit + αi + εit.
(II.1)
After estimating the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects are recovered as αˆi =
y¯i − βˆx¯i, where y¯i and x¯i are time averages of the dependent and independent
variables for a particular ﬁrm. Firm-ﬁxed eﬀects (αi) reﬂect the time-invariant core
leverage of a particular ﬁrm. Therefore, at the second stage, I regress using ordinary
17Frank and Goyal (2009) ﬁnd that a ﬁrm's industry already explains 19% of the variation in
leverage, while the additional 35 factors typically used to explain leverage only add another 17%
to the cumulative R².
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least squares αi on country-level trust, as well as on a dummy for being listed on
the stock market, while controlling for other time-invariant characteristics (xi) at
the country level. In addition, I control for industry dummies. The OLS results as:
αi = listedi + trusti + xi + ηi. (II.2)
4 Results
4.1 Within-Country Analysis
For each country, I regress leverage on a selection of ﬁrm characteristics using
ordinary least squares. Panel A of Table II.6 presents the detailed results per
country. Panel B of Table II.6 aggregates the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrm characteristics
over countries.
[Insert Table II.6 about here.]
Panel A of Table II.6 shows the proportion of the variation in leverage that is
explained by the linear combination of the selected ﬁrm characteristics. It varies
considerably across countries. While the average adjusted R² is 16% (cf. Panel B of
Table II.6), it is relatively low in Germany and Norway at 2% and 4%, respectively,
and relatively high for countries such as Estonia and Romania at 31% and 27%,
respectively.
The within-country results partly conﬁrm the hypotheses (3.a to 7.b) as regards
the selected ﬁrm characteristics that are associated with the extent of agency prob-
lems and problems of asymmetric information.
Firm age. Firm age has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on leverage in most
countries, but squared ﬁrm age (that accounts for a non-linear inﬂuence) only in few.
In most of the countries (87%), leverage decreases with ﬁrm age for the subsample
of unlisted ﬁrms. This evidence supports the substitution-hypothesis (Hypothesis
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3.a) that older ﬁrms substitute external with internal ﬁnancing; given that these
unlisted ﬁrms have only limited access to external equity, such a substitution tends
to decrease leverage. In contrast, only 46% of countries show a negative coeﬃcient for
ﬁrm age in the subsample of listed ﬁrms, in accordance with Hypotheses 3.b. Given
the access of listed ﬁrms to external equity markets, the substitution of external with
internal funds seems to have a less uniform prediction for leverage in this subsample.
In accordance with the reputation-hypothesis (Hypothesis 4), the squared term is
negative in most countries for the subsample of unlisted ﬁrms (83%): Suﬃciently
mature ﬁrms can use their reputation of being a good borrower to increase leverage.
For the subsample of listed ﬁrms, only 46% of countries show a positive sign. In
the whole sample, the standard deviation for age is 22 years. Over all countries,
leverage decreases on average by 9.87 percentage points if ﬁrm age increases by one
standard deviation.
Intangible assets. The impact of the proportion of intangible assets on leverage is
inconsistent across countries: in 71% of countries, it is positive; in 29% of countries,
it is negative. Such cross-country diﬀerences might be partially due to cross-country
diﬀerences in accounting rules: in some countries (especially in German civil law
countries), the balance-sheet item intangible assets does not include capitalized
advertising and R & D expenses.18 The degree of the positive sign of the coeﬃcient
for intangible assets is still surprising and refutes Hypothesis 5. The argument that a
positive correlation may be due to the fact that ﬁrms can only capitalize intangible
assets that they have acquired (predominantly by debt ﬁnancing) still does not
answer the question why of all countries Germany has a negative sign. Overall, the
results of the within-country analysis concerning the proportion of intangible assets
are inconclusive.
18In the later panel regression across countries with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, such measurement concerns
are reduced because ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects control for time-invariant cross-sectional diﬀerences, such as
the measurement of intangible assets.
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Growth opportunities. In 96% of countries, growth opportunities have a sig-
niﬁcant and positive impact on leverage for the subsample of unlisted ﬁrms, but
only in 67% of countries for the subsample of listed ﬁrms. Such a predominantly
positive sign, particularly for unlisted ﬁrms, supports Hypotheses 6.a. and 6.b. It
can be explained by an increased demand for external ﬁnancing in ﬁrms with high
growth opportunities. Unlisted ﬁrms have only limited access to external equity
markets and, therefore, satisfy their external ﬁnancing needs predominantly using
external debt ﬁnancing.
The average (and median) ﬁrm in the whole sample increases leverage by 5.55
percentage points if the growth rate of operating revenues increases by one standard
deviation.
Proﬁtability. The impact of ﬁrm proﬁtability on leverage is relatively consistent
across countries: As expected (cf. Hypothesis 7.a), all coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level with a negative sign, albeit of diﬀerent magnitude, both
for the subsample of unlisted and for the subsample of listed ﬁrms, hence, there is
no clear empirical support for Hypothesis 7.b. Firm proﬁtability increases internal
funds and, therefore, the ﬁrm's ability to substitute (equity- or debt-type) exter-
nal with (equity-type) internal funds, as suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984)'s
pecking-order theory. The pecking-order theory isin the ﬁrst placea funding
theory without clear prediction for a ﬁrm's static capital structure. However, in my
sample, the majority of ﬁrms are privately held. These ﬁrms have only limited access
to external equity ﬁnancing (for instance, via venture capital or private equity) and,
hence, they have to rely predominantly on external debt ﬁnancing if internal funds
are scarce. Therefore, the substitution of internal for external ﬁnancing materializes
in a decrease in leverage. If proﬁtability increases by one standard deviation, for
listed ﬁrms leverage decreases on average by 6.50 percentage points, and for unlisted
ﬁrm by 8.18 percentage points.
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Control variable: Firm size. I include ﬁrm size as a control variable, albeit
there is no unique prediction about the link between size and leverage (cf. Frank and
Goyal, 2007). Most empirical studies ﬁnd a positive impact of size on leverage (cf.
e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2007; Giannetti, 2003). This impact supports the idea that
larger ﬁrms are more creditworthy because size represents lower risk or ﬁrm visibility.
There are considerable cross-country diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients for size, both in
terms of statistical signiﬁcance and in the sign of the coeﬃcient. Without controlling
for ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects (as done in the later panel regression), these diﬀerences could
be due to diﬀerent accounting rules that apply for large compared to small ﬁrms.
4.2 Cross-Country Analysis
The within-country analysis uncovers substantial diﬀerences in the impact of ﬁrm
characteristics on leverage across countries.
A comprehensive analysis within a cross-country panel is necessary in order to
answer two questions: Does trust impact the core leverage of a ﬁrm (measured as
the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect in the panel regression)? Does trust impact the way in which
ﬁrm characteristics that are related to agency problems and problems of asymmetric
information impact leverage?
4.2.1 The Level Eﬀect
In order to address the ﬁrst question (level eﬀect), I analyze the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects
from the panel regression (αi). The αi captures the ﬁrm-speciﬁc inﬂuences on
leverage that are invariant over time. Table II.7 presents the results from a regression
of core leverage on trust and various time-invariant ﬁrm or country characteristics,
using OLS. All speciﬁcations control for industry dummies.
[Insert Table II.7 about here.]
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In speciﬁcation 1 of Table II.7, core leverage is regressed on trust and a dummy
for being listed. In accordance with Hypothesis 2, trust decreases the core leverage
of a ﬁrm by 1.96 percentage points if the measure of country-level trust increases by
14 percentage points. This is the standard deviation of trust that is equivalent to
the diﬀerence in trust-levels between the low-trust country of Portugal and the high-
trust country of Bulgaria. This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcantly stronger for listed
ﬁrms with easier access to external equity markets compared to unlisted ﬁrms. The
interaction between country-level trust and the dummy for being listed is statistically
signiﬁcant and negative (cf. speciﬁcation 2 in Table II.7).19 In summary, ﬁrms in
countries with high levels of trust choose lower core leverage than their counterparts
in low-trust countries. This empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 2.
Deﬁning cultural boundaries as country boundaries, my analysis is prone to the
accusation that other factors at the country level might drive the results instead
of trust. In order to show that culture supersedes these alternative factors, it is
necessary to control for them. Among others, Giannetti (2003) shows that legal
rules and the degree of ﬁnancial development of a country play an important role in
determining the extent of agency problems. More precisely, Giannetti (2003) argues
that corporate leverage is higher in countries with high protection for creditor rights
along with good contract enforcement that eases ex ante contractibility; that leverage
increases with high bond market capitalization, which makes external debt ﬁnancing
available at reasonable costs; as well as with a high corporate tax rate due to the
associated tax advantages of debt ﬁnancing. In contrast, high stock market capitali-
zation is associated with lower leverage because it makes external equity ﬁnancing
available. Booth et al. (2001) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999assessing
the impact of diﬀerent institutions across countries on capital structureemphasize
the role of the following factors: the degree of development of the ﬁnancial system
(size and activity measures), protection of investor rights along with legal eﬃciency
19The eﬀect of the ﬁrm characteristic of being listed alone stays negative, but becomes statisti-
cally nonsigniﬁcant.
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(e.g., enforceability of contracts), inﬂation, economic growth, government subsidies
to certain industries, and tax rates. Therefore, I include proxies for the degree
of development of the ﬁnancial system (stock and bond market capitalization),
protection of creditor rights along with the enforceability of contracts, inﬂation,
gross domestic product, and the corporate tax rate.20
Even if I control for these alternative factors of inﬂuence at the country level
(cf. speciﬁcations 4 to 8 of Table II.7), the impact of trust on the core leverage
of a ﬁrm stays statistically signiﬁcant and positive. Of these control factors, only
the measures of contract enforcement, bond market development, GDP, as well as
inﬂation turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant.
4.2.2 The Correlation Eﬀect
For the second question outlined in the beginning of Subsection 4.2 (correlation
eﬀect), I analyze the coeﬃcients of the time-variant interactions between trust and
ﬁrm age, the proportion of intangible assets, growth opportunities, and proﬁtability.
To the extent that these ﬁrm characteristics are related to agency problems and
problems of asymmetric information, their impact is deemed weaker in countries
with high levels of trust than in countries with low levels of trust.
Table II.8 presents the results from the panel regression with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects
with and without interactions with trust (speciﬁcations 1 and 2, respectively), as
well as separately for certain subsamples of ﬁrms (speciﬁcations 3-6).
[Insert Table II.8 about here.]
For the whole sample, all interaction terms between trust and the ﬁrm charac-
teristics that are related to agency problems or problems of asymmetric information
20From a theoretical point of view, using the marginal corporate tax rate is only appropriate
for corporations. For private companies, personal tax rates should be used with potentially
diﬀerent incentives for corporate capital structure. Given the diﬃculties associated with including
personal tax rates (for instance due to progression in most national tax codes) and the statistically
nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for the corporate tax rate, I do not distinguish between personal and
corporate tax rates.
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are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level with the expected signs. These signiﬁcant
results conﬁrm the predictions of Hypotheses 8.a, 9, 10.a, and 11.a: Trust indeed
changes the way in which certain ﬁrm characteristics impact leverage. In particular,
ﬁrm characteristics that explain leverage with reference to agency problems and
problems of asymmetric information have a weaker impact on leverage in high-trust
countries as compared to low-trust countries. Also, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between certain subsamples of ﬁrms, especially between national and multinational
ﬁrms (speciﬁcations 3 and 4 in Table II.8): While all trust-related interaction terms
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the national subsample, the interaction
term with the proportion of intangible assets loses its statistical signiﬁcance in the
multinational subsample. This provides some empirical support for Hypothesis 1.
Furthermore, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between listed and unlisted ﬁrms as
formulated in Hypotheses 8.b, 10.b, and 11.b.
The results allow detailed conclusions about the ways in which trust changes the
impact of age, intangibility, growth opportunities, and proﬁtability on leverage.
Firm age. Age can represent a ﬁrm's external funding deﬁcit as old ﬁrms are able
to substitute external with internally accumulated funds. The results for the whole
sample support this prediction, formulated in Hypothesis 8.a. This substitution
turns out to have clear implications for corporate leverage only for the subsample of
unlisted ﬁrms that seem to rely more on debt ﬁnancing to cover an external funding
deﬁcit (cf. speciﬁcation 5 in Table II.8). In contrast, for listed ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient is
not statistically signiﬁcant (cf. speciﬁcation 6). This evidence supports Hypothesis
8.b. Trust reduces the costs of external ﬁnancing and makes the substitution of
external for internal funds less necessary in the ﬁrst place. Consequently, for unlisted
ﬁrms leverage decreases less with ﬁrm age if trust is higher.21 If ﬁrm age increases by
one standard deviation, the low-trust country of Portugal and the high-trust country
21A t-statistics of 3.6 indicates a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the regression coeﬃcients
for ﬁrm age between these two subsamples at the 1% level (one-sided t-test).
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of Bulgaria display a diﬀerence in levels of leverage of 2.06 percentage points.
Intangible assets. In high-trust countries, ﬁrms can use debt ﬁnancing even with
a high proportion of intangible assets, i.e., trust substitutes for collateral value. In
accordance with Hypothesis 9, an increase in intangibility and country-level trust
by one standard deviation increases leverage by 0.21 percentage points.
Growth opportunities. Trust mitigates the costs for external ﬁnancing. These
reduced costs favor particularly high-growth ﬁrms that are characterized both by an
external ﬁnancing deﬁcit and by high agency costs of debt. In support of Hypothesis
10.a, the interaction term between trust and growth opportunities has a positive
impact on leverage. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level only for the subsample of unlisted ﬁrms, while it is statistically
nonsigniﬁcant for the subsample of listed ﬁrms (cf. Hypothesis 10.b). Depending on
country-level trust, the overall impact of growth on ﬁrm leverage can be positive or
negative: A one-standard-deviation increase in the growth rate of operating revenues
(which represents growth opportunities) decreases leverage by 0.12 percentage points
in the low-trust country of Portugal, and increases leverage by 0.36 percentage points
in the high-trust country of Bulgaria.
Proﬁtability. According to Myers and Majluf (1984)'s pecking-order theory, pro-
ﬁtable ﬁrms should substitute external funds for internal funds. To the extent that
ﬁrms predominantly substitute external debt ﬁnancing with equity-type internal
funds, this ﬁnancing theory implies a decrease in corporate leverage. Trust decreases
the costs of external ﬁnancing and, hence, makes this substitution less necessary in
the ﬁrst place. The results for the whole sample support this prediction, formulated
in Hypothesis 11.a. In particular for unlisted ﬁrms with limited access to external
equity markets, the interaction between trust and proﬁtability has a statistically
signiﬁcant and positive impact on leverage: An increase of one standard deviation
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in proﬁtability and country-level trust increases leverage by 0.74 percentage points.
The impact is stronger for unlisted ﬁrms, namely 0.75 percentage points compared
to 0.46 percentage points for listed ﬁrms (in accordance with Hypothesis 11.b).22
Control Variables. Firm-ﬁxed eﬀects capture the direct impact of legal or ﬁnan-
cial institutions on leverage, except if there are changes over time. Therefore, in
this ﬁrst-stage panel regression I have to control mainly for those legal or ﬁnancial
institutions that aﬀect leverage through the same ﬁrm characteristics as trust (age,
intangibility, growth opportunities, proﬁtability) by mitigating agency problems or
problems of asymmetric information, and are, in addition, correlated with trust.
Giannetti (2003) ﬁnds that institutions do not only impact the core leverage of a
ﬁrm, but also aﬀect the way in which traditional ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence capital
structure. In particular, her results suggest that interactions between intangibility
and creditor rights, between growth opportunities and stock market development,
and between ﬁrm age and bond market development are drivers of corporate lever-
age. Therefore, I control for these interaction terms. Table II.9 shows the time-
variant results with control variables.
[Insert Table II.9 about here.]
Even if I control for these alternative interaction terms (cf. speciﬁcation 2 in
Table II.9), all trust-related interaction terms stay statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level with the expected signs. The interactions with legal and ﬁnancial institutions,
by contrast, lose some statistical signiﬁcance due to the inclusion of the trust-related
interactions. Hence, the trust-related interactions outperform the interactions with
institutional factors in terms of statistical signiﬁcance. In addition, the diﬀerence
between national and multinational ﬁrms becomes more evident after controlling
for these alternative factors at the country level: In contrast to the subsample of
22A t-statistics of 2.5 indicates that the coeﬃcient for the subsample of unlisted ﬁrms is statis-
tically signiﬁcantly larger (at the 1% level) than for the subsample of listed ﬁrms.
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national ﬁrms and in accordance with Hypothesis 1, the trust-related interaction
terms lose some statistical signiﬁcance in the subsample of multinational ﬁrms (cf.
speciﬁcations 4 and 5 in Table II.9).
More precisely, Giannetti (2003) argues that ﬁrms with a high proportion of
intangible assets have less access to debt ﬁnancing in countries with poor creditor
protection. However, the coeﬃcient of the interaction between creditor rights and
the proportion of intangible assets is statistically nonsigniﬁcant both without (cf.
speciﬁcation 1) and with (cf. speciﬁcation 2) the trust-related interaction terms.
In addition, Giannetti (2003) argues that a well-capitalized stock market favors
unlisted companies with high growth opportunities by the availability of more credit.
The positive coeﬃcient of the interaction between growth opportunities and stock
market development (cf. speciﬁcation 1) might in fact represent the positive coef-
ﬁcient of the interaction between growth opportunities and trust if stock markets
develop primarily in high-trust countries. However, the interaction between growth
opportunities and stock market capitalization becomes statistically nonsigniﬁcant if
I include the trust-related interaction terms (cf. speciﬁcation 2), while the trust-
related interaction terms stay statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Next, Giannetti (2003) argues that ﬁrms can exploit their reputation (measured
by ﬁrm age) to increase leverage only in countries with well-capitalized bond mar-
kets. The interaction between ﬁrm age and bond market capitalization is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, butin contrast to the prediction by Giannetti (2003)suggests a
negative impact on corporate leverage. It stays statistically signiﬁcant and negative
after including the trust-related interaction terms (cf. speciﬁcation 2). Trust does
not only aﬀect the way in which relevant ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence leverage. In
addition, trust serves as a substitute or complement to institutions and also aﬀects
the way in which these country-level factors inﬂuence leverage. I include the interac-
tions between trust, institutions and relevant ﬁrm characteristics in speciﬁcation 3.
It turns out thatdepending on country-level trustthe interaction between ﬁrm
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age and bond market development can be positive (as predicted by Giannetti, 2003)
or negative. It is positive in the low-trust country of Portugal and negative in the
high-trust country of Bulgaria.23
In summary, trust aﬀects the way in which traditional ﬁrm characteristics in-
ﬂuence capital structure.
5 Robustness Tests
5.1 Endogeneity Concerns
Deriving measures of country-level trust from survey evidence on the current levels
of trust may raise endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality because the level
of trust that individuals express in the interview situation may not be exogenous.
Instead, current economic conditions can impact individuals' answers about their
general trust with respect to others. Such economic conditions, in turn, may
be inﬂuenced by corporate capital structure decisions because increased corporate
leverage can cause an increased number of bankruptcies and, as a consequence,
ﬁnancial crises. In such economic circumstances, individuals may be more cautious
about whom to trust. However, such concerns of reverse causality are moderate
because a single ﬁrm's capital structure has only a small impact on the country-level
phenomenon of trust. Giannetti (2003) even argues that country-level factors are
certainly exogenous with respect to the individual ﬁrm. In addition, the endogeneity
concern is moderate because measures of trust are relatively stable over time as Table
II.10 shows.
[Insert Table II.10 about here.]
23These interaction terms between trust, institutions and the relevant ﬁrm characteristics should
be interpreted with caution, given that the degree of ﬁnancial development may not be regarded as
exogenous with respect to corporate leverage and, in addition, legal rules are likely to be correlated
with country-level trust.
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The endogeneity concern might be due to omitted variables that are both cor-
related with the dependent variable (corporate leverage) and with the explanatory
variable (country-level trust). Such omitted variables might consist of additional
legal or ﬁnancial institutions that the empirical literature has not yet identiﬁed as
drivers of capital structure.
5.2 Data and Methods
I address the endogeneity concerns in two ways: Concerning the issue of reverse
causality, I carry out the same analysis as before using predetermined values of trust
(andas far as availablepredetermined values of institutions) reasoning that con-
temporaneous corporate capital structure choices do not impact past country-level
variables. As regards the issue of omitted variables, I use an instrumental-variable
approach to separate the persistent, culturally inherited, exogenous variation in
trust. This exogenous component of trust is neither caused by the contemporaneous
choice of capital structure, nor by omitted institutional variables at the country
level. What is more, if one argues that such alternative institutional factors drive
the capital structure decisions instead of trust, one still has to argue why these
alternative institutional factors diﬀer across countries as they themselves are subject
to choices by politicians or due to economic developments (cf. the questions outlined
in Section 1). The culturally inherited component of trust, to the contrary, may even
be the root of changes in such institutional factors, but (at least within a reasonable
period of time) not vice versa.
5.2.1 Predetermined-Value Approach
Instead of aggregating individual trust-answers over all available waves from the
WVS, I only use the earliest available wave for each country because trust enters the
regression as the independent variable (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006). The
concern with this procedure is thatdue to limited data availabilitypredetermined
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trust-measures cover diﬀerent periods of time for diﬀerent countries (see Table
II.10 for country coverage in the diﬀerent WVS waves). This may create certain
distortions.
The endogeneity concern with respect to the measures of institutions, in particular
with respect to the degree of ﬁnancial development, is greater by far than that with
respect to trust: Bond and stock market development does not only determine ﬁrm-
level leverage, but vice versa, corporate leverage also determines the current bond
and stock market capitalization of a particular country. Therefore, analogously to
trust, I use predetermined values of bond and stock market development (values from
the year 1997). This procedure may not entirely dismiss the endogeneity concern
with respect to these measures of the degree of ﬁnancial development. However, the
impact of ﬁnancial development on corporate leverage is not the main interest of my
study. Measures of ﬁnancial development are only included to show that the eﬀect
that I attribute to country-level trust is not driven by the degree of ﬁnancial market
development, as suggested by Giannetti (2003).
5.2.2 Instrumental-Variable Approach
In an instrumental-variable approach, I separate two components of country-level
trust: The ﬁrst one is the persistent, exogenous component of beliefs and values,
which Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003 and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006
deﬁne as culture, namely the inherited beliefs and values that are transmitted fairly
unchanged from generation to generation. The second component is individual-
speciﬁc and changes over time, and hence might be subject to endogeneity concerns.
The literature shows that religious views and practices change only slowly over
time and have a relatively stable impact on individual beliefs and values even if they
change. The impact of religion persists even though religious views have changed
after a religious reform (Botticini and Eckstein, 2005; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2003), or even though individuals lose their faith (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
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2003). In particular, religious views and practices have been shown to impact trust.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) ﬁnd evidence that a religious upbringing as well
as regular attendance at religious services signiﬁcantly increase the level of trust in
general, but ﬁnd a diﬀerent impact for diﬀerent religious denominations. Religious
views and practices have not only a persistent impact on trust, but they also diﬀer
widely across countries. Therefore, religion can serve as an instrument to separate
the inherited, exogenous component of country-level trust from the endogenously
chosen component.
Religious practices, such as attendance at services, might be subject to similar
endogeneity concerns as trust. Therefore, I choose the percentage of people in
a country that have been raised religiously as an instrument because people have
little impact on their religious upbringing. Therefore, the reverse causality argument
does not apply and the variation in religious upbringing is exogenous with respect
to corporate leverage, at least over one generation, which is certainly suﬃcient for
my analysis.
The percentage of people in a particular country that have been brought up
religiously is only a good instrument (z) for country-level trust if it satisﬁes two
requirements: It has to be strongly correlated with the deemed endogenous trust-
covariates (x): cov(x; z) > 0.24 In addition, it has to be uncorrelated with the
residuals from the ﬁrm-level leverage regression (u): cov(z, u) = 0.25
In order to judge whether the instruments are weak, I perform ﬁrst-stage under-
24In the OLS analyzing time-invariant eﬀects, the endogenous covariate is country-level trust. In
the panel-regression analyzing time-variant eﬀects, the endogenous covariates are the interactions
between country-level trust and the relevant ﬁrm characteristics.
25In the time-invariant analysis, I perform a χ²- test of the endogeneity of trust. The test statistic
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the two Sargan-Hansen test statistics; one for the equation with
endogenous regressors, and one for the equation with exogenous regressors. Unlike the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test, it is robust with respect to violations of conditional homoskedasticity. The
null hypothesis that the speciﬁed endogenous regressors can be treated as exogenous is rejected
(p-value=0.000). In the time-variant analysis, I also perform a χ²- test for the endogeneity of
the interaction terms between trust and the ﬁrm characteristics of age, intangibility, growth
opportunities, and proﬁtability. The null hypothesis that the speciﬁed endogenous regressors
can be treated as exogenous is rejected (p-value=0.000). The instrumental-variable analysis is,
therefore, reasonable.
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and weak-identiﬁcation tests, both for the time-invariant and for the time-variant
analysis. I carry out the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)-Lagrange-multiplier χ²- test as
the adequate under-identiﬁcation test in a case where error terms are assumed not to
be independent and identically distributed.26 Further, I carry out the Wald-F -test
by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) as the adequate weak-identiﬁcation test.
In the time-invariant analysis that assesses the level eﬀect of trust, I can reject
the null hypothesis of under-identiﬁcation (p-value = 0.000). The F -statistic of the
weak-identiﬁcation test by far exceeds the critical value suggested by Stock and Yogo
(2005). In the time-variant analysis that assesses the correlation eﬀect of trust, I
can also reject the null hypothesis of under-identiﬁcation (p-value = 0.000). The
F -statistic of the weak-identiﬁcation test is considerably large, although I cannot
compare it to the Stock and Yogo (2005) cut-oﬀ values because they do not provide
such values for more than three endogenous regressors.
The statistical rejection of the under- and weak-identiﬁcation tests alone is not
enough to preclude that the instruments are weak. In addition, there are economic
arguments. The literature on religion and trust shows that some proportion of the
variation in observed beliefs and values, in particular of trust, is culturally inherited
and can be explained by the persistent impact of religious views and practices (cf.
e.g., Botticini and Eckstein, 2005; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003). Together
with the unambiguous econometric test results, I can conﬁdently conclude that the
instruments are not weak.
The exclusion restriction cannot be tested formally in these regressions (e.g., with
a test of overidentifying restrictions) because they are just identiﬁed, which means
that the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous covariates.
From an economic point of view, it might indeed be doubtful whether religious
upbringing impacts corporate leverage only through its impact on trust. Using
religious upbringing instead of, e.g., current religiosity, the instrumental-variable
26The more commonly used Lagrange-multiplier-test by Anderson (1951) assumes i.i.d. error
terms.
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approach is less prone to the accusation that contemporaneous religiosity directly
impacts the choice of leverage because individuals may have stopped professing their
faith.27 However, there might be other beliefs and values that are driven by religious
upbringing and that areat the same timerelevant for the corporate leverage
decision. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) analyze the impact of religious views
and practices on individual beliefs and values. Most of the beliefs and values that
they relate to religious upbringing, such as intolerance, attitudes towards women,
attitudes towards legal rules, can hardly be argued to impact leverage.
However, there is a value that indeed could be correlated with religiosity and
also impact leverage: risk aversion. There are already studies that explore the link
between religion and risk attitude suggesting a positive impact of religiosity on risk
aversion.28 The evidence on this link is mostly based on current religiosity, rather
than on the instrument that I use, namely religious upbringing. Risk aversion is
not only related to religiosity, but may also be correlated with the corporate choice
of capital structure, although the proxies for business risk are often neglected in
empirical capital structure studies (Booth et al., 2001, as an exception, do include
a proxy for business risk). Also, if risk aversion relates to corporate leverage via the
same ﬁrm characteristics as trust, i.e., via age, intangibility, growth opportunities,
and proﬁtability, then religiosity might drive corporate leverage by impacting risk
aversion in addition to trust. Given the small time-series variation for most of the
ﬁrms in my sample (which is necessary to compute a proxy for a ﬁrm's business risk)
and the yet under-explored link between religious upbringing and current levels of
risk aversion, I cannot convincingly test whether such alternative explanations might
impact the validity of the instruments. Nevertheless, the instrumental-variables
approach is an additional assurance that the results are not driven by endogeneity
27Also, religious upbringing and current religiosity will be correlated.
28Miller and Hoﬀmann (1995), e.g., relate gender diﬀerences in religiosity to gender diﬀerences
in risk aversion and conclude that religious behavior is associated with risk aversion. Hilary and
Hui (2009) show that people who attend church regularly are less likely to accept risky payouts.
Hilary and Hui (2009) even use religiosity as a proxy for risk aversion in order to explain corporate
decisions.
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concerns.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 The Level Eﬀect
Table II.11 shows the results from the robustness test for the time-invariant eﬀects,
both the results using predetermined values of trust (and of measures of the degree of
ﬁnancial development)29 and the results using instrumental variables. The coeﬃcient
for being listed and also the coeﬃcient for trust remain statistically signiﬁcant and
negative, after controlling for other country-level factors. The main insight that the
core leverage of a ﬁrm increases with country-level trust does not seem to be driven
by endogeneity issues.
[Insert Table II.11 about here.]
5.3.2 The Correlation Eﬀect
Table II.12 presents the results from the cross-country panel regression using pre-
determined values of country-level trust (and of measures of the degree of ﬁnancial
development). The impact of country-level trust on corporate leverage is robust
using this variant of the trust-measure.
[Insert Table II.12 about here.]
Table II.13 shows the results from the panel regression using instrumented trust-
covariates.
[Insert Table II.13 about here.]
The impact of trust on corporate leverage is also robust with respect to the
instrumental-variable approach: In countries with higher levels of culturally-inherited
29For creditor rights, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) only provide an aggregate index,
but show that there is relatively little change to creditor rights over the period from 19782004.
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trust (transmitted via religious upbringing), ﬁrm characteristics that are related to
agency problems or problems of asymmetric information have a weaker impact on
corporate leverage than in low-trust countries. With the exception of intangible
assets, the coeﬃcients of the relevant ﬁrm characteristics and the interactions with
trust are similar to the results shown in Subsection 4.2.2, both with respect to their
statistical signiﬁcance and as regards their economic magnitude.30
In summary, the robustness tests provide additional evidence that the main
insights of my study are not driven by endogeneity concerns: Trust decreases the
core leverage of a ﬁrm and weakens the impact of ﬁrm characteristics that are related
to agency problems and problems of asymmetric information on leverage.
6 Conclusion
My study shows that cross-country diﬀerences in trust in part explain the puzzling
diﬀerences in corporate capital structure across countries. Trust impacts the level
of ﬁrm leverage, and also aﬀects the way in which certain ﬁrm characteristics
inﬂuence leverage: Firm leverage is signiﬁcantly lower in countries with high levels of
trust. Furthermore, the inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that are related to agency
problems or problems of asymmetric information (ﬁrm age, intangible assets, growth
opportunities, and proﬁtability) is weaker in countries with high trust as compared
to countries with low trust. My analysis shows that this pattern holds for a data
set comprising large-listed and small-unlisted ﬁrms throughout Europe.
There are, however, some limitations to the results of this study: While this study
is based on abundant data on ﬁrm characteristics, the data on trust is restricted to
24 country observations. Even though this restriction might appear large compared
to other studies (Giannetti, 2003 carries out a comparable cross-country analysis
using only eight countries), it is still vulnerable to the accusation that relatively few
30The impact of the interaction between intangibility and trust remains positive, but loses its
statistical signiﬁcance.
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observations at the country level drive the results. But restraining the analysis to
European countries has decisive beneﬁts: Europe oﬀers wide cultural variety and
at the same timeeconomic proximity. Another limitation refers to the validity of
religious upbringing as an instrument for trust. I am not able to completely dismiss
the concern that religious upbringing also impacts the corporate choice of capital
structure through other cultural beliefs or values, in particular through its impact
on risk aversion.
Based on the results of this study, I have three suggestions for future research:
Following this latter limitation of the results, it would be fruitful to connect other
cultural aspects, such as risk aversion, to the corporate choice of capital structure
by formulating analogous hypotheses about the direct impact of risk aversion on the
level of leverage as well as its indirect impact through relevant ﬁrm characteristics.
Next, I study debt and equity as rather broad categories of ﬁnancing. In particular
for small-unlisted ﬁrms with limited access to external equity markets, the choice
between internal and external ﬁnancing may be a more dominant driver of corporate
leverage than the choice between external debt and external equity. Therefore, it
would be interesting to analyze the eﬀect of trust on ﬁner categories of ﬁnancing
contracts as well. For instance, one could test the impact of trust on the speciﬁc
terms and conditions of debt ﬁnancing contracts, such as covenants. Also, I argue
that trust mitigates agency problems and problems of asymmetric information and,
thereby, aﬀects leverage directly by changing the choice between external debt
and external equity, as well as indirectly, by changing the choice between external
and internal ﬁnancing. While the former channel can adequately be tested with
static capital structure regressions, the latter would be more adequately tested in a
dynamic way. However, for such a test, reliable data on a ﬁrm's external funding
deﬁcit as well as a reasonably large time series would be needed.
Myers (2001) states: There is no universal theory of capital structure, and no
reason to expect one. There are useful conditional theories, however. Each factor
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could be dominant for some ﬁrms or in some circumstances, yet unimportant else-
where. The less likely a universal theory of capital structure is, the more important
it is to explain the conditions under which the theories turn out to be valid, and to
ﬁnd the connecting piece between them. Using trust in explaining corporate capital
structure has proven successful in reconciling some capital structure predictions
with the observed empirical contradictions and contributes to connecting the pieces
of that puzzle.
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Appendix
A Tables
Table II.1: Cultural Variation Within Europe
This table compares the variation of the cultural variables of trust and religious upbringing in the
sample of this studies consisting of 24 Eastern and Western European countries (sample-minimum,
sample-maximum, and sample-standard deviation) with the variation in the whole sample of
countries for which the World Value Studies provide data (minimum, maximum, and standard
deviation).
Variable Min Max Stand.
Dev.
Sample-
Min
Sample-
Max
Sample-
Stand.
Dev.
Trust 5% 65% 13% 15% 64% 14%
Raised 7% 98% 24% 16% 97% 22%
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Table II.3: Number of Firms
This table reports the number of ﬁrms per country used in the ﬁnal sample. It indicates the
proportion of listed as well as the proportion of nationally owned ﬁrms. The number of ﬁrms in
the ﬁnal sample diﬀers from that in the original AMADEUS sample mainly because some ﬁrms do
not provide suﬃcient information on the ﬁrm characteristics required for the econometric analysis.
Country # Firms:
original sample
# Firms:
analysis
% Listed ﬁrms % National ﬁrms
AT 1,887 630 4% 56%
BE 8,929 7,779 1% 64%
BG 1,716 1,086 8% 80%
CH 797 488 34% 61%
CZ 5,344 4,981 0% 88%
DE 16,758 11,181 5% 72%
DK 5,749 3,454 3% 59%
EE 682 647 2% 64%
ES 17,296 15,571 1% 73%
FI 3,295 3,096 4% 74%
FR 25,077 20,894 3% 73%
GB 38,196 22,244 5% 69%
HU 2,441 838 0% 78%
IE 3,805 868 4% 53%
IT 21,776 19,893 1% 63%
LT 820 812 5% 84%
LV 717 715 3% na
NL 10,479 5,529 2% 57%
NO 7,279 5,145 3% 78%
PL 8,023 6,921 2% 74%
PT 3,884 2,968 2% 83%
RO 2,919 2,668 2% 66%
SE 10,283 9,002 3% 73%
SK 1,167 1,121 6% 90%
Total 199,328 148,531 3% 71%
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Table II.4: Statistics: Firm Level
This table reports average values of the selected ﬁrm characteristics. Panel A displays descriptive
statistics for each country of the sample separately. Panel B displays aggregate values (mean and
standard deviation) for the whole sample and also separate for listed and unlisted ﬁrms.
Panel A: Values Per Country
Country Leverage Age Employees Intangibles Growth Proﬁt
AT 65% 28 625 2% 8% 6%
BE 69% 26 190 1% 112% 3%
BG 58% 23 455 1% 24% 4%
CH 30% 57 1478 2% 5% 2%
CZ 55% 10 313 1% 13% 4%
DE 67% 32 837 2% 9% 4%
DK 63% 20 436 2% 11% 6%
EE 56% 13 232 1% 20% 9%
ES 57% 20 389 2% 17% 4%
FI 59% 24 444 2% 13% 7%
FR 71% 26 719 2% 10% 4%
GB 68% 26 1017 2% 11% 5%
HU 60% 11 414 1% 17% 6%
IE 60% 24 577 1% 18% 8%
IT 76% 22 273 2% 13% 2%
LT 54% 9 330 0% 32% 5%
LV 61% 9 337 1% 22% 5%
NL 68% 30 1329 2% 7% 5%
NO 70% 10 134 3% 15% 6%
PL 57% 24 452 1% 12% 4%
PT 67% 26 660 2% 9% 2%
RO 66% 8 504 0% 44% 7%
SE 67% 27 404 1% 14% 5%
SK 56% 11 460 1% 12% 4%
Panel B: Aggregate Values
Country Leverage Age Employees Intangibles Growth Proﬁt
Total 68% 23 605 2% 20% 4%
(Stand. Dev.) 24% 21 916 3% 101% 10%
Listed 56% 35 1806 4% 13% 2%
(Stand. Dev.) 23% 33 2415 4% 76% 11%
Unlisted 68% 23 313 2% 20% 4%
(Stand. Dev.) 24% 20 766 3% 102% 10%
54
Table II.5: Statistics: Country Level
This table describes the country-level factors of inﬂuence used in the empirical analysis. It displays
the baseline measure of trust per country, constructed as the non-weighted average of the individual
trust-answers from the WVS over all available survey waves (ranging from 19802004). It displays
the baseline measures of institutions and economic conditions per country, constructed as the
non-weighted average of the respective measures from 19982007. The total values and standard
deviations refer to the non-weighted average values over the 24 countries in the sample.
Country Trust Credi-
tor
Protec-
tion
Contract
Enforce-
ment
Days
Bond
Market
Capitali-
zation
Stock
Market
Capitali-
zation
Inﬂation Tax
Rate
GDP
per
capita
AT 33% 3 374 72% 25% 1% 33% 24,424
BE 22% 2 112 132% 75% 1% 37% 22,927
BG 31% 2 440 na 10% 7% 21% 1,778
CH 39% 1 170 64% 257% 0% 17% 34,238
CZ 27% 3 300 46% 23% 3% 31% 5,956
DE 34% 3 184 82% 51% 1% 27% 23,257
DK 59% 3 83 166% 61% 2% 31% 30,305
EE 24% na na na 31% 4% 31% 4,981
ES 34% 2 169 73% 81% 3% 35% 14,842
FI 55% 1 240 58% 146% 1% 28% 24,525
FR 23% 0 75 89% 85% 1% 33% 22,809
GB 37% 4 288 48% 152% 2% 30% 25,372
HU 27% 1 365 40% 26% 7% 17% 5,155
IE 41% 1 217 38% 66% 3% 20% 26,862
IT 32% 2 1390 126% 50% 2% 35% 19,264
LT 26% 2 154 na 18% 1% 19% 3,952
LV 21% 3 189 na 9% 3% 21% 4,015
NL 53% 3 48 98% 120% 2% 34% 24,288
NO 64% 2 87 38% 47% 2% 28% 38,542
PL 24% 1 1000 28% 21% 4% 27% 4,723
PT 17% 1 320 69% 44% 2% 31% 10,965
RO 15% 1 335 na 10% 27% 27% 1,934
SE 62% 1 208 86% 115% 1% 28% 28,112
SK 21% 2 565 22% 7% 7% 29% 4,201
Total 35% 1.91 318 72% 64% 4% 28% 16,976
(Stand.
Dev.)
14% 1.00 310 38% 59% 5% 6% 11,548
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Table II.6: Within-Country Results
This table presents the results from the within-country regressions using OLS. Total leverage as
the dependent variable is regressed on ﬁrm age, squared ﬁrm age, a proxy for ﬁrm size, proportion
of intangible assets to total assets, a proxy for growth opportunities, proﬁtability and a constant.
A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table II.2. Panel A gives the detailed
results per country, including the number of ﬁrm-year observations as well as adjusted R² for each
within-country regression. With ***, **, *, I indicate statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively (based on standard errors that have been adjusted to take
into account the potential correlation of errors over time for a given ﬁrm). Panel B aggregates the
results from the within-country regressions: It displays the average adjusted R² and the average
coeﬃcient for each of the ﬁrm characteristics and indicates the percentage of countries that have
a positive sign in the respective coeﬃcient for the whole sample as well as for listed and unlisted
ﬁrms separately.
Panel A: Detailed Results
Country Age Squ.
Age
Size Intan-
gibles
Growth Proﬁt Constant #
Obser-
vations
Adjus-
ted
RSQ
AT 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.32 0.07* -0.56*** 0.70*** 783 0.08
BE 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00 0.38** 0.00 -0.95** 0.77*** 55,271 0.11
BG -0.01** 0.00*** -0.02** 3.40*** 0.04*** -0.75*** 0.82*** 6,271 0.21
CH 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.40** 0.05** -0.36*** 0.59*** 3,180 0.07
CZ -0.01** 0.00** -0.04** 2.14*** 0.08*** -0.95** 0.85*** 27,299 0.17
DE 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.28** 0.02*** -0.24*** 0.67*** 29,758 0.02
DK -0.01** 0.00 0.02*** 0.12 0.04*** -0.76** 0.63*** 11,459 0.17
EE -0.01*** 0.00*** -0.02** 3.05** 0.02*** -0.93** 0.81*** 4,094 0.31
ES -0.01** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.21*** 0.03*** -1.13** 0.73*** 92,972 0.17
FI 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.33*** 0.05*** -0.61*** 0.68*** 19,965 0.12
FR 0.00** 0.00*** 0.02*** -0.58** 0.05*** -1.01** 0.74*** 124,914 0.19
GB -0.01** 0.00*** 0.01*** -0.35*** 0.07*** -0.88** 0.76*** 118,129 0.15
HU -0.02* 0.00 -0.05*** 0.11 0.07*** -0.75*** 0.96*** 1,184 0.18
IE -0.01** 0.00** 0.00 0.23 0.03** -0.74*** 0.77*** 1,178 0.16
IT -0.00** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.02 0.05*** -1.27*** 0.85*** 127,320 0.16
LT -0.01 0.00 -0.05*** 3.84*** 0.15*** -0.73*** 0.90*** 4,257 0.19
LV -0.02** 0.00*** -0.07** 1.59 0.12*** -0.92** 1.08*** 4,805 0.24
NL -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.31** 0.06*** -0.95** 0.77*** 25,738 0.17
NO -0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00** -0.36*** 0.03*** -0.28*** 0.76*** 31,214 0.04
PL -0.01** 0.00*** -0.03*** 1.21*** 0.11*** -0.93** 0.83*** 32,856 0.19
PT -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.51*** 0.05*** -1.14** 0.73*** 1,184 0.18
RO 0.01*** 0.00*** -0.05*** 2.19 0.04*** -0.86*** 1.01*** 17,297 0.27
SE -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00* -0.25*** 0.04*** -0.47** 0.72*** 58,650 0.09
SK -0.01** 0.00 -0.04** 1.53 0.07 -0.81*** 0.85 4,634 0.15
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Panel B: Aggregate Results
Age Squ.
Age
Size Intan
gibles
Growth Proﬁt Constant Adjusted
RSQ
Mean -0.005 0.000 -0.014 0.776 0.055 -0.790 0.790 0.16
Positive
Sign
13% 83% 38% 71% 96% 0% 100%
Positive-
Listed
54% 46% 83% 54% 67% 0% 100%
Positive-
Unlisted
13% 83% 29% 75% 96% 0% 100%
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Table II.9: Time-Variant Results: Control Variables
This table presents the results from the panel regression estimating ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, with total
leverage as the dependent variable. The ﬁrm characteristics of age, squared age, a proxy for size,
proportion of intangible assets to total assets, a proxy for growth opportunities, and proﬁtability are
used as explanatory variables. In addition, various interaction terms between ﬁrm characteristics,
trust, as well as creditor rights and stock and bond market development are included. Speciﬁcations
4 and 5 show separate results for the subsamples of national and multinational ﬁrms. T-statistics
are calculated using standard errors that have been adjusted to take into account the potential
correlation of errors over time for a given ﬁrm. With ***, **, * , I indicate statistical signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
Leverage (1) t-stat (2) t-stat (3) t-stat (4)
Natio-
nal
(5)
Multi-
natio-
nal
Age -0.00*** -13.26 -0.01*** -12.58 -0.02*** -15.67 -0.01*** -0.02***
Squ. Age 0.00*** 17.46 0.00*** 17.45 0.00*** 18.16 0.00*** 0.00***
Size 0.02*** 27.06 0.02*** 26.68 0.02*** 26.62 0.02*** 0.02***
Intangibles 0.15*** 3.77 -0.05 -0.75 -0.35*** -3.34 -0.31*** 0.29
Growth -0.00** -2.54 -0.01*** -12.46 0.00 1.09 -0.01*** -0.01***
Proﬁt -0.53*** -120.29 -0.76*** -60.54 -0.75*** -60.32 -0.77*** -0.75***
Trust*Age 0.00*** 4.65 0.03*** 12.28 0.03*** 0.04**
Trust*Intangibles 0.57*** 4.03 1.48*** 5.25 0.99*** -0.08
Trust*Growth 0.05*** 17.74 0.01 0.72 0.06*** 0.04*
Trust*Proﬁt 0.59*** 19.98 0.58*** 19.63 0.63*** 0.53
Creditor*Intangibles -0.01 -0.43 -0.02 -1.00 0.23*** 3.50 0.01 -0.05***
Stock*Growth 0.01*** 6.49 0.00 1.33 -0.02*** -5.21 -0.00 0.00***
Bond*Age -0.00*** -7.34 -0.00*** -5.79 0.01*** 9.24 0.01*** 0.01**
Bond*Squ. Age 0.00
Trust*Cred*Intang. -0.70*** -3.99
Trust*Stock*Growth 0.06*** 5.90
Trust*Bond*Age -0.04*** -11.73
Constant 0.72*** 210.08 0.72*** 211.47 0.73*** 210.61 0.74*** 0.71
# Observations 772,990 772,990 772,990 414,59 242,076
Adjusted RSQ 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
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Table II.10: Persistence of Cultural Aspects
This table presents the persistence in country-level trust values over time, for each country sepa-
rately. The average country-level measure of trust is based on all available WVS waves. Trust:
Earliest-Latest indicates the diﬀerence (in percentage points) between the country-level measure of
trust based on the earliest available WVS wave and the measure based on the latest available WVS
wave. Ranking: Earliest-Latest indicates the absolute diﬀerence between the ranking position
of the respective country according to the country-level measure of trust based on the earliest
available WVS wave and the measure based on the latest available WVS wave.
Country Waves Trust: Average Trust:
Earliest-Latest
Ranking:
Earliest-Latest
AT 2;4 33% 2% 2
BE 1;2;4 31% 0% 4
BG 2;3;4 29% 4% 2
CH 2;3 39% 6% 0
CZ 2;3;4 27% 3% 2
DE 2;3;4 34% -5% 5
DK 1;2;4 59% -14% 3
EE 2;3;4 24% 4% 1
ES 1;2;3;4 34% -1% 3
FI 2;3;4 55% 5% 3
FR 1;2;4 23% 3% 1
GB 1;2;3;4 37% 14% 3
HU 1;2;3;4 27% 11% 2
IE 1;2;4 41% 5% 0
IT 1;2;4 32% -6% 2
LT 2;3;4 26% 5% 1
LV 2;3;4 21% 2% 2
NL 1;2;4 53% -15% 0
NO 1;2;3 64% -4% 1
PL 2;3;4 24% 13% 0
PT 2;4 17% 9% 0
RO 2;3;4 15% 6% 3
SE 1;2;3;4 62% -10% 0
SK 2;3;4 21% 6% 0
Total 34.6% 1.7% 1.7
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Table II.11: Time-Invariant Results: Predetermined Values and Instrumental
Variables
This table presents the results from the OLS regression with core leverage (the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects
from the previous panel regression) as the dependent variable. As explanatory variables, I include
time-invariant ﬁrm characteristics (a dummy of whether a ﬁrm is listed), country-level trust, as well
as institutions as controls, and interactions between these factors. This table displays the results
for predetermined values of country-level trust (and predetermined values of ﬁnancial development
and economic conditions), and the results for country-level trust, instrumented by the percentage
of people that have been brought up religiously in a country. I include industry dummies in all
speciﬁcations. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors that have been adjusted to take
into account the potential correlation of errors over time for a given country. With ***, **, * , I
indicate statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
Predetermined Values Instrumental Variables
Core Leverage (1) t-stat (2) t-stat
Listed -0.15*** -6.78 -0.15*** -7.28
Trust -0.29*** -6.16 -0.75* -1.78
Creditor 0.00 -0.42 0.01 0.43
Stock 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08
Bond 0.07** 2.44 0.06 1.71
GDP 0.00*** 6.40 0.00** 2.24
Constant -0.14** -2.79 -0.08 -1.05
# Observations 141,127 141,127
Adjusted RSQ 0.11 0.09
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Table II.12: Time-Variant Results: Predetermined Values
This table presents the results from the panel regression estimating ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, with total
leverage as the dependent variable. The ﬁrm characteristics of age, squared age, a proxy for size,
proportion of intangible assets to total assets, a proxy for growth opportunities, and proﬁtability
are used as explanatory variables. Predetermined values of country-level trust (measured as the
country-level aggregate of the individual trust-answers over the earliest available WVS wave) inter-
act with those ﬁrm characteristics that are related to agency problems or problems of asymmetric
information (age, size, intangible assets, growth). In addition, interaction terms between ﬁrm
characteristics and institutions are included as control variables. I use as well predetermined
values of stock and bond market development, measured as the country-level value from the year
prior to the sample period (1997). A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table
II.2. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors that have been adjusted to take into account
the potential correlation of errors over time for a given ﬁrm. With ***, **, * , I indicate statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
Leverage (1) t-stat (2) t-stat
Age -0.01*** -29.00 -0.01*** -16.40
Squ.Age 0.00*** 18.78 0.00*** 17.60
Size 0.02*** 24.34 0.02*** 26.56
Intangibles -0.04 -0.80 -0.04 -0.72
Growth -0.01*** -6.81 -0.01*** -13.63
Proﬁt -0.68*** -71.32 -0.69*** -66.38
Trustearly*Age 0.01*** 8.89 0.00*** 6.19
Trustearly*Intangibles 0.50*** 4.11 0.52*** 4.35
Trustearly*Growth 0.03*** 12.58 0.04*** 16.98
Trustearly*Proﬁt 0.42*** 18.17 0.44*** 17.87
Creditor*Intangibles -0.01 -0.61
Stockearly*Growth 0.01*** 4.11
Bondearly*Age -0.00*** -6.78
Constant 0.73*** 213.47 0.72*** 211.36
# Observations 809,714 772,990
Adjusted RSQ 0.07 0.06
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Table II.13: Time-Variant Results: Instrumental Variables
This table presents the results from the panel regression estimating ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, with total
leverage as the dependent variable, and instrumented values for country-level trust. The ﬁrm
characteristics of age, squared age, a proxy for size, proportion of intangible assets to total assets,
a proxy for growth opportunities, and proﬁtability are used as explanatory variables. At the ﬁrst
stage, country-level trust is instrumented by the percentage of people with religious upbringing
in the particular country. At the second stage, total leverage is regressed on the explanatory
variables, using instrumented values of country-level trust. A detailed description of all variables
can be found in Table II.2. Z-statistics are calculated using standard errors that have been adjusted
to take into account the potential correlation of errors over time for a given ﬁrm. With ***, **, *,
I indicate statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level respectively.
Leverage z-stat
Age -0.01*** -15.16
Squ.Age 0.00*** 18.87
Size 0.02*** 23.60
Intangibles 0.13* 1.72
Growth -0.03*** -20.62
Proﬁt -0.78*** -44.49
Trust*Age 0.00* 1.67
Trust*Intangibles 0.02 0.12
Trust*Growth 0.11*** 22.64
Trust*Proﬁt 0.65*** 14.34
# Observations 793,081
Adjusted RSQ 0.1182
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Chapter III
The Value of Cash Holdings in
Long-Term Principal-Agent
Relationships
1 Introduction
The value of cash is perceived as one of the ten unsolved problems in the area
of corporate ﬁnance (at least according to Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2008), a
standard textbook in corporate ﬁnance). Two empirical observations are particularly
striking: The ﬁrst one refers to the level of cash held by corporations. There is
a considerable number of ﬁrms with inexplicably high amounts of cash on their
balance sheets. Practitioners as well as academicsamong othersexplain that
ﬁrms in rather volatile industries should in fact hold large amounts of cash for
precautionary savings motives. Regarding information technology companies (such
as Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, IBM and Microsoft) and pharmaceutical or chemical
ﬁrms (such as Exxon, Merck or Pﬁzer), this explanation seems to be plausible. But
does Apple, for example, really need almost $10 billion to buﬀer the volatile cash
needs in the information technology industry? Volatility as the cause of large cash
holdings seems even less plausible with regard to other business segments, such as
the beverage industry. How can Coca Cola's almost $8 billion of cash be justiﬁed?1
1These ﬁgures are taken from the respective companies' published 2008-10-Q ﬁlings.
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The second striking observation concerns the contribution of cash to a ﬁrm's value.
It is peculiar that academic studies often assign a value below parity to corporate
cash holdings in the context of company valuation. Again and again, one can even
observe ﬁrms with a market value below the book value of their cash holdings (net of
liabilities). Three recent examples have been reported by Henriques (2008): Ditech
Networks (each share trading at about $1.50 although net cash amounts to $2.52
per share), Peerless Systems (each share trading at less than $2.00 although net
cash amounts to $3.10 per share), and Trident Microsystems (each share trading at
about $3.00 although net cash amounts to nearly $4.00). These examples show that
investors do not cheer up in the light of corporate cash holdings and yet, there are
still a lot of ﬁrms that hold high levels of cash.
These ﬁndings seem rather anecdotal. In addition, academic empirical studies
hitherto well establish these two striking observations: Some ﬁrms hold high levels
of cash for which theories of optimal cash holdings do not account and some ﬁrms
hold cash even though the valuation of a number of corporations shows that one
dollar of cash is worth more outside than inside a ﬁrm (cf. Subsection 2.2).
According to a number of academic empirical studies, these puzzling empirical
ﬁndings are due to the agency theory. These studies point to Jensen (1986) who
links agency theory to corporate cash holdings and concludes thatunder certain
conditionsthere are agency costs to free cash (cf. Subsection 2.1). Such an
explanation of the puzzling observations regarding corporate cash holdings seems
to serve rather as a ﬁg leaf and is, therefore, far from satisfying. While agency
costs of cash can explain the low value of free cash in some ﬁrms, they do not
explain why ﬁrms hold free cash at all even though it contributes negatively to
ﬁrm value. Moreover, despite their negative contribution, high levels of cash can be
explained by entrenched managers shielding cash holdings from the distribution to
the shareholders (entrenchment hypothesis). In that case, high levels of cash have to
be interpreted as a sign of suboptimal ﬁrm behavior due toabove allineﬃciently
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lax corporate governance.
In contrast to previous studies, my study emphasizes that the causality between
the quality of corporate governance mechanisms and the observed level and value
of cash holdings can also be the reverse. I propose that high levels of corporate
cash holdings can partially align the conﬂicting interests of the shareholder and the
empire-building manager of a ﬁrm. Therefore, high levels of cash substitute for
corporate governance mechanisms. Since large cash holdings only partially solve the
conﬂict of interests, they are associated with a certain level of agency costs (and
therefore may appear to have a value below parity). High levels of cash are still
the second-best solution if the associated agency costs are lower than the costs of
implementing corporate governance.
I augment the literature on corporate cash holdings by developing a theoreti-
cal framework to analyze the interrelations between corporate cash holdings, the
principal-agent problem and agency costs. As a start, I develop a one-period model
based on standard assumptions. In this model, a ﬁrm's shareholder and its manager
only interact once. The manager has limited liability and private information on
the return of investment in physical assets. The shareholder's and the manager's
objectives are conﬂicting in that the shareholder wants to maximize the value of
the ﬁrm, but the manager prefers over-investment in physical assets compared to
holding ﬁnancial assets (empire-building preferences). The shareholder controls the
manager with two decisions: The shareholder decides whether or not to implement a
particular corporate governance mechanism that allows him to elicit the manager's
private information about investment prospects, and hence to overcome his initial
opacity. Further, the shareholder determines the amount of cash that is left to the
manager's discretion (given that outside ﬁnancing is endogenously rationed). In
this model, I analyze the value of the ﬁrm for diﬀerent levels of cash holdings in
order to draw conclusions about the level of cash that maximizes ﬁrm value: In
a ﬁrm with an unsolved principal-agent problem (lax corporate governance), the
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shareholder should constrain free cash. This optimal restriction of free cash mirrors
the predictions of Jensen's free-cash-ﬂow-hypothesis. Better corporate governance,
in contrast, allows the shareholder to leave more cash to the manager's discretion
and to increase ﬁrm value (provided moderate costs to acquire the manager's private
information).
In a second step, I develop a multi-period version of this model, in which the
shareholder and the manager interact repeatedly or, more precisely, inﬁnitely. As in
the one-period model, a shareholder can invest in corporate governance and leave
moderate levels of cash to the manager. In addition to the one-period model, a
range of so-called Trigger-Equilibriums emerge in which the shareholder can leave
(potentially very) large cash holdings to the manager by conditioning future funding
for investment projects on past ﬁrm performance. Despite opacity, the shareholder
induces optimal investment incentives (the same as if he had sold the ﬁrm to the
risk-neutral manager via a debt contract).
In an extension of this multi-period model, so-called extreme situations occur
from time to time. In such extreme situations, ﬁrms only survive in the market
if they gain a considerable size by spending a certain large amount of cash on
unproﬁtable investment projects. This is meant to reﬂect, for example, times of
ﬁnancial crises or waves of corporate takeovers. As before, there is an equilibrium
in which the shareholder elicits the manager's private information and only funds
proﬁtable investments. Interestingly, there is another equilibrium in which the
shareholderdespite opacityleaves high levels of cash to the manager and thus
accommodates the waste in extreme situations that assures the ﬁrm's survival. This
equilibrium contributes to a long-term principal-agent relationship that in turn is the
prerequisite for aligning the conﬂicting interests of the shareholder and the manager.
The waste in extreme situations constitutes agency costs. Yet, incentivizing the
manager with high levels of cash is still optimal if it is less costly than corporate
governance.
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Based on this multi-period model with extreme situations, I analyze two com-
peting ﬁrms, each with the same principal-agent problem, but with diﬀerent costs
for corporate governance. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm with high costs for corporate
governance leaves large cash holdings to the manager. These high levels of cash in
the hands of an empire-building manager serve as a threat to the competitor because
in extreme situations they commit the ﬁrm to aggressive investment at a large scale.
Given this commitment, the ﬁrm with low costs for corporate governance elicits
the manager's private information and discontinues operations after an extreme
situation. Paradoxically, such a competitive threat works only for ﬁrms with high
costs for corporate governance. Otherwise, it lacks credibility because the ﬁrm would
rather invest in corporate governance than to allow aggressive investment in extreme
situations. This extension yields the interesting insight that a ﬁrm can even have
an advantage over its competitor due to high costs for corporate governance.
As a contribution to the empirical literature on corporate cash holdings, this
theoretical study identiﬁes new ﬁrm and manager characteristics that are important
to explain why diﬀerent ﬁrms hold diﬀerent levels of cash and display diﬀerent
values for cash. Such characteristics are, for example, a ﬁrm's interest in long-term
principal-agent relationships as well as the manager's time preference. Furthermore,
it provides a rational explanation for the observation that ﬁrms optimally hold high
levels of cash even though they negatively contribute to ﬁrm value: Large cash
holdings serve as a less expensive substitute for corporate governance, which is
set up to exploit the manager's private information in the multi-period setting.
Stricter corporate governance mechanisms increase ﬁrm value in the one-period
setting (provided that implementation costs are moderate), but not necessarily in
the multi-period setting.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I review the theoretical litera-
ture, the building block for this study, as well as the empirical literature that has
motivated my own theoretical work. In Section 3, I develop and analyze a one-
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period model to demonstrate the principle interdependence between corporate cash
holdings and the conﬂicting interests between the shareholder and the manager
of the ﬁrm. In Section 4, I transfer the one-period to a multi-period framework.
In two subsequent extensions, I additionally consider situations in which the ﬁrm
needs large amounts of cash to survive in the market, and also add product market
competition. Section 5 contains suggestions for further empirical tests. Section 6 is
the conclusion.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Theory
This study places particular emphasis on three characteristics that the literature
commonly associates with corporate cash holdings: Cash is the most liquid asset
(that is, immediately available). In addition, cash holdings are visible to any outside
stakeholder of the company, at least at the reporting date. Lastly, the manager
has the discretion to decide how to spend it, whereas the spending of funds from
outside sources is generally more scrutinized; this understanding is a general one in
the literature on corporate cash holdings (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Jensen,
1986; Opler et al., 1999).
The analysis builds on theoretical studies that add to the explanation of the level
of corporate cash holdings as well as of their contribution to ﬁrm value.
Emphasizing the immediate availability of cash, the trade-oﬀ theory explains that
there exists an optimal level of cash holdings where the costs of cash outweigh its ben-
eﬁts. According to this theory, if ﬁrms deviate from the optimal level of cash, they
reduce their value. As to costs, the trade-oﬀ theory primarily refers to opportunity
costs for holding liquid assets instead of investing them, for example, in interest-
bearing assets (the liquidity premium), as well as to potential tax disadvantages.
Regarding the beneﬁts from holding cash, there are precautionary saving motives,
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which intend to meet unexpected contingencies, and speculative saving motives,
which intend to exploit future investment opportunities (cf. e.g., Kim, Mauer, and
Sherman, 1998). Therefore, internal cash overcomes the ﬂaws of external ﬁnancing
in terms of transaction costs (Keynes, 1936) and costs associated with asymmetric
information.
Myers and Majluf (1984) derive from information asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders of the ﬁrm that funding of investment projects follows a pecking order.
According to this pecking-order theory, ﬁrms should ﬁnance investments using ﬁrst
internal funds, then external debt ﬁnancing, and only as a last resort the most
expensive source of ﬁnancing, external equity. Therefore, to the extent that cash
holdings are associated with internal funds, they increase ﬁrm value (Pinkowitz
and Williamson, 2002). However, this pecking order of ﬁnancing can explain cash
holdings only under the controversial assumption that cash is equivalent to negative
debt (rightly doubtful insofar Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). The pecking-
order theory particularly fails to explain why ﬁrms would hold large amounts of cash
andat the same timedebt.
Agency theory, lastly, emphasizes the managerial discretion associated with cash.
It deals with the cooperation between principal and agent in the presence of conﬂict-
ing interests and discretion by the agent to pursue his own interests. Linking agency
theory to the value of cash and assuming that managers tend to over-invest, Jensen
(1986) claims that free cash (deﬁned as cash in excess of the amount required to fund
all positive NPV projects) reduces ﬁrm value. In order to reduce this detriment of
free cash, the shareholders (as the principals) can implement corporate governance
mechanisms, which can be deﬁned as the sum of actions undertaken to assure
the shareholders of getting an adequate return on their investment (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). According to this concept of corporate governance, a principal-agent
problem can either be solved by minimizing the conﬂict of interests or by controlling
the manager's investment decisions. Alternatively, the shareholder can restrain
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the funds left to the manager's discretion that are necessary to make investment
decisions. Jensen's free-cash-ﬂow hypothesis, consequently, recommends such tight
cash constraints in order to reduce the principal-agent conﬂict (if the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced
by equity).
2.2 Empirics
Notwithstanding their contribution to the understanding of corporate cash holdings,
these theoretical studies fail to explain empirical observations regarding corporate
cash holdings: One of these empirical observations refers to the level of cash holdings.
The static trade-oﬀ theory is consistent with theon averageobserved levels of
cash holdings (Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Opler et al., 1999), but it cannot
explain why some ﬁrms hold surprisingly large levels of cash and why average cash
levels have even risen during the last decades (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009).
Another observation, which has not yet been explained plausibly, refers to the
value of cash holdings. Most empirical studies analyze the marginal contribution
of one additional unit of cash to ﬁrm value. Some of these studies determine the
contribution of cash to ﬁrm value directly by analyzing the ways in which managers
dissipate cash (i.e., whether they spend it reasonably or waste it). One example is
the study by Blanchard, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), who ﬁnd that ﬁrms
spend unexpected cash windfalls ineﬃciently. Predominantly, empirical studies do
not examine directly the way in which managers dissipate cash, but indirectly link
ﬁrm value to the observed level of cash. Controlling for certain ﬁrm characteristics
that alternatively impact the value of a ﬁrm, these studies draw conclusions about
the proportion of ﬁrm value that can be attributed to cash holdings. Their results
show a considerable variation, both across diﬀerent studies and within one and
the same study. Ultimately, many of these studies ﬁnd that one dollar of cash
contributes signiﬁcantly less than one dollar to ﬁrm value (cf. e.g., the range of
values in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz
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and Williamson, 2002). More speciﬁcally, the higher a ﬁrm's cash holdings the
lower is the marginal value of cash (Faulkender and Wang, 2006). This relation
between the level and the value of cash may be diﬀerent for extremely large cash
holdings: Especially persistently large cash holdings do not substantially reduce the
value of a ﬁrm (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Opler et al., 1999). However, ﬁrms
with large cash holdings destroy ﬁrm value by spending more on value-decreasing
acquisitions (Harford, 1999; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008). In summary, it
seems puzzling why ﬁrms hold large amounts of cash, given that many studies ﬁnd
that cash decreases ﬁrm value. Moreover, the conditions under which cash reduces
ﬁrm value remain unclear.
In order to justify surprisingly large corporate cash holdings andat the same
timelow values of cash, empirical studies often point to the agency theory, but
without elaborating this link. This justiﬁcation is not satisfying. Principal-agent
problems can be diagnosed as drivers of both high and low cash holdings: Some
international studies ﬁnd that measures of lax corporate governance that are asso-
ciated with higher principal-agent problems positively correlate with cash holdings
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson, 2003). In contrast, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)
ﬁnd evidence of a negative correlation for a U.S. sample. Additionally, empirical
tests that try to more explicitly pin down principal-agent problems as the cause of
large cash holdings fail (cf. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Mikkelson and Partch,
2003; Opler et al., 1999). In the light of these inconsistent results as regards the
relation between principal-agent problems and the level of cash, Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) suggest that unsolved principal-agent problems are more important
for the value than for the level of cash holdings. To the extent that corporate
governance mechanisms can reduce principal-agent problems, they, consequently,
suggest to focus on the role of corporate governance to explain the value of corporate
cash holdings. However, the empirical evidence regarding the relation between
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corporate governance and the value of cash holdings is as well inconsistent. On
the one hand, there is empirical evidence that the quality of corporate governance
substantially increases the average value of cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006). For instance, lax corporate governance
enables managers to spend free cash on value-decreasing projects, mainly, but not
exclusively, on acquisitions (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, Mansi, and
Maxwell, 2008). On the other hand, there is evidence that among the group of
ﬁrms with extremely high cash holdings, the impact of corporate governance on the
managers' investment behavior seems to be negligible (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell,
2008; Mikkelson and Partch, 2003), except for the fact that ﬁrms with lax corporate
governance spend considerably more on value-decreasing acquisitions. Moreover,
there is empirical evidence that at least some measures of corporate governance
do not signiﬁcantly increase ﬁrm value or may even have negative implications for
the value of a ﬁrm (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009).2 It is doubtful that
the high costs for implementing corporate governance alone can account for this
empirical observation.
The literature on cash holdings seems to be under-explored, as also Faulkender
and Wang (2006) note, maybe because cash is often doubtfully regarded as negative
debt. Therefore, the rich literature on capital structure is simply transferred to
explain the level and value of cash holdings as well. The negligence of cash holdings
has left a number of empirical observations unexplained that refer to typical features
of cash, over and above the characteristics of negative debt. Consequently, a deeper
and more comprehensive examination of the determinants of cash holdings beyond
the traditional capital structure arguments is the goal of my study.
2Note that the relationship between corporate governance and ﬁrm value is highly controversial.
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3 One-Period Model
The one-period model builds the framework to systematically think about the in-
terrelations between corporate cash holdings and the principal-agent conﬂict. This
section describes the important concepts and deﬁnitions of the one-period model:
It ﬁrst speciﬁes the agents' strategy spaces. Second, it presents all assumptions
along with the constraints on the parameter values. These assumptions mirror the
arguments, commonly brought forward. Third, it presents the extensive form of the
game.
3.1 Assumptions
3.1.1 The Players and Their Strategies
The model describes the one-time interaction between a shareholder and a manager.
Strategy Sets. The manager has private information about the returns to in-
vestment in physical assets and decides about new investment in physical assets
(I  {0, 1, ...}). His strategy set consists of plans of investment decisions for every
possible strategy choice by the shareholder. The level of investment can take any
non-negative integer. The manager's investment decision implicitly determines the
stock of physical assets (A  {0, 1, ...}) and ﬁnancial assets (F  {0, 1, ...}) that
the company holds during the one period. The shareholder ﬁrst decides whether
to acquire the manager's private information in order to control the investment
decision. Second, he chooses funding. His strategy set consists of two decisions:
1. investment in corporate governance (G): G is a binary decision variable. G = 0
indicates no investment in corporate governance. G = G indicates investment
of G units of capital in corporate governance. G denotes the strictly positive
costs for implementing an eﬃcient level of corporate governance: G > 0.
2. funding (DIV ): DIV can take any integer. IfDIV ≥ 0,DIV is the proportion
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of past-period wealth that the shareholder claims as a dividend. DIV < 0
denotes the injection of new capital. The funding oﬀer can be thought of as
the shareholder's dividend decision at the annual shareholders' meeting, which
implicitly determines the initial level of cash at the reporting date (F 0) that
the manager can dispose of, so F 0 = I+F . Hence, the shareholder can choose:
DIV → F 0.3
Technology. The ﬁrm's investment opportunities pay oﬀ at the end of the period.
CF are the gross cash ﬂows from investment in physical assets that accrue at the
end of the period. I abstract from equilibrium considerations in the product market
and normalize product prices to 1.
There is a good and a bad investment state. The realization of the random
variable θ  {0; 1} characterizes these ﬂuctuations in investment opportunities by
the following probability density function: prob[θ = 1] = p and prob[θ = 0] =
(1− p).
In a good investment state (θ = 1), H > 1 is the present value of the gross
cash ﬂow from the ﬁrst unit of capital invested. In a bad investment state (θ = 0),
this present value is L < 1. Any further unit of capital yields L in either state.
Therefore, investing one unit of capital is eﬃcient in the good, but ineﬃcient in the
bad state. The analysis concentrates on the parameter range p (H − L) + L < 1
in which the manager on average destroys ﬁrm value by investing both in the good
and in the bad investment state. I deﬁne piG = p (H − 1) as the expected proﬁts
from investing only in the good investment state and piB = (1− p) (1− L) as the
expected loss from investing only in the bad investment state.
The present value of gross cash ﬂows that accrue at the end of the period is
described as:
3For simplicity, I restrict the analysis to discrete monetary units. Analogous results, but mainly
without additional insights, can be derived in a continuous setting.
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PV [CF (I, θ)] = I ∗ L+ 1I≥1θ (H − L) . (III.1)
Capital goods are perishable and there are no interest expenses for holding cash.4
Objectives. The manager and the shareholder pursue diﬀerent objectives.
The manager has a tendency to over-invest in physical assets. The manager's
preference to control larger ﬁrms over smaller ﬁrms (empire-building preferences)
is a standard assumption in the literature.5 The manager derives private control
beneﬁts both from the level of physical assets (A) and from the level of ﬁnancial
assets (F ) that the company holds during the period:
u = A+ (1− φ)F. (III.2)
φ > 0 is the discount factor for holding ﬁnancial assets as compared to physical
assets. If φ = 1, the manager does not derive any control beneﬁts from ﬁnancial
assets, but only from physical assets.
The manager's utility function is linear in the company's assets. This risk-
neutrality is meant to restrain the diﬀerences between the shareholder's and the
manager's objective functions to the fundamental empire-building preference. The
risk-neutrality assumption is immaterial because production operates without un-
certainty and, hence, E {u} = u, irrespective of the manager's risk attitude.
The manager can either accept the employment contract or search outside em-
ployment with exogenous utility of u. Therefore, the shareholder's contract oﬀer
has to satisfy the manager's participation constraint:
4The optimal level of cash according to the static trade-oﬀ theory would already account for
such interest expenses. Such an optimal level of cash could easily be incorporated into this analysis
as a baseline level of cash.
5Preference for empire-building can be motivated by career prospects and compensation schemes
that are typically rosier in larger ﬁrms. For a formal derivation of the empire-building motive, cf.
e.g., Kanniainen (2000).
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A+ (1− φ)F ≥ u. (III.3)
The analysis assumes slack in the manager's participation constraint, by nor-
malizing u = 0. u always meets this reservation utility because A and F are non-
negative. The assumption of slack in the participation constraint makes it more
diﬃcult to rationalize large cash holdings. In contrast, assuming a binding partici-
pation constraint, large cash holdingsinstead of wage paymentscould make the
manager work in the company.6
The shareholder maximizes the sum of the injection of capital at the beginning
of the period and the expected value of his end-of-period (liquidating) dividends:
DIV + PV [CF (I, θ)]. Therefore, the shareholder wants to invest only in physical
assets with positive net present value, i.e., he would like to choose I = 1 if θ = 1,
and I = 0 if θ = 0. In a reduced asset valuation framework, ﬁrm value depends
on the investment state (θ) and on the shareholder's funding decision (F 0), given
the shareholder's optimal choice of corporate governance (G) and the manager's
investment choice (I).
Feasible Contracts. The shareholder and the manager can negotiate their inter-
action under the following additional restrictions:
 The manager is wealth-constrained. Otherwise, standard results suggest it to
be optimal to sell the entire ﬁrm to the risk-neutral manager.
 The shareholder has deep pockets and can lend any amount of money to the
manager. This assumption allows the shareholder to inject any amount of
capital: DIV < 0.
6A binding participation constraint could rationalize large cash holdings relatively easily (maybe
even at the expense of the unrealistic result of negative wages). However, it does not explain the
empirical observation that some ﬁrms hold large amounts of cash despite its negative marginal
contribution to ﬁrm value.
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Figure III.1: The Extensive Form of the Game
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Notation: S stands for shareholder, N for nature, and M for manager
3.1.2 The Extensive Form of the Game
At the beginning of the period, the return on the ﬁrm's investment in physical
assets has not yet been realized. It is negative in expectation over the bad and
the good investment state. The shareholder and the manager move sequentially:
The shareholder moves ﬁrst. At the annual shareholder's meeting, he makes two
decisions: He decides whether to invest in corporate governance
(
G = G
)
, which
allows him to observe the investment state of nature (θ). He then sets up the
balance sheet of the company, i.e., determines the initial funding (F 0). An outside
ﬁnancial analyst can observe this balance sheet. After the balance sheet has been
set up, the manager observes the investment state at no costs and decides about
investment in physical assets. This investment decision determines the physical and
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the ﬁnancial asset holdings of the ﬁrm during the period and hence the manager's
private control beneﬁts. At the end of the period, cash ﬂows from investment in
physical assets accrue. At this point, neither the manager, nor the shareholder take
any action. The shareholder observes the deterministic cash ﬂows and perfectly
deduces the manager's investment decision at t = 0 (costless ex post information
symmetry). An outside analyst can also value the assets of the ﬁrm and draw ex post
conclusions about the value of the initial cash holdings (F 0) that the shareholder
has left to the manager's discretion at the beginning of the period.
The exact time structure of the game and, hence, the information set of the
shareholder depend on the investment in corporate governance.
No Investment in Corporate Governance. If G = 0, the shareholder has
to decide about funding (DIV ) before nature has drawn the realization of the
investment state variable (θ). In other words, the information sets of the shareholder
and of the manager diverge: The shareholder is not informed about the investment
state before he makes his funding decision. (This case is described in the left-hand
path of the game tree.)
Investment in Corporate Governance. If the shareholder invests G = G,
he is able to observe the realization of the random variable θ before his funding
decision. Corporate governance conveys the manager's private information about
the investment state to the shareholder. G = Gmitigates the principal-agent conﬂict
by reducing the information asymmetry between the shareholder and the manager.
(This case is described in the right-hand path of the game tree.)
In both cases, the manager decides about the investment in physical assets after
the shareholder's decision and after the move by nature. Any remaining funds that
have not been invested in physical assets constitute cash holdings (F ) during the
period. Since these cash holdings do not earn any interest, their present value at
t = 0 is just equal to one (per unit of cash).
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3.2 Analysis
The one-period model yields an unsatisfactory result: If the shareholder does not
invest in expensive corporate governance, he cannot exploit the positive investment
opportunities in the good state. This result mirrors the predictions of Jensen's
free-cash-ﬂow-hypothesis: Firms with an unsolved principal-agent conﬂict should
constrain the free cash left to the manager's discretion. In the one-period model,
corporate governance increases ﬁrm value provided that the costs for implementing
corporate governance are moderate.
I proceed in four steps: I present candidate equilibriums. I then analyze the
optimization by the manager and the shareholder. This analysis allows to derive
parameter ranges for the unique equilibrium and to draw conclusions about the value
of cash in the one-period model.
3.2.1 Candidate Equilibriums
The equilibrium speciﬁes strategy choices by the shareholder (G∗; F 0∗) and by the
manager (I∗) from which equilibrium payoﬀs to the shareholder (V ∗) and to the
manager (U∗) can be derived. A set of strategy choices (G∗; F 0∗; I∗) constitutes a
Nash equilibrium of the one-period model if (G∗; F 0∗; I∗) is a mutual best response
in the following sense:
U
(
G∗; F 0∗; I∗
) ≥ U (G∗; F 0∗; I) ∀ I, and (III.4)
V
(
G∗; F 0∗; I∗
) ≥ V (G; F 0; I∗) ∀ (G; F 0) . (III.5)
The concept of a Nash equilibrium is reﬁned by the notion of sub-game perfection,
which requires Nash equilibriums in every proper sub-game. Any element of the
feasible set of G∗ ∈ {0;G} × F 0∗ ∈ {0, 1, ...} × I∗ ∈ {0, 1, ...F 0∗} could
potentially be an equilibrium of the one-period model (cf. e.g., the description
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in Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
3.2.2 The Manager's Optimization
I solve this sequential game by backward induction, starting with the manager, who
moves second. The manager optimizes the private beneﬁts from control:
Max
I
u (A,F ) = Max
I
[A+ (1− φ)F ] s.t.

I = A
F 0 = I + F
. (III.6)
The manager's marginal utility from investment in physical assets
(
∂u(A,F )
∂I
= 1
)
always exceeds that from investment in ﬁnancial assets
(
∂u(A,F )
∂F
= 1− φ
)
, both in
the bad and in the good investment state. Therefore, any strategy I < F 0 is strictly
dominated by I = F 0. I = F 0 is the manager's unique undominated strategy for all
strategy choices (G; F 0) by the shareholder. The manager's best response function
follows immediately as:
I∗ = F 0 ∀ (G ∈ {0;G} ; F 0 ∈ {0, 1, ...}) . (III.7)
3.2.3 The Shareholder's Optimization
The shareholder moves ﬁrst and chooses G and F 0 to maximize the value of the ﬁrm
(V (I, F, θ)), which is the present value of the expected dividend (DIV ). By the
principle of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, the shareholder's
strategy is required to be undominated, given the manager's best response function:
I∗ = F 0 (cf. Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
Lemma 1. There are only two undominated strategy combinations in the one-period
model:
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1.No Production: G = 0 and F 0 = 0
2.Corporate Governance: G = G and F 0 = 0 if θ = 0
F 0 = 1 if θ = 1.
Proof. See Subsection A.1 in the appendix.
The No-Production-Equilibrium formalizes the predictions of Jensen's free-cash-
ﬂow-hypothesis: In the presence of an unsolved principal-agent conﬂict, the share-
holder optimally restrains cash (F 0 = 0) because the costs of free cash (due to the
tendency to over-invest) exceed the beneﬁts of free cash (the immediate availability
of cash in an environment with ﬂuctuating investment opportunities and endoge-
nously rationed outside ﬁnancing). The Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium shows
that corporate governance increases ﬁrm value as long as the costs for implementing
corporate governance are moderate: As long as G is not too high, ﬁrm value in the
Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium exceeds that in the No-Production-Equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In the one-period model, there is a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies: For G > p (H − 1), this equilibrium is the No-Production-Equilibrium
with lax corporate governance (G = 0) and low levels of cash (F 0 = 0); for G <
p (H − 1), this equilibrium is the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium with strict cor-
porate governance
(
G = G
)
and moderate levels of cash (on average: F 0 = p).
Proof. By Lemma 1, there are only two undominated strategy combinations: In
the No-Production-Equilibrium, the value of the ﬁrm to the shareholder is equal to
V = 0. In the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium, the shareholder expects to earn
net present value of (H − 1) in the good and 0 in the bad investment state. In
either state, the shareholder has to invest G units of capital in corporate governance
upfront. The value of the ﬁrm in the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium is equal to
V = piG −G (where piG = p (H − 1)). The shareholder chooses the No-Production-
Equilibrium if piG − G < 0, the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium if piG − G > 0,
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and is indiﬀerent between both equilibriums if piG −G = 0.
Figure III.2: The Value of Cash: One-Period Model
Contribution to F irm V alue
Cash Holdings (F 0)0 1
G
G = G
G = 0
Interpretation of Proposition 1. The one-period model describes a prisoner's
dilemma: Both players would be better oﬀ if the shareholder did not invest in corpo-
rate governance (G = 0) and the manager invested funds eﬃciently. The shareholder
is strictly better oﬀ. The manager derives the same utility as in the Corporate-
Governance-Equilibrium with average utility level of u = p;7 the manager derives
strictly higher utility than in the No-Production-Equilibrium with utility level of
u = 0. However, the parties cannot commit to this superior strategy combination
in the one-period model because the manager has an incentive to deviate by over-
investment in the bad investment state.
7In the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium, the manager is endowed with one unit of capital in
the good investment state (with Prob (θ = 1) = p) and derives utility of u = 1. With probability
Prob (θ = 0) = (1− p), the manager is not endowed with any capital and derives utility of u = 0.
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4 Multi-Period Model
The empirical literature struggles with the surprisingly large cash holdings of some
ﬁrms. The one-period model can explain such large cash holdings only under the
strong assumption that managers have the discretion to entrench cash from the
distribution to the shareholders. Therefore, the one-period model needs to be
scrutinized in its most striking assumption: The principal-agent relationship ends
after one interaction.
4.1 Baseline Model
4.1.1 Changes in the Assumptions
In the multi-period set-up, the manager and the shareholder have long-term in-
terests: The one-period model as the stage game is repeated inﬁnitely. The change
from the one-period to the multi-period model leads to changes in the main as-
sumptions of the model: the technology, the players' objective functions, and the
constraints to the set of feasible contracts.
Technology. The change in the production technology is immediate: Each period,
the same production opportunities arise. The realization of θt is independent of the
realizations of θ1,2,...(t−1).
Objectives. The manager derives private control beneﬁts each period until in-
ﬁnity. The utility in future periods is discounted at the rate of β (the same discount
factor for all players and all times). Given that r = 0, I require β < 1
1+r
= 1 in
order to ensure convergence of the payoﬀs:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βtut =
∞∑
t=0
βt [At + (1− φ)F t] . (III.8)
The manager's budget constraint in the multi-period model is determined by the
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level of ﬁnancial assets at the beginning of the period: F 0t = It + Ft.
The shareholder maximizes:
V (Ft, It, θt) =
∞∑
t=0
βtDIV t. (III.9)
The shareholder's dividend decision is equivalent to the funding decision at the
beginning of each period:
F 0t = Ft−1 + CFt −DIVt. (III.10)
Since the shareholder has deep pockets (DIVt can be positive as well as negative),
the funding decision (F 0t ) does not depend on past proﬁts and is essentially the same
as in the one-period model (F 0).
Feasible Contracts. I impose the same restrictions to the set of feasible contracts
as in the one-period model: The shareholder cannot condition his funding decision
on the current state of nature (θt), except if he invests in corporate governance.
In order to simplify the presentation of the results, I restrict the attention to the
case with prohibitively expensive corporate governance where the unique equilibrium
from the one-period model is the No-Production-Equilibrium: G ≥ piG.8
Even without investment in corporate governance the shareholder observes the
realization of the random variable θt along with the manager's investment decision
at the end of each period (costless ex post information symmetry). I assume that
the shareholder cannot formally commit to long-term contracts: The shareholder
has the right to withdraw funds each year at the shareholders' annual meeting and,
thus, cannot make (credible) long-term funding promises.
8Almost the same results can be derived with the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium as the
unique equilibrium of the one-period model. Diﬀerences can arise in the extensions to this model
(Subsections 4.2 and 4.3).
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4.1.2 Changes in the Analysis
In the multi-period set-up, the shareholder can exploit the ex post costless infor-
mation symmetry: The shareholder can induce cooperation by conditioning future
funding on the manager's past performance. The long horizon aligns the interests
of the manager and the shareholder. Despite an unsolved principal-agent conﬂict
(lax corporate governance), the manager invests large amounts of cash holdings
optimally.9
I proceed in the following steps, analogously to the one-period case: I present
candidate equilibriums, analyze the manager's and the shareholder's optimization,
derive best responses and give the parameter conditions for the equilibriums in the
multi-period model.
Candidate Equilibriums. The equilibrium concept in the multi-period model is
the same as in the one-period model: It speciﬁes equilibrium strategy choices by the
shareholder (G∗; F 0∗) and by the manager (I∗) that constitute a Nash equilibrium
in every proper sub-game.10 I restrict the attention to stationary equilibriums in
which both agents adopt the same strategy at each point in time. Since the game
is worth exactly the same before the realization of θt at any t, it suﬃces to look at
one representative period.
Manager's Optimization. In each period, the manager moves second. As in the
one-period model, the participation constraint is assumed to be slack. The mana-
ger's optimal investment decision (It) depends on the way in which the shareholder
conditions his future choice of corporate governance and funding (Gt, F
0
t ) on the
manager's past investment decisions Iτ with τ = 1, 2, ... (t− 1). Therefore, all of
9This result formally requires the inﬁnite time horizon. An inﬁnite game does not necessarily
require an inﬁnite relationship in practice. If the relationship is ﬁnite, but its end is uncertain,
the discount rate can be interpreted as the probability that the relationship ends in a given period
(Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
10In this game of asymmetric information, one period constitutes one sub-game.
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the manager's strategy choices are undominated in the ﬁrst step of the iterated
procedure of eliminating strictly dominated strategies.
Shareholder's Optimization. I solve this game by letting the shareholder opti-
mize over the set of contract oﬀers (Gt; F
0
t ) that respect the manager's best response
and his incentive compatibility constraint. Since the manager cannot commit to stay
in the company forever due to inalienable human capital (as assumed, e.g., in Hart
and Moore, 1994), the incentive compatibility constraint has to be satisﬁed at any
point in time t.
Lemma 2. For G ≥ piG, the inﬁnite repetition of the No-Production-Equilibrium
from the one-period model constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Proof. I prove this lemma by showing that neither the manager, nor the shareholder
have a proﬁtable one-sided deviation: The manager cannot deviate at all: If F 0t = 0,
his only feasible investment choice is It = 0. The shareholder can deviate by leaving
F 0t > 0 to the manager and/or by investing in corporate governance Gt = G.
F 0t > 0: Given the manager's proposed equilibrium strategy to always invest all
available funds in physical assets, increasing cash holdings would be unproﬁtable on
average because piG − piB < 0.
Gt = G: Investment in corporate governance is not a proﬁtable deviation due to
the assumption that G ≥ piG.
The inﬁnite repetition of the unique one-period equilibrium is not the unique
equilibrium in the multi-period model. If the shareholder conditions future funding
on the manager's past investment behavior, there are other candidate equilibri-
ums with positive funding (F 0t > 0).
11 These candidate equilibriums consist of a
cooperation phase and a potential punishment phase. During the cooperation phase,
the shareholder employs a trigger strategy that leaves large cash holdings to the
11If the shareholder does not condition funding on the past, we are principally in the one-period
case where the uniquely optimal funding with Gt = 0 is F
0
t = 0.
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manager's discretion without controlling the latter's investment decision (G∗ = 0).
In this phase, the shareholder expects the manager to invest one unit of capital in
the good and not to invest at all in the bad investment state: I∗ = 1 if θt = 1 and
I∗ = 0 if θt = 0. If the manager betrays the shareholder's trust by wasting funds on
negative NPV projects, he triggers the punishment phase of the equilibrium strategy:
the withdrawal of all funds in the future.12 In this game with certain project returns,
I restrict the attention to the most severe punishment strategy: The shareholder
punishes any waste by the manager forever (grim trigger). Trigger strategies that
allow the manager some waste are interior solutions to the shareholder's optimization
and are thus strictly dominated because the shareholder has all the bargaining power
in this game.
I prove that these candidate equilibriums are indeed Nash equilibriums by showing
that neither the manager, nor the shareholder have an incentive to deviate.
Lemma 3. The manager has no proﬁtable deviation in the cooperation phase of the
candidate Trigger-Equilibrium if φ ≤ β or F 0t ≤ pβφφ−β .
Proof. See Subsection B.1 in the appendix.
The upper bound on the amount of cash that can be left to the manager's
discretion depends on certain ﬁrm and manager characteristics:
The threshold exists only for φ > β. If the future is important to the manager
and/or the empire-building preferences are weak (β > φ), the manager complies with
the Trigger-Equilibrium at any level of cash (F 0t ) in order to derive utility in the
future.
The threshold increases in the manager's care for the future, as
δ( pβφφ−β )
δβ
= pφ
2
(φ−β)2 >
0, and in the probability of a positive NPV project, as
δ( pβφφ−β )
δp
= βφ
φ−β > 0. The thresh-
old decreases in the manager's empire-building interests
(
δ( pβφφ−β )
δφ
= −pβ
2
(φ−β)2 < 0
)
.
12The shareholder punishes the manager with the No-Production-Equilibrium (the unique equi-
librium of the one-period model).
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The shareholder compares ﬁrm values in the candidate Trigger-Equilibrium with
the alternative ﬁrm value in the No-Production-Equilibrium. The ﬁrm value in
the Trigger-Equilibrium is equal to V =
∞∑
j=0
βjpiG =
1
1−βpiG; in the No-Production-
Equilibrium, it is V = 0. The shareholder prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium
over the No-Production-Equilibrium because 1
1−βpiG ≥ 0 is true by assumption.
Therefore, the shareholder has no proﬁtable one-sided deviation.
Proposition 2. In the multi-period model, there is a sub-game-perfect Trigger-
Equilibrium in addition to the sub-game-perfect inﬁnite repetition of the unique
one-period equilibrium. In this additional equilibrium, a lenient payout policy that
leaves the manager with a lot of cash within certain boundaries
(
F 0t ≤ pβφφ−β
)
can
create optimal investment incentives despite lax corporate governance (Gt = 0): The
manager only invests in positive NPV projects.
Proof. Lemma 2 proves the ﬁrst part: The inﬁnite repetition of the one-period equi-
librium is sub-game perfect in the multi-period model. According to the principle
of one-shot deviation, the trigger strategy is sub-game perfect if players do not
have any proﬁtable deviation from the equilibrium strategy.13 Lemma 3 proves that
the manager has no incentive to deviate in the cooperation phase of the Trigger-
Equilibrium by over-investing in negative NPV projects as long as F 0t ≤ pβφφ−β . The
shareholder has no incentive to deviate because 1
1−βpiG ≥ 0 is true by assumption. In
the punishment phase, there are no incentives to deviate, neither for the manager,
nor for the shareholder, because the No-Production-Equilibrium is sub-game perfect
by Lemma 2.
13The principle of one-shot deviation is a critical insight from multi-period programming, ﬁrst
formulated by Blackwell (1965). It states that a strategy proﬁle is sub-game perfect if and only if
there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations. For a proof cf., for instance, Mailath and Samuelson
(2006).
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Figure III.3: The Value of Cash: Multi-Period Model
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Interpretation of Proposition 2. The multi-period setting improves the situa-
tion of ﬁrms with high costs in corporate governance: In the Trigger-Equilibriums,
the shareholder can exploit the manager's private information without investment
in corporate governance. The immediate availability of cash has the same beneﬁts
as in the one-period world: Outside ﬁnancing is restricted in the multi-period world
because the length of the relationship between the ﬁrm (the manager and the
shareholder) and any outside investors is still short-term. The costs to free cash
that result from managerial discretion in the one-period setting can be avoided in
the multi-period case: As long as the manager's incentive compatibility constraint
is met, he does not waste any cash.
In the inﬁnitely repeated game, there is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium with
higher average discounted payoﬀs than in the inﬁnitely repeated Nash equilibrium of
the stage game. Long-term principal-agent relationships can overcome the prisoner's
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dilemma of the one-period model. This sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium results
as an application of the Folk Theorem.14
The Trigger-Equilibrium can only be implemented if the shareholder can credibly
commit to withdraw funds in the future. The outside ﬁnancing constraints, which
follow endogenously from the assumption that piG− piB < 0, serve as a commitment
device as they bond the destiny of the shareholder to that of the manager: If
in a diﬀerent set-upinvestment of one unit of capital was proﬁtable on average
(piG − piB ≥ 0), the shareholder could only credibly commit to punish the manager
by withdrawing funds up to one unit of capital (1-Production-Equilibrium) because
outside ﬁnancing constraints would be less tight. In practice, the impact of outside
ﬁnancing constraints could be important for cross-country comparisons: In countries
where capital markets are underdeveloped and funds are more restricted, compliance
with the Trigger-Equilibrium may be easier to achieve because the manager is aware
that his future utility depends on the availability of internal funds.15
In summary, the multi-period model sets the stage for large cash holdings that
optimize ﬁrm value. It still cannot explain why large cash holdings are necessary.
4.2 Extension 1: Extreme Situations
The empirical literature does not only struggle with the large cash holdings of some
ﬁrms, but more precisely cannot convincingly explain why shareholders leave large
cash holdings to the managers' discretion although the latter waste free cash on
14This version of the Folk Theorem that concerns sub-game perfect Nash equilibriums is due to
Friedman (1971).
15Overall, there are two changes as outside ﬁnancing becomes available (piG − piB ≥ 0):
1. Switching from the 0- to a 1-Production-Equilibrium increases the manager's utility from
deviation by β1−β . In the Trigger-Equilibrium, compliance has an ambiguous eﬀect on the
manager's utility: The upper bound on F 0t increases in p, but is unaﬀected by an increase
in H.
2. The Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium becomes less attractive if the increase in
[p (H − L) + L] is due to an increase in p, compared to an increase in H: The diﬀer-
ence in ﬁrm values between the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium and the 1-Production-
Equilibrium is decreasing in p and unaﬀected by a change in H.
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value-destroying projects. The following extension to the multi-period model yields
exactly this paradoxical result: It is in the best interest of the proﬁt-maximizing,
rational shareholder to leave large cash holdings to the manager, which the latter
wastes on negative NPV projects with a certain probability.
4.2.1 Changes in the Assumptions
In the extension of the multi-period model, the company faces so-called periods of
extreme situations: In such extreme situations, the company only survives if it gains
considerable size or market position by large-scale investment in physical projects
(inﬁnite horizon). Otherwise, the life of the company and, thus, the shareholder-
manager interaction ends (ﬁnite horizon). These extreme situations could be waves
of corporate takeovers in which ﬁrms either grow or are taken over by competitors
(eat or be eaten). Extreme situations could also be evoked by new technological
standards, such as (at least ex ante) the UMTS-licenses: Either ﬁrms invest in these
new technologies and acquire the option to continue to grow in the future, or they
are driven out of the market.
Technology. Extreme situations have three characteristics: They require large
investment outlays; they are not foreseen; they are overall negative NPV projects.
The occurrence of an extreme situation depends on the realization of the random
variable ϕt  {0; 1} : If ϕt = 0, a one-time investment of x units of capital is required
to continue production in the future. If ϕt = 1, which is the case with probability
q, ﬁrms can continue production irrespective of the investment level. The required
investment outlay x is so high that investment in x units of physical assets is an
overall negative NPV project even though it allows to continue the production. In
particular, x > 1. Therefore, it is ﬁrst-best not to invest x units in physical assets.
The realization of θt is independent of the realizations of θ1,2,...(t−1) and ϕ1,2,...t and
the realization of ϕt is independent of the realizations of ϕ1,2,...(t−1) and θ1,2,...t. The
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baseline multi-period model (cf. Subsection 4.1) is just the special case with q = 1.
The shareholder can observe both the realization of θt and the realization of ϕt
before his funding decision at the annual shareholders' meeting if he invests G = G.
Objectives. The manager again moves second and chooses the per-period invest-
ment (It) that maximizes U =
∞∑
t=0
(βtut). As before, the shareholder chooses the
contract oﬀer that maximizes ﬁrm value: U =
∑∞
t=0 β
tDIV t.
4.2.2 Changes in the Analysis
In the multi-period model with extreme situations, the shareholder can choose
between an inﬁnite horizon (which necessitates large-scale investments in extreme
situations) and a ﬁnite horizon. Cooperation necessitates that the shareholder
commits to an inﬁnite horizon. From the manager, cooperation requires optimal
investment decisions, except in extreme situations in which the manager ensures the
survival of the company.
The analysis proceeds in four steps: I ﬁrst present candidate equilibriums. Then,
I analyze the optimality conditions of the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium (F 0t ≥ x) for
the manager and for the shareholder. Third, I analyze the respective conditions for
the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium (F 0t < x). Fourth, I compare the inﬁnite and the ﬁnite
Trigger-Equilibriums from the point of view of the manager and of the shareholder.
Candidate Equilibriums. In an extreme situation, the shareholder cannot pre-
vent the manager from overinvestment: If the manager's funds are not suﬃcient to
guarantee the continuation of the production (F 0t < x), his uniform best response is
to spend all available funds on physical assets, equivalent to the one-period model.
If F 0t ≥ x, the manager spends at least x in order to guarantee the survival of
the company. Whether or not the manager contents himself with investment of x
units of capital or wastes all available funds on negative NPV projects, depends
on the shareholder's punishment strategy: If investment of x units already triggers
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punishment (it is overall a negative NPV project), the manager chooses his best
deviation and spends all available funds, that is F 0t . If investment of x units is not
punished in an extreme situation, but only investment of more than x units triggers
punishment, the manager might be satisﬁed with investment of x units of capital.
The analysis distinguishes between two alternatives:
1. F 0t ≥ x: The shareholder provides cash in excess of x. These large cash
holdings allow the manager to invest x if ϕt = 0 and to prolong the life of the
company inﬁnitely (inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium).
2. F 0t < x: The shareholder provides cash below x; production ends if ϕt = 0
(ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium).
The shareholder's funding decision (F 0t ≥ x or F 0t < x) determines the length of the
principal-agent relationship.
Inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium. The manager's incentive compatibility constraint
needs to be respected in equilibrium at any point in time, both in extreme situations
and in normal situations, in the good as well as in the bad investment state.
The incentive constraint is hardest to satisfy in normal situations and in the bad
investment state. In extreme situations, the manager is allowed to spend x units of
cash on physical assets and, in the good investment state, he is allowed to spend at
least one unit of cash.
Lemma 4. The manager complies with the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium if φ−β ≤ 0
or F 0t ≤ β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}φ−β . The inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium does not exist if 0 < φ −
β − (1− q) βφ and qpβφ
φ−β−(1−q)βφ < x.
Proof. See Subsection B.2 in the appendix.
The upper bound on the amount of cash that can be left to the manager's
discretion depends on certain ﬁrm and manager characteristics:
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The threshold only exists for φ > β. If the future is very important to the
manager and/or the manager's tendency to over-invest is weak, the shareholder can
leave any amount of cash to the manager.
The threshold increases in the probability of a positive NPV project, as
δ( pβφφ−β )
δp
=
βqφ
φ−β > 0; in the probability that an extreme situation occurs, as
δ( pβφφ−β )
δ(1−q) =
βφ(x−p)
φ−β >
0; in the manager's care for the future
δ(β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}φ−β )
δβ
= βφ
2{qp+(1−q)x}
(φ−β)2 > 0; and in
the size of the investment required in an extreme situation, as
δ( pβφφ−β )
δx
= βφ(1−q)
φ−β > 0.
The threshold decreases in the magnitude of the manager's empire-building interests,
as
δ( pβφφ−β )
δφ
= −β[β(1−q)x+qpφ]
(φ−β)2 < 0.
Compared to the multi-period model without extreme situations
(
F 0t ≤ βpφφ−β
)
,
the upper bound on cash holdings is increased by the allowed waste of x, multiplied
by the manager's preference for physical assets (φ), and multiplied by the probability
of an extreme situation (1− q).
The shareholder's optimal contract oﬀer can be derived from comparing the
value of the ﬁrm in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with the value of the ﬁrm in the
alternative No-Production-Equilibrium.
Lemma 5. The shareholder weakly prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the
No-Production-Equilibrium if (1− q) (x− p) (1− L) ≤ piG , which is equivalent to
x ≤ piG
(1−q)(1−L) + p.
Proof. See Subsection B.3 in the appendix.
The shareholder prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the No-Production-
Equilibrium if the waste that he has to allow in extreme situations is not too high
on average over a positive and negative investment state: (x− p) times the present
value of the expected damage from investment in negative NPV projects (1− L),
multiplied by the probability of an extreme situation (1− q), must not exceed the
expected proﬁts from investment in the good investment state. This condition
yields an upper bound on x. This upper bound increases both in H and in L
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(
δ( p(H−1)(1−q)(1−L)+p)
δH
= p
(1−q)(1−L) > 0;
δ( p(H−1)(1−q)(1−L)+p)
δL
= p(H−1)
(1−q)(1−L)2 > 0
)
: If the return on
the positive NPV project increases, the shareholder is willing to accept higher waste
in an extreme situation in order to establish the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium. Hence,
dispersion in project returns (greater distance between H, the return on a positive
NPV project, and L, the return on a negative NPV project) widens the range for
the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium. Analogously, the upper bound on x increases in
the probability of a good state
(
δ( p(H−1)(1−q)(1−L)+p)
δp
= (H−1)
(1−q)(1−L) + 1 > 0
)
and decreases
in the probability of an extreme situation
(
δ( p(H−1)(1−q)(1−L)+p)
δ(1−q) = − p(H−1)(1−q)2(1−L) < 0
)
.
Finite Trigger-Equilibrium. In a ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium, the manager al-
ways invests all available funds in physical assets in an extreme situation: The share-
holder cannot satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint in extreme situations if
F 0t < x. In a normal situation, the manager's incentive compatibility constraint is
again hardest to satisfy in the bad investment state.
Lemma 6. The manager complies with the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium if φ ≤ β or
F 0t ≤ βqpφφ−β . The ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with F 0t = 1 does not exist if φ − β > 0
and qpβφ
φ−β < 1.
Proof. See Subsection B.4 in the appendix.
Compared to the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium, the upper bound on cash hold-
ings in the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is tighter: F 0t ≤ qpβφφ−β (ﬁnite), compared to
F 0t ≤ β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}φ−β = qpβφφ−β + (1−q)xφφ−β (inﬁnite): The fact that the principal-agent
relationship ends after an extreme situation (and, hence, the manager's chance of
future beneﬁts from control) decreases the manager's incentives to comply.
Lemma 7. The shareholder weakly prefers the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the
No-Production-Equilibrium if (1− q) piB ≤ piG.
Proof. See Subsection B.5 in the appendix.
97
This condition is almost the same as for the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with the
mere diﬀerence that the average waste in an extreme situation is only (1− p), instead
of (x− p): The manager wastes free cash for sure if the survival of the company is
at stake. The shareholder optimally sets F 0t = 1 to minimize the waste in extreme
situations. In addition, smaller cash holdings help to satisfy the manager's incentive
compatibility constraint.16
Inﬁnite versus ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibriums. I assume that the continuation of
the production in an extreme situation is a negative NPV project. This assumption
makes the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium unattractive relative to the ﬁnite one because
the former promises the inﬁnite continuation of the production, but the latter does
not.
Lemma 8. The shareholder weakly prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the
ﬁnite one if piG
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
≥ (1− q)
[
piB
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
+ 1
1−β (x− 1) (1− L)
]
.
The inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium does not exist, but the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium
exists if βqpφ
φ−β < 1 < x <
βqpφ
φ−β−βφ(1−q) . The ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium does not exist,
but the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium exists if φ− β − β (1− q)φ < 0 < φ− β.
Proof. See Subsection B.6 in the appendix.
On the one hand, the shareholder earns the same expected proﬁts per period
in the inﬁnite as in the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium, but for a longer period of time:(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
. On the other hand, the costs to inﬁnite horizons are higher because
the shareholder has to accommodate investment of x units in extreme situations
(instead of just 1 unit in the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium). The waste in extreme
situations occurs forever. As opposed to that, the waste in the ﬁnite Trigger-
Equilibrium ends with the discontinuation of the production.
16In the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibriums, in contrast, any level of cash holdings x ≤ F 0t ≤
β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}
φ−β is optimal.
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If the extreme situation coincides with a good investment state, the ﬁnite Trigger-
Equilibrium is always superior to the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium because there is no
waste at all in the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium, but there is some waste in the inﬁnite
one. If the extreme situation coincides with a bad investment state, the inﬁnite
Trigger-Equilibrium can yield higher ﬁrm value: In the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium,
the manager also wastes one unit of capital, but without receiving in return the
prospects of future proﬁts as in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium.
One can imagine at least two additional reasons why the shareholder chooses the
inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium instead of the ﬁnite one:
1. The inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium gives higher private beneﬁts from control
to the manager
{
1
1−β [qpφ+ (1− q)xφ+ F 0t (1− φ)]
}
than the ﬁnite Trigger-
Equilibrium
{
1
1−βq [pφ+ (1− φ)]
}
.
2. Long-term principal-agent relationships oﬀer additional non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts
that are higher with an inﬁnite than with a ﬁnite horizon.
Proposition 3. In the multi-period model with extreme situations, there are two
kinds of Trigger-Equilibriums with lax corporate governance (Gt = 0): In the inﬁnite
Trigger-Equilibrium, the ﬁrm holds large cash holdings: x ≤ F 0t ≤ β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}φ−β
if φ − β > 0 and x ≤ F 0t if φ − β ≤ 0. In the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium, the
ﬁrm holds moderate levels of cash (F 0t = 1). If (1− q)piB ≤ piG, the shareholder
weakly prefers the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the No-Production-Equilibrium; if
(1− q) (x− p) (1− L) ≤ piG, the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the No-Production-
Equilibrium; if piG
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
≥ (1− q)
[
piB
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
+ 1
1−β (x− 1) (1− L)
]
,
the inﬁnite over the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium.
Lemma 4 proves that the manager has no incentive to deviate in the cooperation
phase of the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium as long as F 0t ≤ β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}φ−β or φ−β < 0.
By Lemma 5, the shareholder weakly prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over
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the alternative No-Production-Equilibrium if (1− q) (x− p) (1− L) ≤ piG. The
punishment phase is sub-game perfect by Lemma 2. Lemma 6 proves that the
manager has no incentive to deviate in the cooperation phase of the ﬁnite Trigger-
Equilibrium as long as F 0t ≤ qpβφφ−β or φ−β < 0. By Lemma 7, the shareholder prefers
the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the alternative No-Production-Equilibrium as
long as (1− q) piB ≤ piG. The punishment phase is sub-game perfect by Lemma 2.
If piG
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
≥ (1− q)
[
piB
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
+ 1
1−β (x− 1) (1− L)
]
, the share-
holder prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium
by Lemma 8.
Figure III.4: The Value of Cash: Multi-Period Model with Extreme Situations
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Interpretation of Proposition 3. Finite Trigger-Equilibriums allow the mana-
ger certain waste in extreme situations, but not enough to guarantee the survival
of the company. In contrast, inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibriums accommodate the mana-
ger's wasteful investment of x units of capital in extreme situations in order to
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guarantee the survival of the company. Inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibriums only exist if
the shareholder credibly commits to inﬁnite horizons. However, formal commitment
to long-term funding strategies is not credible by assumption. Otherwise, neither the
implementation of corporate governance, nor large cash holdings would be necessary
to induce optimal investment incentives. Therefore, other commitment devices are
necessary: High costs in corporate governance can commit the shareholder not to
observe the realizations of the random variables θt and ϕt. After the shareholder
has observed ϕt = 0, it is never optimal to continue the production. With Gt = G,
the Trigger-Equilibrium could still be a Nash-Equilibrium, but would not be sub-
game perfect. This time-inconsistency problem is solved by high G that makes the
acquisition of information about the realization of ϕt too expensive. In this sense,
high governance costs are a prerequisite for the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium to exist.
This insight has practical implications: The Trigger-Equilibrium can only be imple-
mented in ﬁrms that implement lax corporate governance because they cannot aﬀord
corporate governance. Country-wide corporate governance regulations with the goal
to decrease G can hinder the otherwise optimal Trigger-Equilibrium and, thus,
reduce ﬁrm value. High costs in corporate governance make the Trigger-Equilibrium
attractive, not only for the shareholder, but also for the manager. Further, high G
makes the Trigger-Equilibrium more likely: For G ≥ piG, the punishment equilibrium
is the No-Production-Equilibrium, not the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium. The
former oﬀers lower utility for the manager in the punishment phase and, hence, more
likely achieves cooperation.
4.3 Extension 2: Product Market Competition
The analysis so far shows: Large cash holdings can substitute for expensive cor-
porate governance. Therefore, it can be optimal for the shareholder to leave large
cash holdings to the manager's discretion at the expense that the latter wastes
free cash on negative NPV projects in so-called extreme situations. The following
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extension adds product market competition to the multi-period model with extreme
situations. The analysis of this extension yields an even more paradoxical result:
Only the competitor with high costs in corporate governance can credibly commit
to aggressive large-scale investment in extreme situations. The competitor with low
costs in corporate governance has a competitive disadvantage that even results in a
lower ﬁrm value.
4.3.1 Changes in the Model
There are two competing ﬁrms (i = 1, 2). Each of them faces the multi-period
principal-agent conﬂict with extreme situations as described in Section 4.2. The
competitors move simultaneously and only diﬀer in their costs for corporate gover-
nance, that is, in the ease with which the shareholders of the two ﬁrms control the
managers: G1 < G2. I assume that
qβpiG − 1−qβ1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} ≤ G1,
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > G1, and
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} < G2 (III.11)
The asymmetry in the competitors' costs for corporate governance is important:
If the competitors were completely identical, we would expect symmetric equilib-
riums in pure strategies (where either both ﬁrms invest or none of them invests) or
in mixed strategies (where the two ﬁrms randomize with the same probabilities
over investment and non-investment). With diﬀerences in G, it is possible to
analyze the impact of the costs for corporate governance on the product market
competition. The extension of the model to product market competition leads to
consecutive changes in the main assumptions of the model: the technology, the
players' objectives, and the constraints to the set of feasible contracts.
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Technology. Both ﬁrms own the right to invest in the same production technology.
They share the exogenous investment opportunities. As before, the production
technology is characterized by ﬂuctuations in investment opportunities and by the
occurrence of extreme situations. Product market competition materializes in both
aspects. In the good investment state, both ﬁrms compete for the one positive NPV
project (H): Firm 1 earns gross present value of H if ﬁrm 1 invests one unit, and
ﬁrm 2 does not invest at all; if both ﬁrms invest, either ﬁrm earns half of the cash
ﬂows from the positive and half of the cash ﬂows from a consecutive negative NPV
project: CFi,t =
1
2
H + 1
2
L. Furthermore, product market competition is material
with respect to investment in extreme situations: If only one of the ﬁrms continues
operations in the case of ϕt = 0 (asymmetric equilibrium), the surviving ﬁrm earns
monopoly proﬁts afterwards.
I again analyze the parameter range for which outside ﬁnancing is endogenously
restricted: piG + piH < 0. As before, I require that investment of one unit of capital
is a positive NPV project in the good investment state and a negative NPV project
in the bad investment state even if both competitors invest: 1
2
(H + L) ≥ 1 and
L < 1.17 I deﬁne the expected proﬁt from investing only in the good investment
state as piG,duopoly = p
[
1
2
(H + L)− 1]. piinfinite,duopoly describes the duopoly ﬁrm
value in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium; piinfinite,monopoly describes the monopoly
ﬁrm value in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium.
Objectives. Product market competition does not change the shareholder's and
manager's objective functions.
Feasible Contracts. For a meaningful analysis, I need to impose an additional
constraint: The competing ﬁrms are not allowed to collude in order to form a
17This requirement simpliﬁes the analysis because it allows for symmetric equilibriums in pure
strategies. In contrast, for 12 (H + L) < 1 ≤ H, symmetric equilibriums would only occur in mixed
strategies. However, the analysis can easily be transferred to this latter parameter range and
mixed-strategy equilibriums.
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monopoly. The right to the production technology cannot be sold, but, of course,
both ﬁrms can end the production at any point in time.
4.3.2 Changes in the Analysis
In extreme situations, ﬁrm 2, which is characterized by high costs in corporate
governance, can drive the competing ﬁrm 1, characterized by low costs in corpo-
rate governance, out of the market by committing to aggressive large-scale invest-
ment. For a ﬁrm with high costs in corporate governance, such a commitment to
large-scale investment and, hence, to long horizons is credible: Long horizons are
necessary in order to solve the internal manager-shareholder conﬂict in the inﬁnite
Trigger-Equilibrium because costs for corporate governance are prohibitively high.
In contrast, the competitor with low costs in corporate governance optimally solves
the internal principal-agent conﬂict by implementing corporate governance, and,
hence, lacks such a credible commitment device. Therefore, low costs in corporate
governance lead to a strategic competitive disadvantage.
Lemma 9. If G < piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}, the share-
holder strictly prefers the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium over the inﬁnite Trig-
ger-Equilibrium if he can only earn duopoly proﬁts after an extreme situation. If
G > qβpiG − 1−qβ1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}, the shareholder strictly prefers
the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium if he
can earn monopoly proﬁts after an extreme situation.
The threshold for G is higher if the company can only earn duopoly proﬁts after
an extreme situation:
βpiG − 1−qβ1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} <
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} (III.12)
Firm value in the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium with duopoly proﬁts after
an extreme situation equals: 1
1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}. Firm value
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in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with monopoly proﬁts after an extreme situation
equals: 1
1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} + 11−qβ {piG,duopoly − qβpiG}. Firm value
in the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium equals: 1
1−βq
{
piG,duopoly −G
}
.
Proof. See Subsection B.7 in the appendix.
If the competitor continues operations after an extreme situation (duopoly),
the shareholder of ﬁrm 1, with the lower costs in corporate governance, prefers
to solve the principal-agent conﬂict between the shareholder and the manager by
implementing corporate governance, which implies that production ends after an ex-
treme situation. If the competitor discontinues operations after an extreme situation
(monopoly), the shareholder of ﬁrm 1 prefers to solve this internal principal-agent
conﬂict by implementing the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium.
Independent of the competitor's action, the shareholder of ﬁrm 2, with higher
costs in corporate governance, strictly prefers to solve the internal principal-agent
conﬂict by implementing the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium compared to investment
in corporate governance. He credibly commits to aggressive large-scale investment
in an extreme situation.
Proposition 4. If x ≤ piG,duopoly
(1−q)(1−L) +p, the value of ﬁrm 2 with G2 exceeds the value
of ﬁrm 1 with G1, where:
qβpiG − 1−qβ1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} ≤ G1,
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > G1, and
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} < G2 (III.13)
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 5, x ≤ piG,duopoly
(1−q)(1−L) +p guarantees that the shareholder of
ﬁrm 1 prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium (with duopoly proﬁts after an extreme
situation) over the No-Production-Equilibrium. By Lemma 9, ﬁrm 2 with
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piG,duopoly − 1− qβ
1− β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} < G2 (III.14)
strictly prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the Corporate-Governance-
Equilibrium, independent of ﬁrm 1's action.
By Lemma 9, ﬁrm 1 with
qβpiG − 1− qβ
1− β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} ≤ G1, and
piG,duopoly − 1− qβ
1− β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > G1 (III.15)
strictly prefers the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium, given ﬁrm 2's choice of
the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium. By Lemma 9, the value of ﬁrm 1 is equal to
V =
1
1− βq
{
piG,duopoly −G1
}
. (III.16)
The value of ﬁrm 1 is lower than that of ﬁrm 2 equal to
1
1− β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}+
1
1− qβ {piG,duopoly − qβpiG} (III.17)
because ﬁrm 1 would also prefer the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium if it was able
to earn monopoly proﬁts after an extreme situation (by Lemma 9).
Interpretation of Proposition 4. In the multi-period model with extreme situa-
tions and product market competition, ﬁrm 2 paradoxically beneﬁts from high costs
in corporate governance that are an unambiguous detriment to ﬁrm value in the one-
period model. Large cash holdings serve two goals: First, they solve the internal
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Figure III.5: The Value of Cash: Multi-Period Model with Competition
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principal-agent conﬂict between the manager and the shareholder by establishing
long horizons that align the conﬂicting interests of both parties. Second, large
cash holdings in the hands of an empire-building manager serve as a threat to
the competitor. High costs in corporate governance serve as a commitment device
to aggressive investment behavior in extreme situations and, hence, earn ﬁrm 2 a
strategic advantage over its competitor: They drive ﬁrm 1 out of the market.
5 Empirical Evidence
Mymodel oﬀers a framework in which otherwise puzzling empirical observations with
respect to corporate cash holdings can be rationalized. Furthermore, the analysis of
the model guides towards several testable predictions:
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The Level of Cash Holdings. Empirical studies so far fail to convincingly
explain why some ﬁrms hold surprisingly large cash holdings. These studies use
traditional ﬁrm characteristics to explain the level of cash holdings. The analysis
of my model shows that certain types of ﬁrms use large cash holdings to solve an
internal principal-agent conﬂict between the shareholder and the manager of the
ﬁrm. These ﬁrms are characterized by a particular interest in long-term principal-
agent relationships and have typically high costs in corporate governance.
The Value of Cash Holdings. The marginal contribution of cash to ﬁrm value
is often perceived to be negative, in particular for ﬁrms with large cash holdings. I
oﬀer a rational explanation why certain ﬁrms optimally hold large amounts of cash
even if these cash holdings show a negative marginal contribution to ﬁrm value. The
analysis of this model yields a Trigger-Equilibrium in which the manager of the ﬁrm
is allowed to invest free cash in negative NPV projects from time to time, namely in
so-called extreme situations. This controlled waste is costly and makes the marginal
contribution of cash appear to be negative.
However, the value of cash in ﬁrms without any principal-agent conﬂict is the
wrong point of comparison. The value of cash in trigger ﬁrms rather has to be
compared with the value of cash in ﬁrms with a principal-agent problem. From this
perspective, cash holdings contribute to ﬁrm value in a positive way.
The Impact of Corporate Governance. There is empirical evidence that cor-
porate governance increases the value of cash, at least in some ﬁrms. However, in
ﬁrms with extremely high cash holdings, corporate governance plays a negligible
role for the manager's investment behavior. Exceptions are ﬁrms with lax corporate
governance that spend more on (value-decreasing) acquisitions.
In the one-period version of my model, stricter corporate governance increases
ﬁrm value, provided that the costs for corporate governance are moderate. In the
multi-period version, corporate governance can even detriment ﬁrm value: Lax cor-
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porate governance may be necessary to commit to the long-term Trigger-Equilibrium.
Anti-takeover provisions are a prominent measure of good corporate governance
(cf. e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and also part of the widely used index by
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), used, for instance, in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009). Anti-takeover provisions provide an example of corporate governance laws
that harm ﬁrm value by hindering the Trigger-Equilibrium. If cash holdings are
high, but valued below parity, as it can occur very well in the Trigger-Equilibrium,
then the ﬁrm risks to be taken over and to lose private beneﬁts of control. Anti-
takeover provisions shield the manager from the scrutiny of outside capital markets.
This type of lax corporate governance is an almost necessary concomitant measure
to make the Trigger-Equilibrium possible because corporate take-overs endanger the
manager's control beneﬁts needed to establish the long-term Trigger-Equilibrium.
Suggestions for Empirical Tests. Companies with a particular interest in long-
term principal-agent relationships and companies with high costs for corporate
governance should have higher levels of cash accompanied by lax corporate gover-
nance. An empirical test should, therefore, measure a ﬁrm's interest in long-term
relationships and its costs for corporate governance. A ﬁrm's interest in long-term
relationships can be originated in non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts: These beneﬁts mainly
arise from the relationship with other stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers,
employees etc. Some ﬁrms rely on ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment, which is partly born by
outside stakeholders, such as employees as far as investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital is concerned, customers as to their reliance on long-term customer care and
suppliers as to their investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc equipment. These stakeholders are
more willing to invest in the relationship with the ﬁrm if they expect the ﬁrm
to continue production for a long time. Studies already have linked the need for
ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment (particularly with respect to the employee's investment in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital) to corporate capital structure (e.g., Jaggia and Thakor,
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1994; Titman, 1984). An analogous link could be drawn between the need for ﬁrm-
speciﬁc investment and corporate cash holdings: In the Trigger-Equilibrium, high
cash holdings can ensure that the company survives extreme situations. High costs in
corporate governance could be measured at the country level as speciﬁc governance
codes diﬀer across countries.
The time-series dimension of cash holdings may turn out to be more important
than the cross-section at one particular point in time. Firms with persistently high
cash holdings and lax corporate governance are likely to be trigger ﬁrms with a
relatively high value of cash holdings. Therefore, empirical tests should look at the
dynamics in cash holdings, rather than the bare holding of cash (such as Mikkelson
and Partch, 2003).
Firms with lax corporate governance should show more variation both in the
level and in the value of cash. The analysis of the model shows that there are two
sub-game perfect equilibriums for ﬁrms with high costs and, hence, optimally lax
corporate governance: (1) Low levels of cash that restrict the managerial discretion
and (2) high levels of cash in the Trigger-Equilibrium. For ﬁrms that choose
to restrict the managerial discretion (1), the value of additional cash holdings is
negative because the manager is going to waste any free cash. In contrast, the value
of additional cash holdings in trigger ﬁrms is almost the same as in ﬁrms with strict
corporate governance.
Measures of corporate governance should be divided into two categories: The
ﬁrst category comprises measures that reduce the conﬂict of interest between the
principal and the agent. Measures of the second category reduce the managerial
discretion that is necessary for the manager to pursue his own interests. Measures
of this ﬁrst category should have a positive impact on the value of cash holdings.
Measures of the second category can detriment ﬁrm value, especially in ﬁrms with
large cash holdings. If the ﬁrm has solved the conﬂict of interest between the
shareholder and the manager by implementing measures of the ﬁrst category, it
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is harmless to leave excessive cash to the manager's discretion. If measures of
corporate governance only diminish asymmetric information between the principal
and the agent and, thereby, the manager's discretion to pursue his own conﬂicting
interests, then it may be necessary to tie such measures to low levels of cash, due
to unsolved conﬂicts of interest. Putting it simply: It is always good to solve the
conﬂict of interest if such a solution is not too expensive. It is not always good
to solve the principal-agent problem by other measures of corporate governance:
Control mechanisms that restrict the manager's discretion are not compatible with
the Trigger-Equilibrium that relies on the virtue of excessive cash holdings.
6 Conclusions
My ultimate recommendation for corporate policy is to look at bundles of cash
holdings and corporate governance, rather than to consider both choices in isolation.
A unilateral decrease in the level of corporate cash holdings as well as a unilateral
increase in the level of corporate governance can be harmful even if each of these
measures seems appropriate in order to increase ﬁrm value: Corporate cash holdings
often show a negative marginal value (at least in badly governed ﬁrms) and corporate
governance should theoretically be appropriate to increase ﬁrm value as long as
involved costs are not excessive. However, both measures can destroy the long-term
Trigger-Equilibrium and, hence, destroy ﬁrm value. Therefore, I recommend to
choose the level of cash holdings and the level of corporate governance simultaneous-
ly. If one cuts down cash holdings without implementing stricter corporate gover-
nance and ignores that cash holdings have been used as a substitute for corporate
governance, one reduces ﬁrm value. If one implements stricter corporate governance
without cutting down cash holdings and ignores thatdespite its negative marginal
contribution to ﬁrm value on the surfacecash is not wasted, exactly because
corporate governance is lax, one reduces ﬁrm value as well. This decision is an
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either-or decision rather than a gradual choice: Either the shareholder decides to
trust the manager and builds up a long-term relationship. Then, cash holdings have
to be high and corporate governance lax. Or the shareholder decides to control the
manager and to keep cash holdings tight. Getting stuck in the middle is most
harmful to ﬁrm value.
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Appendix
A Proofs: One-Period Model
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Kept separately, neither any choice of corporate governance
(
G ∈ {0;G}), nor any
choice of corporate funding (F 0 ∈ {0, 1, ...}) are dominated. By the procedure of
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, I show that some combinations
of G and F 0 are strictly dominated.
G = G. Investment in corporate governance
(
G = G
)
enables the shareholder to
observe the realization of θ before his funding decision. G = G only pays oﬀ if
the shareholder puts this knowledge to use by conditioning funding (F 0) on the
realization of θ. G = G, combined with an unconditional funding strategy, is strictly
dominated by G = 0 because investment in corporate governance is costly
(
G > 0
)
.
In particular, G = G and F 0 = 0 is not an equilibrium combination of strategies
because this combination yields a negative ﬁrm value. In contrast, G = 0 and F 0 = 0
yields a ﬁrm value of 0. F 0 = 0 if θ = 0, and F 0 = 1 if θ = 1 is an equilibrium
combination of strategies. It dominates any other funding strategy with F 0 > 0 if
θ = 0, and F 0 > 1 if θ = 1 because these funding strategies allow investment in
negative NPV projects.
G = 0. Without investment in corporate governance (G = 0), F 0 = 0 is the
unique equilibrium funding strategy, given the manager's best response is to in-
vest all available funds in physical assets. F 0 = 1 is strictly dominated because
investment in the production technology is a negative NPV project on average as
p (H − L) + L < 1. 1 < F 0 is also dominated because any investment in physical
assets in excess of one unit reduces ﬁrm value (L < 1).
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B. Proofs: Multi-Period Model
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The manager's incentive compatibility constraint is more diﬃcult to satisfy in the
bad than in the good investment state. The utility from deviation is the same in
both states, but the utility from compliance is lower in the bad investment state.
The manager prefers investment in physical assets over cash holdings (φ > 0). If
θ = 1, compliance with the candidate Trigger-Equilibrium requires that the manager
invests one unit in physical assets. If θ = 0, compliance requires that the manager
does not invest at all in physical assets. As θ ∼ iid, the expected future utility is
the same in both states. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to require compliance in the bad
investment state.
In the bad investment state, the utility from compliance is the sum of two
components:
1. F 0t (1− φ): the utility from holding F 0t units of cash during the current period;
2. β
1−β {pφ+ F 0t (1− φ)}: the next-period value of the perpetuity of expected
future per-period utility, where pφ is the product of the probability that θ = 1 and φ,
the additional utility from holding physical compared to ﬁnancial assets; F 0t (1− φ)
are the private beneﬁts from holding F 0t units of cash.
The utility from compliance results as:
F 0t (1− φ) +
β
1− β
{
pφ+ F 0t (1− φ)
}
. (III.18)
The utility from deviation is the sum of the private beneﬁts from spending all
available funds on physical assets now (F 0t ) and getting 0 utility in all future periods
(grim trigger punishment):18
18Since the shareholder is assumed to apply a grim trigger strategy that punishes any deviation
inﬁnitely, the manager's best deviation is to spend all available funds
(
F 0t
)
on physical assets.
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F 0t +
β
1− β ∗ 0 = F
0
t . (III.19)
The manager has no incentive to deviate if the utility from compliance in the
bad investment state exceeds that from deviation:
F 0t (1− φ) + β1−β {pφ+ F 0t (1− φ)} ≥ F 0t
β
1−β ∗ pφ ≥ F 0t
[
1− (1− φ)− β
1−β (1− φ)
]
β
1−β ∗ pφ ≥ F 0t
[
1− (1− φ)− β
1−β (1− φ)
]
1
1−β ∗ pβφ ≥ F 0t
[
φ−βφ−β+βφ
1−β
]
1
1−β ∗ pβφ ≥ 11−βF 0t (φ− β)
1
1−β ∗ pβφ ≥ 0
if φ− β = 0
pβφ
φ−β ≤ F 0t
if φ− β < 0
pβφ
φ−β ≥ F 0t if φ− β > 0. (III.20)
If φ− β ≤ 0, the manager's incentive compatibility constraint is always satisﬁed
because 1
1−β ∗ pβφ ≥ 0 , pβφφ−β < 0, and 0 ≤ F 0t .
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
The manager's incentive compatibility constraint is more diﬃcult to satisfy in the
bad investment state than in the good investment state (cf. Lemma 3). Therefore,
it is suﬃcient to require compliance in the bad investment state.
In the bad investment state, the utility from compliance is the sum of two
components:
1. F 0t (1− φ): the utility from holding F 0t units of cash during the current period;
2. β
1−β {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ+ F 0t (1− φ)}: the next-period value of the perpetuity
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of expected future per-period utility, where qpφ is the product of the probability
that ϕ = 1 and θ = 1, and φ, the additional utility from holding physical compared
to ﬁnancial assets; (1− q)xφ is the product of the probability that ϕ = 0 and xφ,
the additional beneﬁts from the allowed waste of x units on investment in physical
assets; F 0t (1− φ) are the private beneﬁts from holding F 0t units of cash.
The utility from compliance results as:
F 0t (1− φ) +
β
1− β
{
qpφ+ (1− q)xφ+ F 0t (1− φ)
}
. (III.21)
As in the multi-period model without extreme situations, the utility from devia-
tion is the sum of the private beneﬁts from spending all available funds on physical
assets now (F 0t ) and getting 0 utility in all future periods:
F 0t +
β
1− β ∗ 0 = F
0
t . (III.22)
The manager has no incentive to deviate if the utility from compliance in the
bad investment state exceeds that from deviation:
F 0t (1− φ) + β1−β {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ+ F 0t (1− φ)} ≥ F 0t
F 0t
(
1− (1− φ)− β
1−β (1− φ)
)
≤ β
1−β {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ}
F 0t
(
φ−βφ−β+βφ
1−β
)
≤ β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}
1−β
1
1−βF
0
t (φ− β) ≤ 11−ββ {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ}
0 ≤ 1
1−ββ {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ}
if φ− β = 0
β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}
φ−β ≤ F 0t
if φ− β < 0
β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}
φ−β ≥ F 0t
if φ− β > 0.
(III.23)
116
If φ− β ≤ 0, the manager's incentive compatibility constraint is always satisﬁed
because 1
1−ββ {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ} ≥ 0, as well as β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}φ−β < 0 and 0 ≤ F 0t .
For certain parameter conditions, the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is not feasible
as it is not possible to set F 0t ≥ x (which is necessary to guarantee the survival in
extreme situations) and to satisfy the manager's incentive compatibility constraint
at the same time:19
x ≤ F 0t ≤
β {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ}
φ− β . (III.24)
This range is empty for:
x > β{qpφ+(1−q)xφ}
φ−β
x (φ− β) < β {qpφ+ (1− q)xφ}
because φ− β < 0
x [(φ− β)− (1− q) βφ] < qpβφ. (III.25)
If φ − β − (1− q) βφ > 0 → x < qpβφ
φ−β−(1−q)βφ . Otherwise, it is not possible
to satisfy the manager's incentive compatibility constraint in the inﬁnite Trigger-
Equilibrium. If φ − β − (1− q) βφ < 0 → qpβφ
[φ−β−(1−q)βφ] < 0 < x and, hence, the
inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is feasible because it is always possible to set F 0t ≥ x
and to satisfy the manager's incentive compatibility constraint.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 5
If ϕ = 1 and θ = 1 (which is the case with prob = qp), the shareholder earns proﬁts
of (H − 1). If ϕ = 0 and θ = 1 (prob = (1− q) p), the shareholder experiences a loss
of (H − 1)− (x− 1) (1− L). If ϕ = 1 and θ = 0 (prob = q (1− p)), the shareholder
earns 0 proﬁts. If ϕ = 0 and θ = 0 (prob = (1− q) (1− p)), the shareholder derives
a loss of x (L− 1). Expected proﬁts result as:
19I only consider the case of φ ≤ β because for φ > β, the incentive compatibility constraint is
satisﬁed for all F 0t ≥ x.
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qp ∗ (H − 1) + (1− q) p ∗ [(H − 1) + (x− 1) (L− 1)] + (1− q) (1− p)x (L− 1)
=qpiG + (1− q) piG − (1− q) p (x− 1) (1− L)− (1− q) (1− p)x (1− L)
=piG − (1− q) (1− L) [p (x− 1) + (1− p)x]
=piG − (1− q) (1− L) [px− p+ x− px]
=piG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L) . (III.26)
Firm value in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is the perpetuity of the expected
per-period proﬁts: 1
1−β {piG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}. The shareholder prefers the
inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the No-Production-Equilibrium if this ﬁrm value
exceeds the ﬁrm value of 0 (in the No-Production-Equilibrium):
1
1−β {piG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} ≥ 0
piG ≥ (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)
piG
(1−q)(1−L) + p ≥ x. (III.27)
B.4 Proof of Lemma 6
In the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibriums, the manager derives utility from compliance of:
F 0t (1− φ) +
β
1− βq
{
qpφ+ (1− q)F 0t φ+ F 0t (1− φ)
}
. (III.28)
The manager's utility from deviation are the private beneﬁts from spending all
available cash on physical assets, but getting 0 utility in the future.
The manager has no incentive to deviate if the utility from compliance exceeds
that from deviation:
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F 0t (1− φ) + β1−βq {qpφ+ (1− q)φF 0t + F 0t (1− φ)} ≥ F 0t
F 0t (1− φ)− F 0t + F 0t β1−βq {(1− q)φ+ (1− φ)} ≥ − β1−βqqpφ
F 0t
[
1− φ− 1 + β
1−βq (1− q)φ+ β1−βq (1− φ)
]
≥ − β
1−βqqpφ
F 0t
[
βqφ−φ
1−βq +
βφ−βqφ
1−βq +
β−βφ
1−βq
]
≥ − β
1−βqqpφ
F 0t
[
β−φ
1−βq
]
≥ − β
1−βqqpφ
0 ≥ − β
1−βqqpφ if φ− β = 0
F 0t ≥ βqpφφ−β if φ− β < 0
F 0t ≤ βqpφφ−β if φ− β > 0.
(III.29)
If φ− β < 0, the manager's incentive compatibility constraint is always satisﬁed
because 0 ≥ − β
1−βqqpφ,
βqpφ
φ−β < 0, and F
0
t ≥ 0. The ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with
F 0t = 1 does not exist if φ− β > 0 and qpβφφ−β < 1.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 7
In the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium, the manager wastes cash for sure if the survival
of the company is at stake because he knows that the principal-agent relationship
ends after the period. Therefore, the shareholder optimally sets F 0t = 1 to minimize
the waste in extreme situations. In addition, small cash holdings make it easier to
satisfy the manager's incentive compatibility constraint with. If θ = 1 (prob = p),
the shareholder earns proﬁts of (H − 1), independent of the realization of ϕ. If θ = 0
and ϕ = 1 (prob = q (1− p)), the shareholder earns 0 proﬁts. If θ = 0 and ϕ = 0
(prob = (1− q) (1− p)), the shareholder derives a loss of (1− L). Expected proﬁts
result as:
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p ∗ (H − 1) + q (1− p) ∗ 0− (1− q) (1− p) (1− L)
=piG − (1− q) piB. (III.30)
Firm value in the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is the present value of the expected
per-period proﬁts that accrue as long as ϕ = 1: 1
1−βq {piG − (1− q) piB}. If this ﬁrm
value exceeds the ﬁrm value of 0 in the No-Production-Equilibrium, the shareholder
prefers the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium over the No-Production-Equilibrium:
1
1− βq {piG − (1− q) piB} ≥ 0
piG ≥ (1− q) piB. (III.31)
B.6 Proof of Lemma 8
Firm value in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is: 1
1−β {piG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}
(cf. Lemma 5). Firm value in the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is: 1
1−βq {piG − (1− q)piB}
(cf. Lemma 7). The shareholder prefers the inﬁnite over the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium
if:
1
1−βq {piG − (1− q) piB} ≥ 11−β {piG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}
piG
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
≥ 1
1−β (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)
− 1
1−βq (1− q) (1− p) (1− L)
piG
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
≥ (1− q)
[
piB
(
1
1−β − 11−βq
)
+ 1
1−β (x− 1) (1− L)
]
.
(III.32)
For certain parameter conditions, the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium does not exist,
but the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with F 0t = 1 does, and vice versa. By Lemma
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4, for 0 < φ − β − (1− q) βφ the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is only feasible if
x ≤ qpβφ
φ−β−β(1−q)φ . By Lemma 6, for 0 < φ − β, the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium (with
F 0t = 1) is only feasible if 1 ≤ qpβφφ−β .
The inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium does not exist, but the ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium
with F 0t = 1 exists if 0 < φ − β − (1− q) βφ (which implies that 0 < φ − β) and
qpβφ
φ−β−(1−q)βφ < x, but 1 ≤ qpβφφ−β . Such a parameter constellation is possible:
qpβφ
φ−β−β(1−q)φ < x → qpβφ < x [φ− β − (1− q) βφ]; qpβφφ−β ≤ 1 → qpβφ ≤ φ − β.
Hence, φ− β ≤ qpβφ < x [φ− β − (1− q) βφ] has to be possible. This condition is
equivalent to the requirement that there are parameter values for φ, β, q, p such that
φ−β
[φ−β−βφ(1−q)] ≤ qpβφ[φ−β−βφ(1−q)] < x. φ−β[φ−β−βφ(1−q)] ≤ qpβφ[φ−β−βφ(1−q)] is possible for small
(φ− β); βqpφ
[φ−β−βφ(1−q)] < x is possible at least for large x.
The ﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with F 0t = 1 does not exist, but the inﬁnite
Trigger-Equilibrium exists if φ− β − (1− q) βφ ≤ 0 < φ− β and βqpφ
φ−β < 1.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 9
Firm value in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium is independent of the costs for cor-
porate governance
(
G
)
. With monopoly proﬁts after an extreme situation, it is the
sum of three components:
1. − 1
1−β (1− q) (x− p) (1− L): the perpetuity of the product of the probability
that ϕt = 0 and the expected loss in extreme situations (− (x− p) (1− L));
2. 1
1−qβpiG,duopoly: the expected duopoly proﬁts from investing only in the good
state (piG,duopoly) this period for sure and for all future periods as long as ϕt = 1 for
the ﬁrst time;
3.
(
β
1−β − qβ1−qβ
)
piG: the next-period value of the perpetuity of the expected
monopoly proﬁts from investing only in the good state
(
β
1−βpiG
)
, minus the next-
period value of these proﬁts if ϕt = 1 for all past periods until period t, where the
ﬁrm has only been able to earn duopoly proﬁts.
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− 1
1− β (1− q) (x− p) (1− L) +
1
1− qβpiG,duopoly +
(
β
1− β −
qβ
1− qβ
)
piG
=
1
1− β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}+
1
1− qβ {piG,duopoly − qβpiG} . (III.33)
Analogously, ﬁrm value in the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium with duopoly proﬁts
after an extreme situation is the sum of two components:
1. − 1
1−β (1− q) (x− p) (1− L);
2. 1
1−βpiG,duopoly: the perpetuity of the expected duopoly proﬁts from investment
in the good state (piG,duopoly):
1
1− β (1− q) (x− p) (L− 1) +
1
1− βpiG,duopoly
=
1
1− β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} . (III.34)
Firm value in the Corporate-Governance Equilibrium depends on G: It is the
perpetuity of the duopoly proﬁts minus the costs for corporate governance as long
as only normal situations occur 1
1−qβ
{
piG,duopoly −G
}
.
The shareholder strictly prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium (with monopoly
proﬁts after an extreme situation) over the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium if:
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1
1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}+ 11−qβ {piG,duopoly − qβpiG} >
1
1−qβ
{
piG,duopoly −G
}
1
1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}+ 11−qβ
{−qβpiG +G} > 0
1
1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > 11−qβ
(
qβpiG −G
)
1−qβ
1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > qβpiG −G
qβpiG − 1−qβ1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} < G.
(III.35)
The shareholder strictly prefers the inﬁnite Trigger-Equilibrium (with duopoly
proﬁts after an extreme situation) over the Corporate-Governance-Equilibrium if:
1
1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > 11−qβ
{
piG,duopoly −G
}
1−qβ
1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} > piG,duopoly −G
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} < G.
(III.36)
Of course, the threshold for G is higher if the company can only earn duopoly
proﬁts after an extreme situation:
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β {piG,duopoly − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)} >
qβpiG − 1−qβ1−β {βpiG − (1− q) (x− p) (1− L)}
piG,duopoly − 1−qβ1−β piG,duopoly > qβpiG − 1−qβ1−β βpiG(
1−β−1+qβ
1−β
)
piG,duopoly >
(
q−qβ−1+qβ
1−β
)
βpiG
−
(
1−q
1−β
)
βpiG,duopoly > −
(
1−q
1−β
)
βpiG
piG > piG,duopoly.
(III.37)
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Chapter IV
Financial Development and
Intersectoral Growth: The Capital
Reallocation Hypothesis
1 Introduction
1.1 Summary
There is hardly any doubt that well-developed ﬁnancial systems often can be found in
countries with considerable economic growth. Nevertheless, after decades of ongoing
debate, there is no consensus about the mechanisms that connect a well-developed
ﬁnancial system and economic growth. This study contributes to bridging this gap.
In this study, I describe a speciﬁc channel through which a well-developed ﬁnancial
system promotes economic growth: this channel can provide external ﬁnancing
at low costs, following shifts in demand or supply, and reallocate that capital to
industries where it can be used more productively (the so-called capital reallocation
hypothesis).
The empirical literature has approached this capital reallocation hypothesis in
two main ways (cf. review in Subsection 1.2.2): According to one approach, a
well-developed ﬁnancial system facilitates the reallocation of capital towards any
industry that shows positive investment opportunities (Ciccone and Papaioannou,
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2006; Fisman and Love, 2004b). Another approach focuses on industries thatfor
technological reasonstypically depend on external ﬁnancing (Rajan and Zingales,
1998).1
Ambiguity has risen about the interdependence of these two approaches: do they
exclude each other, does one approach comprise the other one, or do they essentially
test the same? I propose that, under certain conditions, both are conceptually
distinct. The two approaches implicitly assume that the diﬀerent natures of growth
opportunities cause the need to reallocate capital: one approach refers to temporary
and at the same time stochastic natures, the other one to persistent and at the same
time deterministic natures.
In order to derive this conclusion, I develop a formal model with two ﬁrms a
and b. They are assumed to be located in two economies with identical investment
opportunities, but diﬀerently developed ﬁnancial systems: In contrast to ﬁrm b, ﬁrm
a has to pay a premium for raising external ﬁnancing. The degree of development of
the ﬁnancial system does not aﬀect internal ﬁnancing. Internal ﬁnancing is, however,
only available to the extent that the ﬁrms have accumulated past proﬁts. Internal
proﬁt accumulation requires the owners of the ﬁrms to leave funds to the discretion
of the managers that creates a potential corporate governance problem in both ﬁrm
a and ﬁrm b. Although the managers are better informed about stochastic growth
opportunities, they have no incentive to give up the control of funds. In this frame-
work, I compare capital reallocation towards ﬁrms a and b as following temporary
and stochastic or following persistent and deterministic investment opportunities.2
Regarding temporary demand shifts, the model predicts that ﬁrm a will exploit
both positive and negative investment opportunities less than ﬁrm b. The develop-
1An industry technologically depends on external ﬁnancing if it has higher need for capital than
can be ﬁnanced by operating cash ﬂow.
2In my partial equilibrium model, it is irrelevant whether these investment opportunities are due
to shifts in demand or supply; commodity prices and interest rates are assumed to be exogenous
in either case. It appears more reasonable to associate temporary (and stochastic) investment
opportunities with the demand side and persistent (and deterministic) investment opportunities
with the supply side. For this reason, I contrast temporary (and stochastic) demand shifts with
persistent (and deterministic) supply shifts.
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ment of the ﬁnancial system has a steady-state impact on capital growth rates, even
though ﬁrm a is technologically independent of external ﬁnancing in that phase.
Regarding persistent supply shifts, the model predicts that ﬁrm a will allocate
less capital to the production of the commodity at early stages of ﬁrm a's life when it
has not yet been able to accumulate enough past proﬁts (technological dependence
on external ﬁnancing). However, even at these early stages, ﬁnancial development
only impacts the growth rates of capital if the premium for external ﬁnancing itself
is a function of ﬁrm a's demand for external ﬁnancing. Under that assumption,
ﬁrm a can exploit investment opportunities less than ﬁrm b if ﬁrm b technologically
depends on external ﬁnancing. Hence, in the presence of persistent supply shifts
there is an impact of ﬁrm a's technological dependence on external ﬁnancing, both
on the level of and the growth rates of capital.
The analysis of the model shows that the development of the ﬁnancial system
inﬂuences capital growth rates. However, for temporary and persistent growth
opportunities, the impact is diﬀerent.
This ﬁnding has large-scale implications for empirical tests of the capital realloca-
tion hypothesis: It establishes the need to develop diﬀerent tests for temporary and
persistent types of growth opportunities. Assuming that ﬁrm a is a representative
ﬁrm of a particular industry in country a (less-developed ﬁnancial system) and ﬁrm
b is a representative ﬁrm of the same industry in country b (perfectly developed
ﬁnancial system), the tests for temporary and for persistent growth opportunities
have to diﬀer in the following ways:
 An industry's (technological) dependence on external ﬁnancing is important
for persistent supply shifts, but not for temporary demand shifts. This distinc-
tion can be tested using a regression speciﬁcation that comprises the product
of the ﬁnancial development in country a and capital growth rates in country b,
as well as the interaction between ﬁnancial development in country a, capital
growth rates in country b, and the increase in an industry's ﬁnancial depen-
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dence. The impact of the second product should be statistically insigniﬁcant
regarding temporary demand shifts, but statistically signiﬁcant and positive
regarding persistent supply shifts.
 The development of the ﬁnancial system impacts the steady-state growth
rates of industries that are subject to temporary demand shifts. Regarding
persistent supply shifts, in contrast, ﬁnancial development only aﬀects the
growth rates of industries at early stages in their growth cycle.
 Financial development has only a weak impact on the level of capital allocation
towards industries with temporary demand shifts. As opposed to that, an
economy with a well-developed ﬁnancial system specializes in those industries
in which persistent supply shifts lead to technological dependence on external
ﬁnancing, even in a steady-state.
The analysis of the model shows that the concept of technological, ﬁnancial depen-
dence is relevant only with respect to persistent supply shifts. However, not only
technological factors determine ﬁnancial dependence, but also the design of external
ﬁnancing contracts, in particular as to the repayment modalities. Therefore, this
ﬁnding suggests that the model could be extended by using a distinction between
two types of contracts that specify diﬀerent repayment modalities. The analysis of
this extension uncovers a further diﬀerence between the ﬁrst approach towards the
capital reallocation hypothesis (that refers to temporary investment opportunities)
and the second approach (regarding persistent investment opportunities): If a well-
developed ﬁnancial system inﬂuences capital growth rates in the way described by
the ﬁrst approach, the industry is in a steady-state. However, in a steady-state
temporary demand shifts cause a need for short-term external ﬁnancing. If, on the
other hand, a well-developed ﬁnancial system inﬂuences capital growth rates in the
way of the second approach, the industry is still at an early stage in the growth cycle,
when persistent supply shifts cause a need for long-term external ﬁnancing. This
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conclusion has an important consequence for the empirical literature on the capital
reallocation hypothesis: An empirical test regarding temporary demand shifts should
measure the development of a ﬁnancial system in a diﬀerent manner than a test
regarding persistent supply shifts. So far, however, the empirical tests following the
ﬁrst approach use the same measures of ﬁnancial development as the empirical tests
following the second approach.
My model must assume that the international integration of ﬁnancial systems is
not perfect. If, instead, ﬁrms can raise external ﬁnancing abroad, then the national
ﬁnancial system can impact growth in the respective economy less. It is likely that
international integration has a diﬀerent eﬀect on the components of a ﬁnancial sys-
tem that provide short-term ﬁnancing and on those that provide long-term ﬁnancing.
Since temporary demand shifts cause a need for short-term ﬁnancing and persistent
supply shifts cause a need for long-term ﬁnancing, international integration will
likely change the importance of the two origins of growth in the future: temporary
or persistent growth opportunities.
The motivation for this study is the inadequateness of the empirical evidence
on the role of ﬁnancial development for the intersectoral reallocation of capital in
an economy. In particular, this inadequateness reﬂects on our understanding of the
interdependence of the two prominent approaches towards the capital reallocation
hypothesis. In the following, I derive my research question in detail and show where
my results add necessary precision to this strand of the empirical literature.
1.2 Derivation of the Research Question
1.2.1 Studies at the Macroeconomic Level
The empirical literature tries to pin down a causal relation between the degree of
development of a ﬁnancial system and the economic growth rates of the respective
country. Earlier studies approach the relation between ﬁnance and growth at a
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macroeconomic level:3 They compare cross-country diﬀerences in overall economic
growth rates with the development of the respective ﬁnancial system.4 These studies
struggle with two main problems.
First, it is likely that there are omitted factors driving both the development of
a ﬁnancial system and economic growth (such as the availability of human capital
or of a good infrastructure).
Second, causality can work in both directions, ﬁnance leading to growth and
vice versa: On the one hand, following Schumpeter (1949) one can emphasize that
any entrepreneurial activity requires the ex ante availability of credit (this implies
that ﬁnance leads growth). On the other hand, following Robinson (1952), p. 86
one can argue that reverse causality is also possible (where enterprise leads, ﬁnance
follows).
Modern econometrics oﬀer partial solutions to the problems of omitted variables
and reverse causality (for instance, the use of lagged or instrumental variables,
vector auto-regression or ﬁxed eﬀects estimation). But studies at the macroeconomic
level do not satisfy completely because results on the question of causality are not
unanimous, and none of these studies accurately shows the mechanisms of how
ﬁnancial development promotes growth within the respective economy.
1.2.2 Studies at the Microeconomic Level: The Concept of the Capital
Reallocation Hypothesis
In contrast, microeconomic studies do not address separately the questions of whether
and of how a well-developed ﬁnancial system promotes economic growth. As opposed
to the studies at the macroeconomic level, these studies at the microeconomic level
look into the black box (Wachtel, 2004, p. 43) and test speciﬁc channels through
3As an example for such an early study, Goldsmith (1969) ﬁnds such a correlation between the
degree of development of a ﬁnancial system and economic growth at the macroeconomic level.
4The appendix gives a broad review of the existing studies at the macroeconomic level in Section
A. For a more comprehensive review of the empirical literature cf. e.g., Ang (2008), Wachtel (2004)
or Carlin and Mayer (2003).
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which a well-developed ﬁnancial system can generate economic growth. This restric-
tion to speciﬁc channels of inﬂuence reduces the impact of issues such as reverse
causality and omitted variables. Consequently, the microeconomic perspective is
the preferable approach. However, it can only unfold its advantages if the channel
through which a well-developed ﬁnancial system can promote economic growth is
deﬁned as precisely as possible.
My study contributes to the understanding of one such microeconomic channel,
the capital reallocation hypothesis.
1.2.3 Two Approaches to the Capital Reallocation Hypothesis
In empirical studies, two approaches to this capital reallocation hypothesis have
emerged. They identify diﬀerent industry characteristics that determine whether
and to what extent the development of a ﬁnancial system aﬀects industry growth
rates within an economy.
First Approach: Industries with Investment Opportunities. One approach
relates to industries with investment opportunities (hereinafter, ﬁrst approach).
According to Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) and Fisman and Love (2004b), the
degree of ﬁnancial development of a country (Fc) promotes growth in all industries
i of that country c (Growthic) that show positive growth opportunities:
Growthic = αZic + βFc ∗Growth Opportunityi + εic. (IV.1)
This speciﬁcation implies that the product of ﬁnancial development and the
industry's growth opportunities has a positive impact on realized growth rates
(β > 0). In other words, an industry can exploit positive growth opportunities
better in an economy with a well-developed ﬁnancial system than in an economy
with a less-developed ﬁnancial system.
This expectation matches the results of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) and
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Fisman and Love (2004b): a well-developed ﬁnancial system has a signiﬁcantly
positive impact on the output growth in sectors with positive measures of global
investment opportunities.5
Second Approach: Industries with Dependence on External Financing.
This approach relates to industries that depend on external ﬁnancing (hereinafter,
second approach).
According to Rajan and Zingales (1998), the degree of ﬁnancial development of
a country (Fc) promotes growth in those industries i of country c (Growthic) that
are dependent on external ﬁnancing:
Growthic = αZic + βFc ∗ Financial Dependencei + εic. (IV.2)
This speciﬁcation implies that the product of the degree of ﬁnancial development
and the industry's ﬁnancial dependence has a positive impact on realized growth
rates (β > 0). In other words, an industry's growth rates are higher in an economy
with a well-developed ﬁnancial system than in an economy with a less-developed
one, to the extent that the industry depends on external ﬁnancing.
This expectation matches the results of Rajan and Zingales (1998) (and as well
those of Fisman and Love, 2007): They conﬁrm a signiﬁcantly positive impact of
a well-developed ﬁnancial system on the output growth in sectors with particular
dependence on external ﬁnancing.6
5Similarly, Wurgler (2000) ﬁnds that the more developed the ﬁnancial system, the more the
respective economies increase investments in growing industries, and the more they decrease
investments in declining industries. For the special case of China, a country with high growth
and low levels of ﬁnancial development, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) conﬁrm the role of ﬁnancial
development for economic growth, but only for listed as well as state-owned ﬁrms. If ﬁrms are
privately held, other ﬁnancing channels (such as reputation and relationship lending) substitute
for ﬁnancial development.
6Similarly, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) ﬁnd a positive impact of the concentration of com-
petition in the banking sector on the growth of those industries that rely on external ﬁnancing,
especially if they are young. Beck and Levine (2002) show a positive growth impact of overall
ﬁnancial development for ﬁnancially dependent industries, but do not ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects for
market- and bank-based ﬁnancial systems. Carlin and Mayer (2003) encounter a strong link
between industry characteristics (such as the reliance on bank or market sources of ﬁnancing
and the reliance on skilled labor) and the speciﬁc characteristics of a ﬁnancial system. Kroszner,
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1.2.4 Interdependence between the Two Approaches
Manifest Aspects of Interdependence between the Two Approaches. How-
ever, both approaches of the capital reallocation hypothesis still show a lack of
precision: they do not suﬃciently characterize the industries that beneﬁt from a
well-developed ﬁnancial system. This ﬂaw has lead to ambiguity about the interde-
pendence of the two approaches. Insofar, there are two evident conclusions:
1. Both approaches are essentially the same: Positive investment opportunities
cause an increase in the demand for external ﬁnancing and, hence, an increase
in the dependence on external ﬁnancing. Following this conclusion, Rajan and
Zingales (1998)'s measure of the dependence on external ﬁnancing is no more
than a measure of investment opportunities.
2. According to another conclusion, the second approach is restricted speciﬁcally
to the narrow channel of external ﬁnancing, but the ﬁrst approach more
generally comprises all functions of a ﬁnancial system (such as information
acquisition and dispersion, risk diversiﬁcation, or monitoring; cf. Fisman
and Love, 2004a). This is the conclusion of Fisman and Love (2007), who
empirically test both interpretations against each other. They ﬁnd support
for both and, notably, they ﬁnd weaker support for the second approach.
Including both the measure of investment opportunities (in the sense of the
ﬁrst approach) and the measure of ﬁnancial dependence (in the sense of the
second approach) into one regression, they ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development has
more explanatory power for capital growth rates in industries with investment
Leaven, and Klingebiel (2007) ﬁnd that, particularly in ﬁnancially better developed countries,
industries depending on external ﬁnancing decline during a banking crisis because preceding
the crisis, industries in such countries have accessed external ﬁnancing to a particular extent.
Developing this approach, a number of further studies apply this measure of dependence on external
ﬁnancing to ﬁrm-level data: On this basis, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) can conﬁrm
the results at the ﬁrm level by ﬁnding that active (though not necessarily large) stock markets as
well as a large banking sector are associated with externally ﬁnanced ﬁrm growth. Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2002) show that there is a diﬀerent impact of bank- and market-based ﬁnancial
systems on economic growth, especially for long-term external ﬁnancing. The latter fact is in
contrast to the results of studies using macroeconomic data (Levine, 2002).
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opportunities (ﬁrst approach) than for capital growth rates in ﬁnancially de-
pendent industries (second approach). In particular, the impact of the latter
is statistically less signiﬁcant and of lower economic magnitude.
The Paramount Aspect of Interdependence between the Two Approaches.
However, these two conclusions are not the only possible ones. My study proposes
another view of the interdependence between the two approaches of the capital
reallocation hypothesis: both interpretations are substantially distinct. The ﬁrst
approach refers to temporary growth opportunities that are ﬂuctuating (that is,
they are positive in some and negative in other periods); the second approach refers
to persistent growth opportunities. I show that both interpretations refer to diﬀerent
stages in an industry growth cyclethe ﬁrst one to industries in their steady-state,
the second one to industries at an early stage in the growth cycle. The diﬀerent
natures of growth opportunities have diﬀerent ﬁnancing needs and, hence, relate
to diﬀerent aspects of a ﬁnancial system: Industries in their steady-state require
short-term ﬁnancing, while industries at an early stage in their growth cycle require
long-term ﬁnancing. Consequently, these two diﬀerent aspects of a ﬁnancial system
can have a diﬀerent impact on economic growth in the respective country.
Both approaches refer to the same kind of ﬁnancial friction: less-developed
ﬁnancial systems provide external ﬁnancing only at additional costs; in contrast,
the degree of development of the ﬁnancial system does not aﬀect internal ﬁnancing.
However, internal ﬁnancing works diﬀerently well when ﬁnancing diﬀerent types of
growth opportunities: For persistent, deterministic growth opportunities (second
approach), internal funds perfectly substitute for external funds, but may typically
not be available (technological dependence on external ﬁnancing). For temporary,
stochastic growth opportunities (ﬁrst approach), internal ﬁnancing may typically
be available (no technological dependence on external ﬁnancing), but may be too
inertial to meet the ﬂuctuating ﬁnancing needs of this type of growth opportunities.
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My conclusions are not self-evident. Their basis comes from an analysis of a
formal model for which I proceed in the following steps: Section 2 reviews the theo-
retical foundations of the capital reallocation hypothesis that are important for my
model. In Section 3, I develop a formal model of two ﬁrms with identical investment
opportunities, but with diﬀerent costs in external ﬁnancing. The analysis in Section
4 compares the capital reallocation in both ﬁrms, following temporary, stochastic
demand shifts and persistent, deterministic supply shifts and extends the model
through a distinction between diﬀerent types of external ﬁnancing contracts. Section
5 concludes by giving an outlook on the changing role of ﬁnancial development for
capital allocation in the light of international integration.
2 Literature Review
The following section reviews the theoretical foundations for my model of the capital
reallocation hypothesis. First, it describes how an individual ﬁrm's decision to use
capital impacts macroeconomic growth rates (investment). Second, it describes
how this decision to use capital by the individual ﬁrm depends on the degree of
development of the ﬁnancial system it has access to (ﬁnance).
2.1 Investment
For the sake of simplicity, the growth rates of value added in an economy follow
a simple AK-growth model. In such a framework, economic growth can either be
generated by capital accumulation (K) or by improved capital productivity (A).
My model disregards growth via capital accumulation (K). It assumes a constant
savings ratio, irrespective of the costs for external ﬁnancing (where the substitution
eﬀect of an increased capital return equals the income eﬀect).7
7The diﬃculties of this type of studies in deriving a substantial impact on growth rates merely
from capital accumulation justify such an assumption (Levine, 2005). Wachtel (2004) emphasizes
that capital productivity is more important than capital accumulation giving the examples of
countries that show similar levels of overall capital investment, but have widely diverse growth
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In contrast, my model concentrates on capital productivity (A). If ﬁnancial
development leads to an eﬃcient capital allocation, it improves capital productivity.
Thus, A is increasing. The role of ﬁnancial development regarding allocative eﬃ-
ciency has been highlighted, for instance, by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990): In
their model, capital can be invested either in safe, low-yield or in high-risk, high-
yield projects; they ﬁnd that ﬁnancial intermediaries unscramble productivity shocks
and reduce individual investors' risks, thereby allowing to fund riskier projects.
In the model by Bencivenga and Smith (1991), ﬁnancial intermediaries cushion
individual households' liquidity shocks: Intermediaries improve allocative eﬃciency
and, thereby, avoid an ineﬃciently early project liquidation. Levine (1991), on the
other hand, ﬁnds that security markets buﬀer liquidity shocks.
The question whether a well-developed ﬁnancial system promotes overall eco-
nomic growth is only a consequence of my primary research objective. Primarily,
I focus on the impact of ﬁnancial development on the capital (re-)allocation itself.
For a particular industry i, I also assume sectoral AK-growth models. In such
models, ﬁnancial development impacts economic growth by exploiting exogenous
growth opportunities: Sectoral capital productivity is driven either by exogenous
technological progress (change in Ai) or by exogenous changes in demand (change
in pi). Exogenous growth opportunities determine the capital productivity of all
ﬁrms within one industry (industry-level data).
The ultimate question (and challenge) of the model is to derive an impact of
ﬁnancial development not just on the level of capital, but also on the growth rates.8
experiences.
8Pagano (1993), p. 613 opposes the level and the growth eﬀect of ﬁnancial development: In
traditional growth theory, ﬁnancial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital stock
per worker or to the level of productivity, but not to their respective growth rates. The latter
were ascribed to exogenous technological progress. Recent endogenous growth models show that
ﬁnancial development can impact economic growth. My approach is a combination of both: At the
sectoral level, I only allow for exogenous growth and analyze whether ﬁnancial development helps
to exploit growth opportunities and leads to diﬀerent growth rates across sectors. At the level of
the whole economy, I allow endogenous growth: Eﬃcient capital reallocation between sectors can
impact the capital productivity and change the A in the AK-growth model for the economy as a
whole (cf. Pagano, 1993).
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2.2 Finance
The degree of development of the ﬁnancial system determines the wedge between the
costs for external and the costs for internal ﬁnancing. Therefore, it can impact the
individual ﬁrm's use of capital and hence the allocative eﬃciency in the respective
country.
A proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm decides to use an amount of capital that equates the
marginal productivity and the marginal costs for capital. The marginal productivity
of capital is determined by ﬁrm, industry or country characteristics. As to the
marginal costs for capital, my model distinguishes between internal and external ﬁ-
nancing. Therefore, the marginal costs for capital have the following two dimensions:
(1) the costs for external capital, relevant for ﬁrms that demand external ﬁnancing;
(2) the opportunity costs for internal capital, relevant for ﬁrms that supply external
ﬁnancing.
According to the capital reallocation hypothesis, a well-developed ﬁnancial sys-
tem reduces frictions to the ﬂow of capital. Such frictions can cause the marginal
productivity of capital in diﬀerent countries to diﬀer across sectors and across time.
Financial frictions create a wedge between the costs for internal and external capital.
Whether ﬁnancial frictions increase the costs for external capital or decrease the
opportunity costs for internal capital depends on the elasticities of capital demand
and supply. My model assumes such a friction only for external ﬁnancing.
Next, I list commonly identiﬁed ﬁnancial frictions, and afterwards, I point at
commonly identiﬁed functions of a well-developed ﬁnancial system to reduce ﬁnan-
cial frictions (or the negative consequences thereof).
Levine (1997) distinguishes between three types of ﬁnancial frictions: Transac-
tion costs, information costs, and enforcement costs. Transaction costs hinder the
transfer of capital from the lender to the borrower. Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr
(1996) point at the direct and indirect growth implications of transaction costs:
Directly, they reduce the level of productive capital supply. Indirectly, they distort
136
the reallocation of capital between sectors in favor of investments in place and to the
disadvantage of new (innovative) investments. Information costs due to problems
of adverse selection or moral hazard are typically associated with external rather
than with internal ﬁnancing and, hence, hinder the transfer of capital from a ﬁrm
with excess funds to a ﬁrm that needs funds. Enforcement costs, associated with
the obligations from external ﬁnancing contracts, are a general hurdle to external
ﬁnancing.
Financial development tackles frictions, such as asymmetric information, directly,
or indirectly, by preparing the grounds for contracts that work well under the given
ﬁnancial frictions or by implementing control mechanisms etc. Therefore, ﬁnancial
development decreases an existing wedge between the costs for external and internal
ﬁnancing and smoothes the transfer of funds from lenders to borrowers.
In particular, a well-developed ﬁnancial system reduces transaction, information,
and enforcement costs. The ﬁnancial system reduces transaction costs by mobilizing
and pooling small savings that allow the ﬁnancing of investment projects at an
eﬃcient scale (King and Levine, 1993b; Levine, 1997; Levine, 2005; Wachtel, 2004).
It directly reduces ex ante information asymmetries by acquiring and trans-
mitting information about the quality of investment projects. The reduction of
information asymmetries helps to allocate capital to those sectors where it can be
used more productively (cf. inter alia Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel, 2001;
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wachtel,
2004). Financial intermediaries and ﬁnancial markets reduce information costs in
a diﬀerent way: Intermediaries use their expertise in project evaluation and take
advantage of ﬁxed cost degression (Boyd and Prescott, 1986; King and Levine, 1993b;
Levine, 1997; Wachtel, 2004). In contrast, markets generate information, mainly by
setting publication requirements for market participants, or by giving incentives to
others to acquire private information (Levine and Zervos, 1998) that is then made
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public via prices (in information-eﬃcient markets).9 A ﬁnancial system, especially
ﬁnancial intermediaries, directly reduce ex interim information asymmetries by con-
trolling the manager's actions and, more broadly, by any measures of corporate
governance (Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel, 2001; Levine, 1997, 2005; Levine
and Zervos, 1998; Wachtel, 2004).
Finally, a ﬁnancial system reduces enforcement costs via institutions and, e.g.,
codes of conduct.
Some of these functions are rather ascribed to ﬁnancial intermediaries, others
rather to ﬁnancial markets.10 A remarkable number of studies has been devoted to
the question whether a bank-based or a market-based ﬁnancial system (often linked
to debt versus equity contracts) is more adequate to overcome certain ﬁnancial
frictions.11
Whereas the investment side can be argued to be common to all ﬁrms within a
particular industry (industry-level data), ﬁnancial development determines the costs
for capital for all ﬁrms within one country (country-level data).
3 Model
In my model, there are two ﬁrms a and b that are located in two diﬀerent countries.
Both ﬁrms start operations in period t = 0 and operate forever. Each ﬁrm behaves
competitively and is owned by one individual.
9Wurgler (2000) emphasizes the role of secondary markets as public price signals and of banks
in the aggregation of information about investment prospects.
10King and Levine (1993b) attempt to give a broad categorization.
11A ﬁnancial system fulﬁlls other functions that do not directly impact the wedge between the
costs for external and internal ﬁnancing and that are, hence, not considered in my model. They
can, nevertheless, impact the capital (re-)allocation between sectors, such as by facilitating trade,
by allowing to diversify liquidity, production and inter-temporal risk, by organizing the ﬂow of
cash that accompanies any ﬂow of goods and services etc. (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Levine,
1991).
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3.1 Investment
The two ﬁrms a and b produce the same commodity with the identical production
function:
f (Kt) = AtK
α
t , (IV.3)
where Kt is the unique input factor capital, At is the technology parameter and
0 < α < 1. This Cobb-Douglas production function satisﬁes the so-called Inada
conditions (cf. Inada, 1963).
Decreasing returns to scale allow the ﬁrms to make proﬁts. Capital depreciates
completely at the end of the period. The production cycle takes one period, from t
to t + 1, and causes a time lag between the investment outlay of Kt and the cash
ﬂowing back from operating activity. Cash ﬂow from operating activity is equal to
ptAtK
α
t . Product markets are perfectly internationally integrated and, hence, the
exogenous world market price for the commodity (pt) is the same in both countries,
i.e., the same for ﬁrms a and b.
There are exogenous demand shifts. They are reﬂected in the commodity price
(pt): pt = p+ ε˜t with p = E (pt) = const over time and ε˜t ∼ iid
with ε˜t =

+ε Prob = 12
−ε Prob = 12
.
I denote phigh = p+ ε and plow = p− ε.
The shifts in demand are temporary: They only occur for one period and do not
impact the expected price of the commodity in the future.
In addition to these temporary demand shifts, there are persistent shifts in supply
conditions. Such supply shifts are reﬂected in a change in the technology parameter
(At). At is deterministic, i.e., the productivity path is known for all future periods
at the beginning of the ﬁrms' operations (at t = 0).
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3.2 Finance
Firms can ﬁnance investments either with funds from internal sources (IKt) or with
funds from external sources. The conditions for ﬁrms to raise external ﬁnancing
diﬀer in both countries: Firm b has access to a perfectly developed ﬁnancial system,
where it can raise external ﬁnancing at costs of r (the exogenous world market
interest rate in all periods t). Let r > 1. In contrast to ﬁrm b, ﬁrm a only has access
to a less-developed ﬁnancial system: In addition to the interest rate r, ﬁrm a has to
pay a constant premium of f > 0 for each unit of external ﬁnancing. The premium
for external ﬁnancing can be motivated, e.g., by asymmetric information between
the ﬁrm and outside investors (cf. Section 2.2 and the motivation in Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). The premium for external ﬁnancing is assumed to be suﬃciently
small relative to the ﬁrms' ability to make proﬁts r− f ≥ α and relative to the size
of the stochastic demand shift
phigh
plow
≥ r+f
r−f .
In period t, the levels of internal and external ﬁnancing are determined sequen-
tially in each of the two ﬁrms: First, the owners of the ﬁrms decide about the
required distribution (dt) and, hence, about internal ﬁnancing (IKt). Nature draws,
second, the realization of ε˜t, which determines the commodity price (pt). Third,
the ﬁrms determine the levels of capital (Kt) allocated to the production of the
commodity by their decision to raise external ﬁnancing (Kt − IKt).
3.2.1 Internal Financing
Funds from internal sources (IKt) are the ﬁrms' past accumulated proﬁts. Internal
funds result from two components: Technologically, IKt depends on the ﬁrms' ability
to make proﬁts (pit). Proﬁts are equal to operating cash ﬂows minus the required
remuneration for external ﬁnancing:
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pit,a = ptAtK
α
t,a − (r + f) (Kt,a − IKt−1,a) , and (IV.4)
pit,b = p1AtK
α
t,b − r (Kt,b − IKt,b) . (IV.5)
Another component that determines IKt is the proﬁt distribution to the owners
of the ﬁrms: After the cash ﬂows from operating activity have accrued and the
required remunerations to the providers of external ﬁnancing have been paid out,
the owners of the ﬁrms decide to what extent to allow proﬁt accumulation inside the
ﬁrm. Alternatively, the owners can earn r per unit of capital in the external capital
market.
The owners of the two ﬁrms choose an inﬁnite sequence of control variables
{dt, IKt+1}∞t=0 to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
1
r
)t
dt, (IV.6)
subject to the starting value for internal funds of IK0. The transition law for
IKt is equal to: IKt+1 = pit − dt. In addition, the non-negativity constraints apply:
0 ≤ dt and 0 ≤ IKt.
3.2.2 External Financing
After the realization of ε˜t, the ﬁrms decide about the levels of capital (Kt) allocated
to the production of the commodity with the objective to maximize proﬁts:
Max
Kt
(pit) s.t. Kt ≥ IKt. (IV.7)
The constraint (Kt ≥ IKt) restricts both ﬁrms to use available funds only for
the production of the commodity. In contrast to the owners, the ﬁrms cannot earn
r in the outside capital market. Consequently, they always employ at least IKt in
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Figure IV.1: Time Line
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the production process. This restriction ensures that the capital allocation decision
ultimately lies in the hands of the owners of capital: The owners decide whether to
leave funds inside the ﬁrms or to devote them to alternative investment projects.
Once they leave the funds to the control of the (managers of the) ﬁrms, the (managers
of the) ﬁrms have no incentive to give up control until the next balance-sheet day.
This lack of control is the dark side of internal funds.12
4 Analysis
I analyze the levels of capital that ﬁrms a and b devote to the production of
the commodity over time. Since the ﬁrms face completely identical investment
conditions in both countries, any diﬀerence in the levels of capital allocated towards
ﬁrms a and b can be traced back to cross-country diﬀerences in the ﬁrms' costs for
external ﬁnancing.
4.1 Principles of Capital Allocation
I ﬁrst present the mechanisms of proﬁt distribution and capital allocation in both
ﬁrms, which I will apply throughout the later analysis.
In period t, there are two sequential decisions in each ﬁrm: First, the owners
choose the level of distribution (dt) and, hence, the ﬁrm's internal ﬁnancing capacity
12The restriction that ﬁrms can only invest in the production of the commodity is in line with
the related ideas in the empirical literature: Rajan and Zingales (1998) deﬁne their measure of
ﬁnancial dependence as capital expenditures minus cash ﬂows that accrue from investments in the
same industry segment, divided by capital expenditures. Thus, they exclude any cross-subsidization
within conglomerates.
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for the next period (IKt+1); second, the ﬁrms decide about the optimal capital
stock for the next period (Kt+1) and, thus, the demand for external ﬁnancing
(Kt+1 − IKt+1). I solve this sequential optimization problem by backward induction,
starting with the ﬁrms. Both ﬁrms know the realizations of pt before their capital
allocation decision.
Firm a maximizes its current proﬁts, given its internal ﬁnancing capacity (IKt,a):
Max
Kt,a
(pit,a) s.t. Kt,a ≥ IKt,a where pit,a = ptAtKαt,a − (r + f) (Kt,a − IKt,a).
Oﬀ corners, the ﬁrst-order condition is equal to: αptAtK
α−1
t,a − (r + f) = 0. The
optimal capital allocation rule for ﬁrm a follows immediately as:
Kt,a = Max
(
IKt,a;
(
αptAt
r + f
) 1
1−α
)
. (IV.8)
According to this optimal capital allocation rule, ﬁrm a employs all available
internal funds and, in addition, raises outside funds as long as the marginal produc-
tivity of capital
(
αptAtK
α−1
t,a
)
exceeds its marginal costs: r + f .
From the perspective of the owner of ﬁrm a, the capital allocation (Kt,a) is a
function of the state of internal funds (IKt,a) and the realization of pt. Hence, proﬁts
are equal to:
pit,a = Max
[
ptAt (IKt,a)
α ; ptAt
(
αptAt
r + f
) α
1−α
− (r + f)
((
αptAt
r + f
) 1
1−α
− IKt,a
)]
.
(IV.9)
Therefore, the sequential optimization problem can be reduced to the following
dynamic optimization problem: The owner of ﬁrm a chooses the inﬁnite sequence
of controls
{dt,a, IKt+1,a}∞t=0 to maximize E0
∞∑
t=0
(
1
r
)t
dt,a subject to
 IK0 ≥ 0 given,
 IKt+1,a + dt,a = pit,a (transition law),
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 dt,a ≥ 0 and IKt+1,a ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0.
The dynamic optimization problem is characterized by the parameter r, the owner's
linear utility function (U (dt,a) = dt,a), which maps from R+ → R, the proﬁt function
pit,a (IKt,a), which maps from R+ → R+, and the initial state of internal funds IK0.
Similarly to Stokey and Lucas (1989), I summarize the following properties of the
utility function and the proﬁt function to which I need to refer in the later analysis:
 (U1) 0 < 1
r
< 1 (by assumption).
 (U2) The linear utility function (U) is continuous.
 (U3) U is strictly increasing in dt,a (with slope equal to 1).
 (U4) U is weakly concave.
 (U5) U is continuously diﬀerentiable (with slope equal to 1 everywhere).
 (P1) pit,a is continuous: At IKt,a =
(
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
, pit,a = ptAt
(
αptAt
r+f
) α
1−α
from
above and below.
 (P2) At IKt,a = 0 , pit,a = ptAt
(
αptAt
r+f
) α
1−α − (r + f)
(
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
> 0 as α < 1
by assumption. There exists a maintainable internal funding capacity IKt,a,
such that IKt,a ≤ Epit,a (IKt,a) ≤ IKt,a for all 0 ≤ IKt,a ≤ IKt,a, and
Epit,a (IKt,a) < IKt,a for all IKt,a > IKt,a (cf. similarly Stokey and Lucas,
1989).
 (P3) pit,a is strictly increasing: For IKt,a <
(
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
, δpit,a
δIKt,a
= r + f . For
IKt,a ≥
(
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
, δpit,a
δIKt,a
= αptAtIK
α−1
t,a .
 (P4) pit,a is weakly concave. In the ﬁrst phase (for IKt,a <
(
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
), pit,a is
weakly concave; in the second phase (for IKt,a ≥
(
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
), pit,a is strictly
concave.
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 (P5) pit,a is continuously diﬀerentiable: pit,a (IKt,a) is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable with respect to IKt,a:
lim
IKt,a
>→(αptAtr+f )
1
1−α
(
δpit,a
δIKt,a
)
= αptAt
(
αptAt
r+f
)α−1
1−α
= (r + f) and
lim
IKt,a
<→(αptAtr+f )
1
1−α
(
δpit,a
δIKt,a
)
= − (r + f) (−1) = (r + f).
Corresponding to this problem, I write the functional equation that reformulates
the problem in a recursive way. For this purpose, I deﬁne a return function as:
r (IKt,a, IKt+1,a, ε˜t) = pit,a (IKt,a, ε˜t) − IKt+1,a. Let IK denote the set of possible
values for the state variable IKt,a. The constraint correspondence Γ : IK → IK
describes the set of feasible values for IKt,a. The graph of Γ is described by{
(IKt+1,a, IKt,a) : 0 ≤ IKt+1,a ≤ pit,a − dt,a, dt,a ∈ R+0
}
.
The maximum value function for ﬁrm a can be written in the form of the Bellman
equation:
V (IKt,a) = max
dt,a,IKt+1,a
{
dt,a +
1
r
V (IKt+1,a)
}
(IV.10)
s.t. dt,a, IKt+1,a ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0
IKt+1,a ≤ pit,a − dt,a.
According to Stokey and Lucas (1989), such a reformulation requires the problem
to be well-behaved, which is satisﬁed if:
1. Γ is non-empty.
2. lim
T→∞
(
1
r
)T
r (IKt,a, IKt+,a) exists.
I will verify these conditions for each of the analyzed cases separately (cf. Subsections
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5).
In contrast to ﬁrm a, ﬁrm b can raise external ﬁnancing frictionless, at costs
of r. Therefore, ﬁrm b: Max
Kt,b
(pit,b) s.t. Kt,b ≥ IKt,b where pit,b = ptAtKαt,b −
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r (Kt,b − IKt,b). The oﬀ-corner ﬁrst-order condition is equal to: αptAtKα−1t,b = r.
The optimal capital allocation rule for ﬁrm b follows immediately as:
Kt,b = Max
(
IKt,b;
(
αptAt
r
) 1
1−α
)
. (IV.11)
Firm b employs all available internal funds and, in addition, raises outside funds
as long as the marginal productivity of capital exceeds its marginal costs (r).
Analogously to ﬁrm a, the owner of ﬁrm b chooses the inﬁnite sequence of controls
{dt,b, IKt+1,b}∞t=0 to maximize E0
∞∑
t=0
(
1
r
)t
dt,b subject to
 IK0 ≥ 0 given
 IKt+1,b + dt,b = pit,b (transition law)
 dt,b ≥ 0 and IKt+1,b ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0
where pit,b = Max
[
ptAt (IKt,a)
α ; ptAt
(
αptAt
r
) α
1−α − r
((
αptAt
r
) 1
1−α − IKt,b
)]
.
4.2 Benchmark Case: Eﬃcient Capital Allocation
As a benchmark case, I consider the capital allocation of ﬁrm b. The owner of ﬁrm
b is indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing the optimal capital stock internally or externally
because external funds are provided frictionless. Given ﬁrm b's capital allocation
rule (cf. equation IV.11), the owner with rational expectations leaves funds inside
the ﬁrm up to the amount that is optimal in the case of a negative demand shift:
0 ≤ IKt,b ≤
(
αplowAt
r
) 1
1−α . The following range of dt,b results as optimal: dt,b
indeterminate ∈
[
pit,b −
(
αplowAt
r
) 1
1−α ; pit,b
]
. Therefore, ﬁrm b always employs the
eﬃcient capital stock:
Kt,b =
(
αptAt
r
) 1
1−α
. (IV.12)
The capital growth rate in ﬁrm b (eﬃcient capital growth rate) follows imme-
diately as:
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Kt,b
Kt−1,b
=
(
pt
pt−1
) 1
1−α
(
At
At−1
) 1
1−α
. (IV.13)
4.3 Capital Allocation without Exogenous Growth Opportu-
nities
For ﬁrm a, I ﬁrst analyze the capital allocation in an environment without exogenous
growth opportunities: There are neither stochastic demand shifts (ε = 0 and, hence,
pt = p = const), nor persistent shifts in supply (At = A = const).
I use dynamic programming techniques to solve the owner's optimization prob-
lem. The requirements for using dynamic programming techniques (non-empty Γ
and existence of lim
T→∞
(
1
r
)T
r (IKt,a, IKt+,a)) are satisﬁed because Γ and r have the
following properties (cf. Stokey and Lucas, 1989):
1. Γ is a compact set. Similar to Stokey and Lucas (1989), I restrict the set of
possible choices (IKt+1,a) to ﬁrm a's maintainable internal funding capacity:
IK =
[
0; IK
]
with IK = (pA)
1
1−α = const.13 Therefore, the constraint
correspondence Γ that maps from the closed interval IK into the closed interval
IK (constraining 0 ≤ IKt+1,a ≤ pit,a (IKt,a) − dt,a) is a compact set. In
addition, Γ : IK → IK is clearly non-empty, compact-valued and continuous.
2. r is bounded. Even though the owner's linear utility function U is unbounded,
the return function r is bounded because it is continuous and maps from
the compact state space IK into the real numbers.14 In addition, r > 1 by
assumption.
From (1) and (2), I conclude that the solution to the original dynamic optimization
problem and the solution to the (recursive) functional equation coincide exactly
13Such a restriction is justiﬁed by properties (U3) and (P3) that preclude optimal free disposal
of funds.
14A sequence is said to be bounded if there is a number B such that |xn| ≤ B for all n (cf. the
deﬁnition by Simon and Blume, 1994).
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(for a proof cf. Stokey and Lucas, 1989), and, in addition, that a solution to this
problem in fact exists. Therefore, I can proceed by solving the functional equation.
Substituting the transition law dt,a = pit,a−IKt+1,a into the Bellman equation gives:
V (IKt,a) = max
0≤IKt+1,a≤pit,a
{
(pit,a − IKt+1,a) + 1
r
V (IKt+1,a)
}
. (IV.14)
Firm a is deﬁned as technologically dependent on external ﬁnancing if
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α >
pit,a. Depending on ﬁrm a's technological dependence on external ﬁnancing, I suggest
an optimal policy function (dt,a or equivalently IKt+1,a) and verify afterwards that
it in fact satisﬁes the Bellman equation.
Phase 1: pit,a <
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α
 dt,a = 0, or equivalently: IKt+1,a = pit,a.
Phase 2:
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
 dt,a = pit,a −
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α , or equivalently: IKt+1,a =
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α .
Two additional properties of Γ and r guarantee that the value function is diﬀeren-
tiable oﬀ-corners (cf. Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979 and Stokey and Lucas, 1989
for detailed results on the diﬀerentiability of the value function):
 Γ is convex. Convexity requires that IKt+1,a ∈ Γ (IKt,a) and IK ′t+1,a ∈
Γ
(
IK
′
t,a
)
imply that aIKt+1,a + (1− a) IK ′t+1,a ∈ Γ
(
aIKt,a + (1− a) IK ′t,a
)
whenever IKt,a, IK
′
t,a ∈
[
0; IKt,a
]
and a ∈ [0, 1] (cf. e.g., the deﬁnitions
in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995; Stokey and Lucas, 1989). By
(P4) , pit,a (which is the upper bound on IKt+1,a) is weakly concave. At
IKt,a =
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
, pit,a is diﬀerentiable, by (P5). Therefore, the constraint
set is convex.
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 r(IKt,a, IKt+1,a) = pit,a (IKt,a)− IKt+1,a is concave. Concavity requires that
r
(
a (IKt,a, IKt+1,a) + (1− a) ∗
(
IK
′
t,a, IK
′
t+1,a
)) ≥
a ∗ r (IKt,a, IKt+1,a) + (1− a) ∗ r
(
IK
′
t,a, IK
′
t+1,a
)
(IV.15)
whenever IKt,a, IK
′
t,a ∈
[
0; IK
]
and a ∈ [0, 1] (cf. e.g., the deﬁnitions in Simon
and Blume, 1994; Stokey and Lucas, 1989). For IKt,a ≥
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
, the inequality
even holds strictly if IKt,a 6= IK ′t,a because returns to IKt are decreasing on that
interval.
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) give the envelope condition for V ′ (IKt,a):15
V ′ (IKt,a) =
δ (pit,a − IKt+1,a)
δIKt,a
=

(r + f) if pit−1,a <
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
αpA (IKt,a)
α−1 if pit−1,a ≥
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
(IV.16)
Oﬀ-corner diﬀerentiability is not suﬃcient because the non-negativity constraint
dt,a ≥ 0 (or equivalently: IKt+1,a ≤ pit,a) can be binding. In fact, I even suggest the
boundary solution to be optimal in phase 1 (for pit,a <
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ).16
Standard results on the diﬀerentiability of the value function rely on the inte-
riority of the optimal policy function. Rincón-Zapatero and Santos (2009) extend
these standard results to boundary solutions. In particular, they provide conditions
under which the value function is diﬀerentiable even at the boundary, for concave,
15I have already shown above that the proﬁt function is diﬀerentiable at IKt,a =
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
(P5)and so is the value function: lim
IKt,a→(αpAr+f )
1
1−α
δ(pit,a−IKt+1,a)
δIKt,a
= (r + f) from below and
lim
IKt,a→(αpAr+f )
1
1−α
δ(pit,a−IKt+1,a)
δIKt,a
= αpA (IKt+1,a)
α
= (r + f) from above.
16In contrast, the non-negativity constraint for internal funds (IKt+1,a ≥ 0) is never binding:
Given the owner's linear utility function, the marginal costs for increasing internal funds are equal
to = −1 for any IKt,a. At IKt,a = 0, the marginal beneﬁts of increasing internal funds are (smaller
or) equal to:
δpit+1,a
δIKt+1,a
r =
(
r+f
r
)
, where the increase in next-period proﬁts is discounted at the rate
of r. Since f > 0,
δpit+1,a
δIKt+1,a
r exceeds one. Therefore, the constraint IKt,a ≥ 0 is never binding and
can be ignored.
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not necessarily strict concave optimization. Analogous to their example, I need to
ensure that the optimal path of the owner's distribution policy eventually reaches
an interior (ﬁrst-best) solution. Then, applying Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979),
the derivative of the value function always exists, even at the boundary. Therefore,
I need to ensure that ﬁrm a reaches phase 2 at some ﬁnite point in time τ . In
an environment without exogenous growth opportunities, this condition is met:(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α stays constant over time. In contrast, pit,a increases over time because,
with α < 1, ﬁrm a makes proﬁts and accumulates these proﬁts as internal funds,
according to the suggested optimal distribution policy. Therefore, there is a ﬁnite
point in time τ , where
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ≤ piτ,a, and, hence, the optimal policy reaches the
interior. According to the suggested optimal policy function, pit,a is constant for all
periods following τ , i.e., non-decreasing. Therefore, ﬁrm a never enters phase 1 with
the boundary solution after τ .
I last verify the optimality of the suggested policy function. The optimal policy
has to satisfy the ﬁrst-order necessary condition of the Bellman equation:
−1 +
(
1
r
)
V ′ (IKt+1,a) = 0. (IV.17)
The envelope condition gives the value for V ′ (IKt+1,a):
V ′ (IKt+1,a) =

(r + f) if pit,a <
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
αpA (IKt+1,a)
α−1 if pit,a ≥
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
(IV.18)
Together, these two conditions yield the Euler equation:
if pit,a <
(
αpA
r + f
) 1
1−α
→
(
1
r
)
(r + f) = 1;
if pit,a ≥
(
αpA
r + f
) 1
1−α
→ IKt+1,a =
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α
. (IV.19)
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For pit,a <
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
, the condition never holds with equality: The marginal
costs for increasing internal funds (r) are always lower than the respective marginal
beneﬁts (r + f). Therefore, the suggested boundary solution of IKt+1,a = pit,a is
optimal. If pit,a ≥
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
, where the return function is strictly concave in IKt,a,
IKt+1,a =
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α (or equivalently dt,a = pit,a −
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ) is the unique solution.
This solution is only feasible if pit,a ≥
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α . For
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a <
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ,
the boundary solution of IKt+1,a = pit,a is still optimal.
Ultimately, I am interested in the eﬀect of the owner's optimal internal funding
policy on the capital allocation Kt,a. I distinguish between the following phases:
Phase 1.a: pit,a <
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
 Kt+1,a =
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
Phase 1.b:
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a <
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α
 Kt+1,a = pit,a.
Phase 2:
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
 Kt+1,a =
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α .
At the early stages of ﬁrm a's life (phases 1.a and 1.b), past accumulated proﬁts
are insuﬃcient to cover the eﬃcient capital stock (cf. equation IV.12). Firm a is
technologically dependent on external ﬁnancing. Since the owner of ﬁrm a cannot
inject funds (dt,a ≥ 0) and because of the premium for external ﬁnancing (f), ﬁrm
a allocates less capital than eﬃcient to the production of the commodity. Without
exogenous growth opportunities, ﬁrm a gets independent of external ﬁnancing at
some ﬁnite point in time τ . From that time on,
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a allows ﬁrm a to
operate at the eﬃcient scale, completely ﬁnanced by internal funds.
The comparison of the capital allocation in ﬁrms a and b allows conclusions about
the relevance of ﬁnancial development.
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Corollary 1. With ε = 0 and At = A = const, the degree of ﬁnancial development
impacts the allocation of capital only temporarily at an early stage of ﬁrm a's life,
as long as pit,a <
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α (phases 1.a and 1.b). If pit,a <
(
αpA
r+f
) 1
1−α
(phase 1.a),
Kt,a =
(
r
r + f
) 1
1−α
∗Kt,b (IV.20)
Kt,a
Kt−1,a
=
Kt,b
Kt−1,b
= 1, (IV.21)
where Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is decreasing.
Proof. This relation follows immediately from comparing the level and growth rate
of capital in ﬁrm a with the level and growth rate of capital in ﬁrm b (cf. equations
IV.12 and IV.13).
Interpretation of Corollary 1. Firm a has access to a less-developed ﬁnancial
system than ﬁrm b: It can raise external ﬁnancing only at the premium f . Firm a can
compensate this comparative disadvantage by accumulating internal funds. Without
exogenous growth opportunities (ε = 0 and At = A = const), internal funds increase
over time. In the steady-state, ﬁrm a has accumulated enough internal funds to be
(technologically) independent of external ﬁnancing and there is no impact of the
degree of ﬁnancial development, neither on the level, nor on the growth rates of
capital.
4.4 Capital Allocation with Stochastic, Temporary Growth
Opportunities
I now analyze the capital allocation in both ﬁrms if there are temporary demand, but
no persistent supply shifts, i.e., for the parameter values: ε > 0 and At = A = const.
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Analogously to the benchmark case without exogenous growth opportunities, I
restrict the set of possible state variables to IK =
[
0; (p+A)
1
1−α
]
, which is even larger
than the expected maintainable capital stock. As before, Γ is non-empty, compact-
valued and continuous; r is bounded on the compact set IK =
[
0; (p+A)
1
1−α
]
. In
addition, following the reasoning in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), with ε˜t ∼ iid
the optimization problem continues to have a recursive structure because controls
dated t aﬀect returns in later, but not in earlier periods.
Therefore, the solution to the original dynamic optimization problem and the
functional equation coincide exactly. Substituting the transition law dt,a = pit,a −
IKt+1,a into the Bellman equation gives:
EV (IKt,a) = max
0≤IKt+1,a≤pit,a
{
(pit,a − IKt+1,a) + 1
r
EV (IKt+1,a)
}
. (IV.22)
With temporary demand shifts, ﬁrm a is deﬁned to technologically depend on
external ﬁnancing if
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
> pit,a. Depending on ﬁrm a's technological,
ﬁnancial dependence, I suggest an optimal distribution policy (dt,a or equivalently
IKt+1,a) and verify afterwards that it satisﬁes the Bellman equation.
Phase 1: pit,a <
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
 dt,a = 0, or equivalently IKt+1,a = pit,a.
Phase 2: pit,a ≥
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
 dt,a = pit,a −
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
, or equivalently IKt+1,a =
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
.
As before, convexity of Γ and concavity of r guarantee the diﬀerentiability of the
value function oﬀ-corners. As in the benchmark case, the suggested policy function
reaches an interior solution (phase 2) at some ﬁnite point in time τ :
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
stays constant over time, but pit,a is increasing because ﬁrm a accumulates proﬁts
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internally as long as
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
> pit,a. For all periods following τ , IKt+1,a =(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
. By ﬁrm a's capital allocation rule (cf. equation IV.8), Kt+1,a =(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
if ε˜t = −ε because
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
>
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
. Kt+1,a =
(
αphighA
r+f
) 1
1−α
if ε˜t = +ε because
(
αphighA
r+f
) 1
1−α
>
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
as
phigh
plow
> r+f
r−f by assumption. Since
(r − f) ≥ α (by assumption), pit+1,a ≥
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
for all periods following τ and
hence ﬁrm a never enters phase 1 (with the boundary solution) again.
I last verify the optimality of the suggested policy function. The optimal policy
has to satisfy the ﬁrst-order necessary condition of the Bellman equation:
−1 +
(
1
r
)
EV ′ (IKt+1,a) = 0. (IV.23)
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) give the envelope condition for EV ′ (IKt+1,a):
EV ′ (IKt+1,a) =
1
2
δpihigh,t+1,a
δIKt+1,a
+
1
2
δpilow,t+1,a
δIKt+1,a
, (IV.24)
where
δpilow,t+1,a
δIKt+1,a
=

(r + f) if pit,a <
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
1
2
αpA (IKt+1,a)
α−1 if pit,a ≥
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
and
δpihigh,t+1,a
δIKt+1,a
=
(r + f) .
Therefore:
EV ′ (IKt+1,a) =
1
2
(r + f) +
1
2
∗

(r + f) if pit,a <
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
1
2
αplowA (IKt+1,a)
α−1 if pit,a ≥
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
(IV.25)
Together, these two conditions yield the Euler equation:
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if pit,a <
(
αplowA
r + f
) 1
1−α
→
(
1
r
)
(r + f) = 1;
if pit,a ≥
(
αplowA
r + f
) 1
1−α
→ IKt+1,a =
(
αplowA
r − f
) 1
1−α
. (IV.26)
For pit,a <
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
, the condition never holds with equality. Therefore, the
boundary solution of IKt+1,a = pit,a is optimal in that phase. For pit,a ≥
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
,
IKt+1,a =
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
is the unique solution. This solution is only feasible if pit,a ≥(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
. For
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a <
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
, the boundary solution of
IKt+1,a = pit,a is still optimal.
Given the owner's optimal internal funding policy, Kt,a diﬀers throughout the
following phases:
Phase 1.a: pit,a <
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
 Kt+1,a =
(
αptA
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
Phase 1.b:
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a <
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
 Kt,a =

pit,a if ε˜t = −ε(
αphighA
r+f
) 1
1−α
if ε˜t = +ε
.
Phase 2:
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
 Kt,a =

(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
if ε˜t = −ε(
αphighA
r+f
) 1
1−α
if ε˜t = +ε
.
Regarding temporary demand shifts, there is the same (transitional) eﬀect of the
degree of ﬁnancial development on the capital allocation as in the benchmark case:
Firm a initially needs external ﬁnancing because past accumulated proﬁts are in-
suﬃcient to cover the eﬃcient capital stock (cf. equation IV.12). As formulated in
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Corollary 1, there is no eﬀect on capital growth rates during that phase. In addi-
tion, ﬁrm a permanently needs funds from external sources, even in a steady-state
(phase 2), where it is technologically independent of external ﬁnancing: The owner
restricts ﬁrm a's internal funding capacity to
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
because of a corporate
governance problem: In contrast to the owner, the (manager of the) ﬁrm observes
the realization of the stochastic demand shift before the investment decision, but
has no incentive to give up control of internal funds (lack of outside investment
opportunities). With this (optimal) restriction of internal funds, ﬁrm a only de-
mands external ﬁnancing in order to adjust to positive investment opportunities.
Hence, Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is the same in each period where demand is positively shocked.
If
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α
> 1
2
(
αplowA
r
) 1
1−α + 1
2
(
αphighA
r
) 1
1−α
, the owner of ﬁrm a allows capital
hoarding, in the sense that the level of internal funds exceeds the average eﬃcient
level of capital.
Proposition 1. With ε > 0 and At = A = const, the degree of ﬁnancial
development impacts the allocation of capital persistently. If
(
αplowA
r−f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
(phase 2),
Kt,a =

(
r
r−f
) 1
1−α
Kt,b if ε˜t = −ε(
r
r+f
) 1
1−α
Kt,b if ε˜t = +ε
(IV.27)
Kt,a
Kt−1,a
=

Kt,b
Kt−1,b
= 1 if ε˜t = ε˜t−1(
r
r+f
) 1
1−α Kt,b
Kt−1,b
if ε˜t = +ε and ε˜t−1 = −ε(
r
r−f
) 1
1−α Kt,b
Kt−1,b
if ε˜t = −ε and ε˜t−1 = +ε
(IV.28)
where Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is constant.
Proof. This relation follows immediately from comparing the level and the growth
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rate of capital in ﬁrm a with the level and growth rate of capital in ﬁrm b (cf.
equations IV.12 and IV.13).
Interpretation of Proposition 1. The owner of ﬁrm a only expects, but does
not observe the temporary shifts in demand. If ﬁrm a is technologically independent
of external ﬁnancing, the owner of ﬁrm a can partially provide for positive demand
shifts by allowing the hoarding of capital. However, such a substitution of external
with internal ﬁnancing comes at the expense of lower ﬂexibility: Internal funds are
inertial because they are adjusted only once per period, before the realization of the
demand shift. Therefore, even in a steady-state, ﬁrm a demands external ﬁnancing
in order to adjust to positive demand shifts.17
Empirical Implication of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 suggests an economet-
rical test that is very close to that by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) and Fisman
and Love (2007) (cf. their speciﬁcation in Subsection 1.2.3).
I interpret ﬁrm a as the representative ﬁrm of a particular industry in country
a (with the less-developed ﬁnancial system) and ﬁrm b as the representative ﬁrm
of the same industry in country b (perfectly developed ﬁnancial system). Applying
Proposition 1, the ﬁnancially less-developed country a shows lower capital growth
rates than country b in those sectors that are subject to positive demand shifts.
Analogously, sectors that are subject to negative demand shifts shrink less in country
a than in country b. This implication is in line with Ciccone and Papaioannou
(2006) and Fisman and Love (2007) who predict that the interaction between growth
opportunities and the degree of ﬁnancial development is positively associated with
realized capital growth rates. In contrast to the impact on capital growth rates, the
17Since shocks are only temporary, one can compare capital growth rates in ﬁrms a and b
without separating the adjustment to contemporaneous shifts from the lagged adjustment to past
demand shifts. If capital adjustment was overlapping, the econometrical procedure by Fisman
and Love (2004b) would be preferable to the one by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006): They
relate correlations in capital growth rates for diﬀerent countries to similar degrees of ﬁnancial
development.
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degree of ﬁnancial development only leads to small diﬀerences in the average levels
of capital in both countries: Due to capital hoarding, the average capital stock of
an industry subject to temporary demand shifts in country a may even exceed that
of the same industry in country b.
Furthermore, the analysis shows that the speciﬁcation regarding temporary,
stochastic demand shifts only applies to certain industries. Such industries are in the
steady-state of their growth cycle and subject to volatile investment opportunities.
4.5 Capital Allocation with Deterministic, Persistent Growth
Opportunities
I now analyze the capital allocation in both ﬁrms if there are no temporary demand
shifts (ε > 0), but persistent shifts in supply, i.e., At changes over time. I consider
a speciﬁc productivity growth cycle. At stage 1 in this growth cycle (t ≤ t1), 0 <
At
At−1
< At+1
At
; at stage 2 (t1 < t ≤ t2), At+1At <
At
At−1
; at stage 3 (t2 < t),
At+1
At
= const
with 1 ≤ At+1At ≤ r1−α.
In contrast to the cases analyzed before, with sustained economic growth (due
to persistent supply shifts) it is not natural to restrict the set of possible internal
funding capacities to a compact set. Consequently, the return function r is un-
bounded. Uniformly bounded growth rates still allow to meaningfully analyze the
supremum of the value of the ﬁrm.
By the usual contractive arguments, Stokey and Lucas (1989) establish condi-
tions under which the solution to the (recursive) functional equation coincides with
the supremum of the ﬁrm value. In order to apply their reasoning, I need to show
that
 Γ (IK) = [0, pit,a) 6= {} (which is clearly the case), and
 lim
τ→∞
(
1
r
)τ
r (IKt,a, IKt+,a) exists and there is an upper bound to the supremum
of the value of ﬁrm a: V (IK) ≤ B.
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I show below that the second condition is satisﬁed. Substituting the transition law
dt,a = pit,a − IKt+1,a into the Bellman equation gives:
V (IKt,a) = max
0≤IKt+1,a≤pit,a
{
(pit,a − IKt+1,a) + 1
r
V (IKt+1,a)
}
. (IV.29)
If
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
> pit,a, I deﬁne ﬁrm a as technologically independent of external
ﬁnancing. Depending on ﬁrm a's technological, ﬁnancial dependence, I suggest an
optimal distribution policy (dt,a or equivalently IKt+1,a) and verify its optimality.
Phase 1: pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
 dt,a = 0, or equivalently: IKt+1,a = pit,a.
Phase 2:
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
 dt,a = pit,a −
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
, or equivalently: IKt+1,a =
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
.
As in the cases before, I verify that ﬁrm a reaches the interior solution in phase 2 at
some ﬁnite point in time τ . As long as pit,a <
(
αpAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
, the owner of ﬁrm a allows
to accumulate all proﬁts inside the ﬁrm. From the assumption that At+1At ≤ r1−α,
which implies that At+1At ≤
(
r+f
α
)1−α
, and from α < 1 it follows for t > t2 that
internal funds (past accumulated proﬁts) grow more than the current eﬃcient capital
stock (cf. equation IV.12). Therefore, there will be a ﬁnite point in time τ , where
pit,a ≥
(
αpAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
. As At+1
At
≤ r1−α, internal funds are thereafter increasing more
than the current eﬃcient capital stock such that there will be a ﬁnite point in time
τ , where pit,a ≥
(
αpAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
. Firm a will never enter phase 1 again as At+1
At
< r1−α
and, hence, At+1
At
<
(
r
α
)1−α
. Therefore, at t = τ the policy function reaches an
interior solution.
The solution to the recursive functional equation coincides with that to the initial
dynamic optimization problem if lim
τ→∞
(
1
r
)τ
r (IKt,a, IKt+1,a) exists and there is an
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upper bound to the supremum of the ﬁrm value: V (IK) ≤ B. At τ , ﬁrm a enters
phase 2 with Aτ < ∞ and IKτ,a < ∞. For all t ≥ τ , any feasible path satisﬁes:
pit,a ≤ p1+α+...+α(t−τ)A1+α+...+α(t−τ)τ r(t−τ)(1−α)+(t−τ−1)(1−α)α+...+(1−α)α(t−τ−1)IKα(t−τ+1)τ,a as
r(1−α) bounds growth rates. r (IKt,a, IKt+1,a) ≤ r (IKt,a, 0) and r (IKt,a, 0) = pit,a.(
1
r
)t
r (IKt,a, IKt+1,a) ≤ p1+α+...+α(t−τ)A1+α+...+α(t−τ)τ r−t+...+(1−α)α(t−τ−1)IKα(t−τ+1)τ,a . Ap-
plying the convergence results for ﬁnite geometric sequences,
−t+ (t− τ) (1− α) + (t− τ − 1) (1− α)α + ...+ (1− α)α(t−τ−1)
= −t+ (1− α) [(t− τ) (1 + ...+ α(t−τ−1))− (α + ...+ (t− τ − 1)α(t−τ−1))]
= t+ (t− τ) (1− α(t−τ−1+1))− α(t−τ−1+2)−(t−τ−1+1)αt−τ−1+1+α
1−α =
ταt−τ+1−ταt−τ−α
1−α .
This term converges to −α
1−α as t→∞.
Therefore, lim
t→∞
(
1
r
)t
r (IKt,a, IKt+1,a) ≤ p( 11−α)A(
1
1−α)
τ
(
1
r
α
1−α
)
. Hence, there is
a convergent upper bound to the supremum of the value of ﬁrm a: V (IK) ≤
p(
1
1−α)A
( 11−α)
τ
(
1
r
α
1−α
)
.18
As in the cases analyzed before, Γ is convex and r is concave.
I last verify the optimality of the suggested distribution policy. The optimal
policy has to satisfy the ﬁrst-order necessary condition of the Bellman equation:
−1 +
(
1
r
)
V ′ (IKt+1,a) = 0. (IV.30)
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) give the envelope condition for V ′ (IKt+1,a)
as:
V ′ (IKt+1,a) =

(r + f) if pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α
αpAt+1 (IKt+1,a)
α−1 if pit,a ≥
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
(IV.31)
Together, these two conditions yield the Euler equation:
18For details on a similar proof cf. Stokey and Lucas, 1989.
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if pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r + f
) 1
1−α
→
(
1
r
)
(r + f) = 1;
if pit,a ≥
(
αpAt+1
r + f
) 1
1−α
→ IKt+1,a =
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
. (IV.32)
For pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α
, the condition never holds with equality. Therefore, the
boundary solution of IKt+1,a = pit,a is optimal in that phase. If pit,a ≥
(
αplowA
r+f
) 1
1−α
,
IKt+1,a =
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
is the unique solution. This solution is only feasible if pit,a ≥(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
. For
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
, the boundary solution of
IKt+1,a = pit,a is still optimal.
Given the owner's optimal internal funding policy, Kt,a diﬀers throughout the
following phases:
Phase 1.a: pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α
 Kt+1,a =
(
αpAt
r+f
) 1
1−α
.
Phase 1.b:
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
 Kt+1,a = pit,a.
Phase 2:
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
 Kt+1,a =
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
.
Since growth opportunities are deterministic (no information asymmetry between
the owner and the manager of the ﬁrm), internal funds are perfect substitutes for
external funds. Therefore, the owner's optimal policy during phases 1.a and 1.b is
to allow the accumulation of proﬁts until the ﬁrm has reached the eﬃcient capital
stock (cf. equation IV.12). At stage 1 in the ﬁrm's growth cycle (t < t1), ﬁrm a will
never be able to reach the eﬃcient capital stock because it grows faster than proﬁts
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from operating activities, which lag one period. At that stage, relative demand
for external ﬁnancing
(
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
)
is increasing: Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
< Kt+1,a−IKt+1,a
Kt+1,a
implies
that
pAt−1
(
αpAt−1
r+f
) α
1−α
(αpAtr+f )
1
1−α
>
pAt(αpAtr+f )
α
1−α(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α
, which implies that
(
At
At−1
) 1
1−α
<
(
At+1
At
) 1
1−α
or
At
At−1
< At+1
At
. In phase 2, ﬁrm a is technologically independent of external ﬁnancing
and, hence, ﬁnances the eﬃcient capital stock completely using internal funds.
Proposition 2. With ε = 0 and 0 < At
At−1
< At+1
At
for t ≤ t1, At+1At < AtAt−1 for
t1 < t ≤ t2 and At+1At = const with 1 ≤
At+1
At
≤ r1−α for t > t2 : The degree of
ﬁnancial development impacts the allocation of capital temporarily at an early stage
in the growth cycle as long as
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a. If t ≤ t1,
Kt,a =
(
r
r + f
) 1
1−α
∗Kt,b; (IV.33)
Kt,a
Kt−1,a
=
Kt,b
Kt−1,b
=
(
At
At−1
) 1
1−α
, (IV.34)
where Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is increasing.
Proof. This relation follows immediately from comparing the level and growth rate
of capital in ﬁrm a with the level and growth rate of capital in ﬁrm b (cf. equations
IV.12 and IV.13).
Interpretation of Proposition 2. If exogenous growth opportunities are per-
sistent, sustained economic growth induces technological dependence on external
ﬁnancing at least as long as the eﬃcient capital stock grows faster than operating
proﬁts (stage 1 in the growth cycle). Given technological dependence on external
ﬁnancing during that early stage in the ﬁrm's growth cycle, the degree of ﬁnan-
cial development impacts the realized capital stock. Such an impact of ﬁnancial
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development is of transitional nature and only occurs at early stages in the ﬁrm's
growth cycle. Assuming a constant premium for external ﬁnancing (f), the degree
of ﬁnancial development only impacts the level, but not the growth rates of capital
at this stage because it impacts the capital allocation at t in the same way as the
capital allocation at t− 1.
4.6 Extension 1: Financial Development as a Function of
Varying Firm Characteristics
The analysis so far shows: Only with temporary demand shifts and in a ﬁrm's steady-
state, the degree of ﬁnancial development has the expected impact on capital growth
rates (in the way described by Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006). In this steady-state,
the ﬁrm is technologically independent of external ﬁnancing, but still needs external
ﬁnancing in order to adjust fast to stochastic demand shifts. In contrast, Rajan
and Zingales (1998) argue that the degree of ﬁnancial development is particularly
important for industries that technologically depend on external ﬁnancing. In the
analysis so far, ﬁnancial development matters for the level of capital, but not for the
growth rates of capital. The reason for this preliminary result is that the degree of
ﬁnancial development has the same impact on the capital allocation in periods t and
t− 1: However, a constant industry characteristic only impacts the level of capital,
but not the growth rates of capital. The crucial driver of this preliminary result is
the assumption that the premium for external ﬁnancing (f) has been assumed to
be constant. Consequently, I analyze how the main results change if I assume that
f is an increasing function of ﬁrm a's demand for external ﬁnancing relative to its
capital stock
(
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
)
, where f→ 0 as IKt,a
Kt,a
→ 1.19
The ﬁrst change in the analysis lies in the capital allocation decision by ﬁrm
a. Given IKt,a, ﬁrm a Max
Kt,a
(pit,a) s.t. Kt,a ≥ IKt,a where pit,a = ptAtKαt,a −
19One simple functional form of f that satisﬁes these requirements is f = c∗
(
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
)
, where
c = const.
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(r + f) (Kt,a − IKt,a) and f now depends on
(
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
)
in the way described above.
For the range Kt,a > IKt,a, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Kt,a is equal to:
αptAtK
α−1
t,a = (r + f)−
δf
δ
(
Kt−IKtt
Kt
) IKt
K2t
. (IV.35)
I now analyze how the assumption of a varying f changes the main insights of
Propositions 1 and 2.
4.6.1 Stochastic, Temporary Growth Opportunities
According to Proposition 1, the adjustments to exogenous shifts in demand in the
sense of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) occur in a phase where the demand for
external ﬁnancing is exclusively due to the stochastic nature of demand shifts, which
have the same size each period. Therefore, Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is constant. If f is increasing
in Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
, the results of Proposition 1 remain unchanged, with the equilibrium
premium for external ﬁnancing (f ∗) replacing the constant premium of f .
4.6.2 Deterministic, Persistent Growth Opportunities
In contrast, according to Proposition 2, ﬁnancial development has an impact on
the exploitation of persistent supply shifts only at an early stage of the ﬁrm's life.
However, at these early stages, Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is not constant. In particular, at the ﬁrst
stage in the growth cycle (t < t1),
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is increasing (cf. Proposition 2). Since
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is systematically changing in those phases where ﬁnancial development
impacts the exploitation of persistent growth opportunities, the functional form of
f is crucial for this type of growth opportunities.
The analysis is modiﬁed as follows. As before, Γ (IK) = [0, pit,a) is non-empty,
compact-valued and continuous. Γ is also convex: For pit,a <
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α , pit,a is
concave; as IKt,a increases, proﬁts increase at a decreasing rate because the increase
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in proﬁts (due to the lower premium for external ﬁnancing with a higher level of
internal funds) decreases as the relative demand for external ﬁnancing Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
and,
hence, f shrink. For pit,a ≥
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α , pit,a is (strictly) concave due to the decreasing
returns to scale. At IKt,a =
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α , pit,a is diﬀerentiable as IKt,a →
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α
implies that f → 0. r is unbounded, but lim
τ→∞
(
1
r
)τ
r (IKt,a, IKt+,a) exists, and there
is an upper bound to the supremum of the value of ﬁrm a: V (IK) ≤ B. In addition,
r is concave. Firm a reaches an interior solution at some ﬁnite point in time τ . After
that point in time τ , ﬁrm a never enters phase 1 again.
Therefore, the solution exists and is equivalent to the solution of the (recursive)
functional equation, as well as the initial dynamic optimization problem.
Phase 1: pit,a <
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α
 dt,a = 0 (equivalent to IKt,a = pit,a).
Phase 2: pit,a ≤
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α
 dt,a = pit,a −
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α (equivalent to IKt,a =
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α ).
I last verify the optimality of the suggested policy function. The optimal policy has
to satisfy the ﬁrst-order necessary condition of the Bellman equation:
−1 +
(
1
r
)
V ′ (IKt+1,a) = 0. (IV.36)
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) give the envelope condition for V ′ (IKt+1,a):
V ′ (IKt+1,a) =

δpit+1,a
δIKt+1,a
if pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
αpAt+1 (IKt+1,a)
α−1 if pit,a ≥
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
.
(IV.37)
Together, these two conditions yield the Euler equation:
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if pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
→ r = δpit+1,a
δIKt+1,a
;
if pit,a ≥
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
→ IKt+1,a =
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α
, (IV.38)
where δpit+1,a
δIKt+1,a
captures the varying premium for external ﬁnancing that the ﬁrm
saves by increasing internal funds. For pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
, a marginal increase
in internal funds increases operating proﬁts due to decreased costs for external
ﬁnancing for this marginal unit (r + f ∗) and due to decreased costs for external
ﬁnancing for all units of external ﬁnancing.
The case distinction is at pit,a =
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
, not at pit,a =
(
αpAt+1
r+f
) 1
1−α
as before,
because f→ 0 as IKt,a
Kt,a
→ 1 by assumption. The condition never holds with equality
if pit,a <
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α
because f > 0 ∀ Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
, so f ∗ > 0. The boundary solution of
IKt+1,a = pit,a is optimal in the ﬁrst phase. In the second phase, IKt+1,a =
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α
is the unique solution, which is always feasible as pit,a ≥
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α . Let K∗t,a =
argmax
Kt,a
[
ptAt (IKt,a)
α ; ptAt
(
αptAt
r+f
) α
1−α − (r + f)
((
αptAt
r+f
) 1
1−α − IKt,a
)]
. The allo-
cation of capital diﬀers according to the following phases:
Phase 1: pit,a <
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α
 Kt+1,a = K
∗
t+1,a
Phase 2:
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a
 Kt+1,a =
(
αpAt
r
) 1
1−α
Importantly, K∗t,a is increasing in f , whichin turnis increasing in
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
.
Therefore, as Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is increasing during the ﬁrst stage in the growth cycle (t < t1)
(cf. Proposition 4.5), ﬁrm a can exploit less and less of the increasing exogenous
supply shifts.
166
Proposition 3. With ε = 0 and 0 < At
At−1
< At+1
At
for t ≤ t1, At+1At < AtAt−1 for
t1 < t ≤ t2, and At+1At = const (with 1 ≤
At+1
At
≤ r1−α), for t > t2: The degree of
ﬁnancial development impacts the allocation of capital temporarily at an early stage
in the growth cycle as long as
(
αpAt+1
r
) 1
1−α ≤ pit,a. If t1 < t,
Kt,a < Kt,b; (IV.39)
Kt,a
Kt−1,a
<
Kt,b
Kt−1,b
, (IV.40)
where both (Kt,a −Kt,b) and
(
Kt,a
Kt−1,a
− Kt,b
Kt−1,b
)
are increasing in f .
Proof. This relation follows immediately from comparing the level and growth rate
of capital in ﬁrm a (cf. Proposition 2) with the level and growth rates of capital in
ﬁrm b (cf. equations IV.12 and IV.13), using the fact that Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
is increasing
for t < t1.
Interpretation of Proposition 3. If ﬁrm a (technologically) depends on external
ﬁnancing, it has a comparative disadvantage in the sense of Ricardo, compared to
ﬁrm b that is located in the country with a perfectly developed ﬁnancial system: It
allocates less to the production of the commodity. However, this level eﬀect does
not automatically translate into diﬀerent capital growth rates in both ﬁrms.
For ﬁnancial development to impact capital growth rates from t−1 to t, ﬁnancial
development has to impact ﬁrm a's capital allocation decision both at t− 1 and at
t, and, in addition, it has to impact the capital allocation decisions at both points
in time in a diﬀerent manner. With the assumed functional form of f , ﬁrm a meets
this requirement if its dependence on external ﬁnancing is positive and, in addition,
changes over time. Along the productivity growth cycle, ﬁnancial dependence is
positive and increasing if t ≤ t1.
167
Notably, the assumption that supply shifts follow the deﬁned growth cycle is
not crucial to derive this result: Internal funds depend on the history of the ﬁrm.
They represent the cumulative function of past proﬁts as long as there are positive
investment opportunities in the future, which the owner foresees because supply
shifts are assumed to be deterministic. Hence, internal funds are non-decreasing.
The growth-cycle deﬁnition simpliﬁes the analysis because it allows to reduce the
history of the ﬁrm to the last period, and the future of the ﬁrm to the next period.
Due to the growth-cycle assumption, current technological dependence on external
ﬁnancing and future technological dependence on external ﬁnancing are linked in a
way that ensures that the owner does not let the manager invest excessive internal
funds only becauseat some time in the futurethe ﬁrm again will face positive
growth opportunities.
Empirical Implications. Proposition 3 suggests an econometric test that is close
to, but diﬀerent from that by Rajan and Zingales (1998) (cf. their speciﬁcation in
Subsection 1.2.3). One can interpret ﬁrm a as a representative ﬁrm of a particular
industry in country a that is subject to temporary, stochastic demand shifts. Firm
b is a representative ﬁrm of the same industry in country b. Applying Proposition 3,
sectoral capital growth rates in the ﬁnancially less-developed country a are in fact
lower than in the country with the perfectly developed ﬁnancial system. As found
by Rajan and Zingales (1998), this model predicts a positive sign of the coeﬃcient
of an interaction between the degree of ﬁnancial development and technological,
ﬁnancial dependence.
The comparison of the capital reallocation in both ﬁrms following persistent
supply shifts suggests certain reﬁnements:
 Rather than the industry's absolute (technological) dependence on external
ﬁnancing, its change has to be interacted with the degree of ﬁnancial develop-
ment. Positive ﬁnancial dependence is a prerequisite, but not enough for
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ﬁnancial development to impact growth rates.20
 In contrast, absolute (technological) dependence on external ﬁnancing, as
used by Rajan and Zingales (1998), is important to explain the Ricardian
specialization of ﬁnancially well-developed countries in industries that techno-
logically depend on external ﬁnancing. Thus, the product of the development
of a ﬁnancial system and the absolute ﬁnancial dependence of that industry
should have a positive impact on the level of capital allocated to the respective
industry.
The analysis allows further suggestions for an empirical test:
 The speciﬁcation only applies to certain industries. Such industries are at
an early stage in the industry growth cycle (young ﬁrms).21 The concept of
technological, ﬁnancial dependence (and, hence, the suggested speciﬁcation) is
especially important for industries with low proﬁt margins and for industries
with a long time lag between the investment outlay and the cash ﬂowing back
from operations (in my model this time lag is 1 period).
Comparison: Temporary Demand versus Persistent Supply Shifts. This
section compares the results from the analysis of temporary demand and persistent
20As opposed to the predictions from my model, Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the measure
of ﬁnancial dependence in the ﬁnancially perfectly developed country b. This measure is meant
to reduce the endogeneity between the capital growth rates and ﬁnancial dependence in country
a. I have two remarks on their measures: First, optimal capital growth rates of ﬁrm b and the
ﬁnancial dependence of ﬁrm b are of course related. Therefore, the measure by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) accounts for part of the growth opportunities that my model suggest to add. Importantly,
the concepts of capital growth rates and ﬁnancial dependence are not the same: Industries with
positive growth opportunities are not necessarily ﬁnancially dependent if they can use internally
accumulated proﬁts to ﬁnance such growth opportunities. Furthermore, the test by Rajan and
Zingales (1998) fails to distinguish between the industry characteristic of ﬁnancial dependence,
which has an impact on the capital allocation, and the change in that industry characteristic,
which has an impact on capital growth rates. Second, my model shows that
Kt,b−IKt−1,b
Kt−1,b
is not
uniquely determined because a large range of distribution decisions is optimal for the owner in
the ﬁnancially perfectly developed country b (cf. the derivation of equation IV.12). Rajan and
Zingales (1998) avoid this ambiguity with respect to the optimal distribution of ﬁrm b by deﬁning
technological dependence as the diﬀerence between capital expenditures and operating cash ﬂows,
relative to capital expenditures.
21Rajan and Zingales (1998) already test the impact of their measure particularly on young
ﬁrms.
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supply shifts in order to derive diﬀerent empirical implications. The main distinc-
tions are the following:
 Regarding temporary demand shifts, sectoral capital growth rates in the ﬁ-
nancially less-developed country a positively depend on the product of the
degree of ﬁnancial development and eﬃcient capital growth rates. In con-
trast, concerning persistent supply shifts, sectoral capital growth rates in the
ﬁnancially less-developed country a positively depend on the product of the
degree of ﬁnancial development, the increase in ﬁrm a's ﬁnancial dependence,
and eﬃcient capital growth rates. In summary, the product of the degree of
ﬁnancial development and capital growth rates in country b is expected to
have a statistically signiﬁcant and positive impact both regarding temporary
demand and regarding persistent supply shifts. However, technological, ﬁ-
nancial dependence is only a relevant concept in the latter case. Therefore,
one could empirically distinguish between the two speciﬁcations by testing
whether the product of the degree of ﬁnancial development, the increase in
ﬁrm a's ﬁnancial dependence, and eﬃcient capital growth rates is statistically
signiﬁcant (which points to persistent supply shifts) or not (which points to
temporary demand shifts).22
 The development of a ﬁnancial system inﬂuences capital growth rates, and
has only a weak impact on the absolute level of capital allocated towards an
industry that is subject to temporary demand shifts in the respective countries.
In contrast, regarding persistent supply shifts, the ﬁnancially better developed
country specializes in those industries that technologically depend on external
ﬁnancing.
 As to temporary demand shifts, the development of the ﬁnancial system im-
22For simplicity, it is also possible to add only the absolute value of technological, ﬁnancial
dependence, instead of its increase. Only regarding persistent supply shift, this concept should
matter at all.
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pacts growth rates in industries even in their steady-state. Concerning persis-
tent supply shifts, by contrast, only industries at early stages in their industry
growth cycle are aﬀected.
4.7 Extension 2: Financial Development in the Form of Dif-
ferent Financing Contracts
The analysis of the baseline model shows: The role of ﬁnancial development crucially
depends on the nature of growth opportunities. Following temporary, stochastic
demand shifts, the development of a ﬁnancial system impacts capital growth rates
even in a steady-state. In contrast, following persistent, deterministic supply shifts,
the development of a ﬁnancial system impacts capital growth rates only along the
growth path. Only regarding persistent, deterministic supply shifts, the concept of
technological, ﬁnancial dependence is important in order to explain this relation.
Financial dependence does not only have a technological component. A ﬁrm's
internal ﬁnancing capacity is, in addition, determined by the design of the external
ﬁnancing contracts, in particular by the speciﬁcations of the repayment modalities.
Therefore, I extend the model to distinguish between two types of external ﬁnancing
contracts. The analysis of this extension shows a further diﬀerence between the role
of a ﬁnancial system for the capital reallocation following temporary, stochastic
demand shifts, and following persistent, deterministic supply shifts: Both types of
growth opportunities systematically diﬀer in their ﬁnancing needs and, hence, refer
to diﬀerent aspects of a ﬁnancial system.
4.7.1 Model Extension
I distinguish between two types of external ﬁnancing contracts that are available for
ﬁrm a. For ﬁrm b, such a distinction is not necessary because any external ﬁnancing
is provided frictionless.
Contract type 1 oﬀers external ﬁnancing at the additional costs of fD per unit
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of external ﬁnancing of type 1 (Dt). It speciﬁes that the ﬁrm pays back ﬁxed
amortization and interest of r for each unit of Dt at the end of the period.
Contract type 2 oﬀers external ﬁnancing at the additional costs of fE per unit
of external ﬁnancing of type 2 (Et). It leaves the pay-back schedule unspeciﬁed. At
the end of the period, the providers of this type of external ﬁnancing (along with
the owner of the ﬁrm) choose the distribution dt for each unit of Et.
Let f ∗ denote the overall equilibrium premium for external ﬁnancing. Assume,
as above, that fE and fD are increasing in
Kt,a−IKt,a
Kt,a
, where fE, fD→ 0 as IKt,aKt,a → 1.
4.7.2 Analysis
I analyze the optimal choice of dt if ﬁrm a raises external ﬁnancing of type 2 (i.e.,
Kt,a = IKt,a + Et,a), ﬁrst, in the steady-state with temporary demand shifts, an
second, along the growth path with persistent supply shifts.
Corollary 2. Let ε > 0 and At = A = const. If ﬁrm a is technologically
independent of external ﬁnancing (phase 2), then dt,a
IKt,a+Et,a
≥ r.
Proof. By Proposition 1, in phase 2, ﬁrm a is technologically independent of external
ﬁnancing. Analogously to the suggested optimal distribution policy in Subsection
4.4, dt,a = pit,a − IK∗t,a, where IK∗t,a denotes the optimal level of capital hoarding:
IK∗t,a = argmax
IKt,a
[
1
2
plowAIK
α
t,a +
1
2
(
phighAK
∗α
t,a − (r + f ∗)
(
K∗t,a − IK∗t,a
))]
. Since
0 < α < 1,
dt,a
Kt,a
≥ r.
Therefore, in a phase where ﬁrm a adjusts less than ﬁrm b to stochastic demand
shifts, there is no advantage of contract type 2 over contract type 1 becauseat
the end of each periodboth require distribution of (at least) r per unit of external
ﬁnancing.
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Corollary 3. Let ε = 0 and 0 < At
At−1
< At+1
At
for t ≤ t1, At+1At < AtAt−1 for t1 < t ≤ t2
and At+1
At
= const with 1 ≤ At+1
At
≤ r1−α. If t ≤ t1, dt,aIKt,a+Et,a < r.
Proof. By Proposition 2, ﬁrm a's relative demand for external ﬁnancing increases
in phase 1 (t ≤ t1). Analogously to the suggested optimal distribution policy in
Subsection 4.5, dt,a = 0, i.e., the owner of ﬁrm a optimally chooses the boundary
solution. Hence, if outside ﬁnancing is partly provided via contract of type 2, setting
dt,a = 0 improves ﬁrm a' s internal ﬁnancing capacity and, hence, increases proﬁts in
this ﬁrst stage in the growth cycle as long as t+1 ≤ t1. Therefore, dt,aIKt,a+Et,a < r.
Therefore, in a phase where ﬁrm a adjusts less than ﬁrm b to deterministic
persistent supply shifts, contract type 2 oﬀers a systematic advantage over contract
type 1: It allows to leave more funds inside the ﬁrm in a phase where internal funds
are scarce.
Interpretation and Empirical Implications. With respect to temporary de-
mand shifts, the development of the ﬁnancial system has a steady-state impact on
capital growth rates of ﬁrm a. In that phase, ﬁrm a is technologically independent of
external ﬁnancing and, hence, there is no additional advantage of ﬁnancing contracts
that can ﬂexibly postpone repayment in order to leave funds inside the ﬁrm. In
contrast, regarding persistent supply shifts, the development of the ﬁnancial system
only has an impact on capital growth rates if ﬁrm a is at an early stage in the
industry growth cycle, where technological, ﬁnancial dependence is still increasing.
However, in that phase, the owner would like to leave more capital inside the ﬁrm
to allow the ﬁrm to get faster independent of external ﬁnancing. However, the
owner cannot inject new capital. Therefore, in this phase, ﬁrm a has an additional
advantage of external ﬁnancing contracts that can ﬂexibly postpone repayment to
leave funds inside the ﬁrm.
Therefore, an empirical test should categorize the measures of ﬁnancial develop-
ment according to whether they rather suit the ﬁnancing of temporary, stochastic
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growth opportunities (i.e., refer to the provision of short-term ﬁnancing) or the
ﬁnancing of persistent, deterministic growth opportunities (i.e., refer to the provision
of long-term ﬁnancing). If the aspects of a ﬁnancial system that provide short-
term external ﬁnancing and those that provide long-term external ﬁnancing are not
developed to the same extent in a particular country, the empirical speciﬁcation
for temporary demand shifts should be tested using diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial
development than the speciﬁcation for persistent supply shifts.
5 Conclusion
The analysis derives from my model that a ﬁnancial system can in fact impact sec-
toral growth rates in the respective economy. This result is based on the assumption
that a ﬁrm can only raise external ﬁnancing within its own national ﬁnancial system.
Assuming instead that a ﬁrm can raise external ﬁnancing abroad, for instance,
by listing at a foreign stock exchange, within the framework of this model, the
national ﬁnancial system would not have the same impact on national capital growth
rates. However, international integration of ﬁnancial systems may seem plausible
with respect to stock exchanges, but less so with respect to other elements of a
ﬁnancial system: Bank credits, for instance, do not seem to be perfectly suited for
international integration: Even within one economy, banks typically do not deal in
credits outside a narrow geographic circle (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004).
My analysis shows that both approaches to the capital reallocation hypothesis
(cf. above Subsection 1.2.3) refer to diﬀerent natures of growth opportunities:
the ﬁrst approach to temporary, stochastic growth opportunities (cf. Subsection
4.4), the second approach to persistent, deterministic growth opportunities (cf.
Subsection 4.5). Both types of growth opportunities lead to diﬀerent ﬁnancing
needs (provision of short-term versus long-term capital) and, hence, refer to diﬀerent
aspects of a ﬁnancial system (cf. Subsection 4.7). It is likely that international
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integration diﬀerently aﬀects the components of a ﬁnancial system that provide
short-term capital and those that provide long-term capital. Consequently, in the
course of international integration of national ﬁnancial systems, the element of a
ﬁnancial system that is more aﬀected by international integration than the other
one should have a decreasing eﬀect on the growth rates in the respective economy.
If, concluding from Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), bank credits were less
internationally integrated than equity markets, this would result in a weaker impact
of ﬁnancial development according to the second approach to the capital reallo-
cation hypothesis (regarding industries with dependence on external ﬁnancing, cf.
Subsection 1.2.3).
This theory is reﬂected in the results by Fisman and Love (2007) as explained
above (in Subsection 1.2.3). They show that the impact of ﬁnancial development on
sectoral growth rates is weaker emphasizing industries with dependence on external
ﬁnancing (second approach, above Subsection 1.2.3), compared to an emphasis on
industries with positive investment opportunities (ﬁrst approach, cf. Subsection
1.2.3). However, their conclusion that the ﬁrst approach comprises all functions
of a ﬁnancial system, and that the second one only refers to the narrow channel
of external ﬁnancing is incomplete. The analysis of my model associates both
interpretations with diﬀerent kinds of growth opportunities, but with the same
function of a ﬁnancial system, namely the provision of external ﬁnancing.
The majority of studies on the capital reallocation hypothesis use data from
the 1980s. It is worthwhile to test whether supposedly increased international
integration of ﬁnancial systems since then has weakened the impact of national
ﬁnancial systems or of one of their elements. A way to do so would be to use more
recent data and to measure more explicitly the extent of international integration of
ﬁnancial systems, such as the extent of cross-listings or foreign direct investments,
or the extent of regional ﬁnancial integration, for instance, within the European
Union.
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Appendix
A Review of Studies at the Macroeconomic Level
One stream in the empirical literature tries to pin down an impact of the degree
of development of a ﬁnancial system on the growth in the respective economy
at the macroeconomic level: They compare cross-country diﬀerences in overall
economic growth rates with the development of the respective ﬁnancial system.
These macroeconomic studies address the main issues in this literature, namely the
problems of reverse causality and of omitted variables mainly by certain econometric
techniques. They exploit either the cross-sectional variation in the country-level data
(over diﬀerent countries c), the time-series variation (over diﬀerent points in time t)
or both the cross-sectional and the time-series variation:
 Cross-section variation: Growthi = αZc + βFc + εc
Controlling for other country-level factors that inﬂuence economic growth (Zc),
cross-sectional studies predict the inﬂuence (β) of ﬁnancial indicators (Fc)
on economic growth rates (Growthc). As the benchmark study, King and
Levine (1993a) ﬁnd that contemporaneous ﬁnancial development positively
predicts contemporaneous as well as subsequent economic growth. Levine and
Zervos (1998) provide similar evidence even after controlling for other relevant
economic and political factors at the country level. Cross-sectional studies
often address the concern of omitted variables with the help of instruments
(Ang, 2008), but do not solve the egg-chicken problem of reserve causality.
In contrast, time-series data allows to observe the relation between ﬁnancial
development or economic growth over time (Arestis and Demetriades, 1996).
 Time-series variation: Growtht = αZt + βFt + εt
Time-series studies ﬁnd a causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on economic
growth (e.g., Neusser and Kugler, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998), but
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cannot fully exclude a bi-directional causality between ﬁnancial development
and economic growth (Luintel and Khan, 1999). Furthermore, ﬁnancial sys-
tems may develop in anticipation of future economic growth and, hence, be
a leading indicator rather than the underlying cause (Rajan and Zingales,
1998). Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005) still conclude that ﬁnance acts as
the driving force behind investment.
 Cross-section and time-series variation: Growthct = αZct + βFct + εct
Panel data allows to econometrically control for unobserved country- and time-
speciﬁc eﬀects and allows to more conﬁdently conclude that a well-developed
ﬁnancial system promote economic growth (Beck and Levine, 2004; Rousseau
and Wachtel, 2000).
177
Bibliography
Acharya, Viral V., Heitor Almeida, and Murillo Campello, 2007, Is cash negative
debt? A hedging perspective on corporate ﬁnancial policies, Journal of Financial
Intermediation 16, 515554.
Aggarwal, Raj, and Sutthisit Jamdee, 2003, Determinants of capital structure:
Evidence from the G-7 countries, Working Paper, Kent State University.
Allen, Franklin, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian, 2005, Law, ﬁnance, and economic
growth in China, Journal of Financial Economics 77, 57116.
Anderson, Theodore W., 1951, Estimating linear restrictions on coeﬃcients for
multivariate normal distributions, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22, 327351.
Ang, James B., 2008, A survey of recent developments in the literature on ﬁnance
and growth, Journal of Economic Surveys 22, 536576.
Arestis, Philip, and Panicos O. Demetriades, 1996, Finance and growth: Institu-
tional considerations and causality, Working Paper, University of East London.
, and Kul B. Luintel, 2001, Financial development and economic growth:
The role of stock markets, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 33, 1641.
Bancel, Franck, and Usha R. Mittoo, 2004, Cross-country determinants of capital
structure choice: A survey of European ﬁrms, Financial Management 33, 103132.
Bates, Thomas W., Kathleen M. Kahle, and René M. Stulz, 2009, Why do U.S. ﬁrms
hold so much more cash than they used to?, Journal of Finance 64, 19852021.
VI
Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, 2009, What matters in corporate
governance?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 783827.
Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine, 2002, Industry growth and capital allocation:
Does having a market- or bank-based system matter?, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 64, 147180.
, 2004, Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel evidence, Journal of
Banking & Finance 28, 423442.
Bencivenga, Valerie R., and Bruce D. Smith, 1991, Financial intermediation and
endogenous growth, Review of Economic Studies 58, 195209.
, and Ross M. Starr, 1996, Equity markets, transactions costs, and capital
accumulation: An illustration, World Bank Economic Review 10, 241251.
Benveniste, Lawrence, and Jose Scheinkman, 1979, On the diﬀerentiability of the
value function in dynamic models of economis, Econometrica 47, 727732.
Blackwell, David, 1965, Discounted dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical
Statistics 36, 226235.
Blanchard, Olivier J., Florencio López-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1994, What
do ﬁrms do with cash windfalls?, Journal of Financial Economics 36, 337360.
Booth, Laurence, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic,
2001, Capital structures in developing countries, Journal of Finance 51, 87130.
Botticini, Maristella, and Zvi Eckstein, 2005, Jewish occupational selection: Educa-
tion, restrictions, or minorities?, Journal of Economic History 65, 922948.
Boyd, John H., and Edward C. Prescott, 1986, Financial intermediary-coalitions,
Journal of Economic Theory 38, S. 211232.
VII
Bradley, Michael, Gregg A. Jarrell, and E. Han Kim, 1984, On the existence of an
optimal capital structure: Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance 39, 857878.
Brealey, Richard A., Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen, 2008, Principles of
corporate ﬁnance (McGraw-Hill: Boston) 9 edn.
Brounen, Dirk, Abe de Jong, and Kees Koedijk, 2004, Corporate ﬁnance in Europe:
Confronting theory with practice, Financial Management 33, 71101.
Carlin, Wendy, and Colin Mayer, 2003, Finance, investment, and growth, Journal
of Financial Economics 69, 191226.
Cetorelli, Nicola, and Michele Gambera, 2001, Banking market structure, ﬁnancial
dependence and growth: International evidence from industry data, Journal of
Finance 56, 617648.
Chui, Andy C. W., Alison E. Lloyd, and Chuck C. Y. Kwok, 2002, The determination
of capital structure: Is national culture a missing piece to the puzzle?, Journal of
International Business Studies 33, 99127.
Ciccone, Antonio, and Elias Papaioannou, 2006, Adjustment to target capital,
ﬁnance, and growth, Working Paper, Center for Economic Policy Research.
Cronqvist, Henrik, Anil K. Makhija, and Scott E. Yonker, 2009, What does CEO's
personal leverage tell us about corporate leverage?, Working Paper, Fisher College
of Business.
Day, Judy, and Peter Taylor, 2005, Accession to the European Union and the process
of accounting and auditing reform, Accounting in Europe 2, 321.
De Bondt, Gabe J., 1998, Financial structure: Theories and stylized facts for six
EU countries, Economist 146, 271301.
VIII
De Jong, Abe, Rezaul Kabir, and Thuy Thu Nguyen, 2008, Capital structure around
the world: The role of ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc determinants, Journal of Banking
& Finance 32, 19541969.
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998, Law, ﬁnance, and ﬁrm
growth, Journal of Finance 53, 21072137.
, 1999, Institutions, ﬁnancial markets and ﬁrm debt maturity, Journal of
Financial Economics 54, 295336.
, 2002, Funding growth in bank-based and market-based ﬁnancial systems:
Evidence from ﬁrm-level data, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 337363.
Diamond, Douglas W., 1991, Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank
loans and directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99, 689721.
Dittmar, Amy, and Jan Mahrt-Smith, 2007, Corporate governance and the value of
cash holdings, Journal of Financial Economics 83, 599634.
, and Henri Servaes, 2003, International corporate governance and corporate
cash holdings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 111133.
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, 2007, Private credit in 129
countries, Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299329.
Fan, Joseph P. H., Sheridan Titman, and Garry Twite, 2008, An international com-
parison of capital structure and debt maturity choices, Working Paper, Chinese
University of Hong Kong.
Faulkender, Michael, and Rong Wang, 2006, Corporate ﬁnancial policy and the value
of cash, Journal of Finance 61, 19571990.
Fisman, Raymond J., and Inessa Love, 2004a, Financial development and growth in
the short- and long-run, Working Paper, World Bank.
IX
, 2004b, Financial development and intersectoral allocation: A new approach,
Journal of Finance 59, 27852807.
, 2007, Financial dependence and growth revisited, Journal of the European
Economic Association 5, 470479.
Frank, Murray Z., and Vidhan K. Goyal, 2007, Trade-oﬀ and pecking order theories
of debt, Working Paper, University of British Columbia.
, 2009, Capital structure decisions: Which factors are reliably important?,
Financial Management 38, 137.
Friedman, Avner, 1971, Diﬀerential Games (Wiley: New York).
Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2003, Do better institutions mitigate agency problems?
Evidence from corporate ﬁnance choices, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 38, 185212.
Glaeser, Edward L., David I. Laibson, José A. Scheinkman, and Christine L. Soutter,
2000, Measuring trust, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 811846.
Gleason, Kimberly C., Lynette Knowles Mathur, and Ike Mathur, 2000, The inter-
relationship between culture, capital structure, and performance: Evidence from
European retailers, Journal of Business Research 50, 185191.
Goldsmith, Raymond W., 1969, Financial structure and development (Yale Univer-
sity Press: New Haven, Conn.).
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and
equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107155.
Graham, John R., and Campbell R. Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of
corporate ﬁnance: Evidence from the ﬁeld, Journal of Financial Economics 61,
153.
X
Greenwood, Jeremy, and Boyan Jovanovic, 1990, Financial development, growth
and the distribution of income, Journal of Political Economy 98, 10761107.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2003, People's opium? Religion
and economic attitudes, Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 225282.
, 2004, The role of social capital in ﬁnancial development, American Eco-
nomic Review 94, 526556.
, 2006, Does culture aﬀect economic outcomes?, Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 20, 2348.
Hall, Graham C., Patrick J. Hutchinson, and Nicos Michaelas, 2004, Determinants
of the capital structures of European SMEs, Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting 31, 711728.
Harford, Jarrad, 1999, Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions, Journal of Finance
54, 19691997.
, Sattar A. Mansi, and William F. Maxwell, 2008, Corporate governance and
ﬁrm cash holdings in the US, Journal of Financial Economics 87, 535555.
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 1990, Capital structure and the informational role
of debt, Journal of Finance 45, 321349.
, 1991, The theory of capital structure, Journal of Finance 46, 297355.
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, 1994, A theory of debt based on the inalienability of
human capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 841879.
Henriques, Diana B., 2008, U.S. ﬁrms sitting atop piles of cash - unlike most
Americans, corporations have learned to save, The International Herald Tribune,
3rd of March.
XI
Hilary, Gilles, and Kai Wai Hui, 2009, Does religion matter in corporate decision
making in America?, Journal of Financial Economics 93, 455473.
Hofstede, Geert H., 1980, Culture's Consequences: International Diﬀerences in
Work-Related Values (Sage Publications: Beverly Hills).
Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1963, On a two-sector model of economic growth: Comments and
a generalization, Review of Economic Studies 30, 119127.
Jaggia, Priscilla B., and Anjan V. Thakor, 1994, Firm-speciﬁc human capital and
optimal capital structure, International Economic Review 35, 283308.
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash ﬂow, corporate ﬁnance, and
takeovers, American Economic Review 76, 323329.
, and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the ﬁrm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305360.
Kalcheva, Ivalina, and Karl V. Lins, 2007, International evidence on cash holdings
and expected managerial agency problems, Review of Financial Studies 20, 1087
1112.
Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000, Empire building by corporate managers: The corporation
as a savings instrument, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24, 127141.
Keynes, John M., 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(Harcourt, Brace: New York).
Kim, Chang-Soo, David C. Mauer, and Ann E. Sherman, 1998, The determinants of
corporate liquidity: Theory and evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 33, 335359.
Kim, Wi Saeng, and Eric H. Sorensen, 1986, Evidence on the impact of the agency
costs of debt on corporate debt policy, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 21, 131144.
XII
King, Robert G., and Ross Levine, 1993a, Finance and growth: Schumpeter might
be right, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717737.
, 1993b, Finance, enterpreneurship, and growth: Theory and evidence,
Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 513542.
Kleibergen, Frank, and Richard Paap, 2006, Generalized reduced rank tests using
the singular value decomposition, Journal of Econometrics 133, 97126.
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer, 1997, Does social capital have an economic
payoﬀ? A cross-country investigation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1251
1288.
Kroszner, Randall S., Luc Leaven, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2007, Banking crisis,
ﬁnancial dependence, and growth, Journal of Financial Economics 84, 187228.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W.
Vishny, 1997, Trust in large organizations, American Economic Review 87, 333
338.
, 1998, Law and ﬁnance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 11131155.
Levine, Ross, 1991, Stock markets, growth, and tax policy, Journal of Finance 46,
14451465.
, 1997, Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda,
Journal of Economic Literature 35, 688726.
, 2002, Bank-based or market-based ﬁnancial systems: Which is better?,
Journal of Financial Intermediation 11, 398428.
, 2003, More on ﬁnance and growth: More ﬁnance, more growth?, Working
Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
XIII
, 2005, Finance and growth: Theory and evidence, in Philippe Aghion, and
Steven N. Durlauf, ed.: Handbook of Economic Growth (Elsevier: Amsterdam).
, and Sara Zervos, 1998, Stock market development and long-run growth,
American Economic Review 88, 537558.
Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent, 2004, Recursive macroeconomic theory
(MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts).
Luintel, Kul B., and Mosahid Khan, 1999, A quantitative reassessment of the
ﬁnance-growth nexus: Evidence from a multivariate VAR, Journal of Development
Economics 60, 381405.
Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson, 2006, Repeated Games and Reputations:
Long-run relationships (Oxford University Press: New York).
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, 1995,Microeconomic
theory (Oxford University Press: New York).
Mikkelson, Wayne H., and M. Megan Partch, 2003, Do persistent large cash reserves
hinder performance?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 275294.
Miller, Alan S., 2000, Going to hell in Asia: The relationship between risk and
religion in a cross cultural setting, Review of Religious Research 42, 518.
, and John P. Hoﬀmann, 1995, Risk and religion: An explanation of gender
diﬀerences in religiosity, Journal of the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion 34, 6375.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation
ﬁnance and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48, 261297.
Myers, Stewart C., 2001, Capital structure, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15,
81102.
XIV
, and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, Corporate ﬁnancing and investment decisions
when ﬁrms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial
Economics 11, 187221.
Neusser, Klaus, and Maurice Kugler, 1998, Manufacturing growth and ﬁnancial
development: Evidence from OECD countries, Review of Economics and Statistics
80, 638646.
Opler, Tim, Lee Pinkowitz, René Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 1999, The determi-
nants and implications of corporate cash holdings, Journal of Financial Economics
52, 346.
Pagano, Marco, 1993, Financial markets and growth: An overview, European Eco-
nomic Review 37, 613622.
Park, Hoon, 1998, The eﬀect of national culture on the capital structure of ﬁrms,
International Journal of Management 15, 204211.
Pinkowitz, Lee, René Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 2003, Do ﬁrms in countries
with poor protection of investor rights hold more cash?, Working Paper, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
, 2006, Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and dividends to
ﬁrm value depend on governance? A cross-country analysis, Journal of Finance
61, 27252751.
Pinkowitz, Lee, and Rohan Williamson, 2002, What is a dollar worth? The market
value of cash holdings, Working Paper, Georgetown University.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, 1995, What do we know about capital
structure? Some evidence from international data, Journal of Finance 50, 1421
1460.
XV
, 1998, Financial dependence and growth, American Economic Review 88,
559586.
Ramirez, Andres, and Solomon Tadesse, 2007, Corporate cash holdings, national
culture, and multinationality, Working Paper, University of Michigan.
Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo, and Manuel S. Santos, 2009, Diﬀerentiability of the
value function without interiority assumptions, Journal of Economic Theory 144,
19481964.
Robinson, Joan, 1952, The rate of interest and other essays (Macmillan: London).
Ross, Stephen A., 1977, The determination of ﬁnancial structure: The incentive-
signalling approach, Bell Journal of Economics 8, 2340.
Rousseau, Peter L., and Dadanee Vuthipadadorn, 2005, Finance, investment, and
growth: Time series evidence from 10 Asian economies, Journal of Macroeco-
nomics 27, 87106.
Rousseau, Peter L., and Paul Wachtel, 1998, Financial intermediation and economic
performance: Historical evidence from ﬁve industrialized countries, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 30, 657678.
, 2000, Equity markets and growth: Cross-country evidence on timing and
outcomes, 19801995, Journal of Banking & Finance 24, 19331957.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1949, The theory of economic development (Harvard Uni-
versity Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts) 3. edn.
Schwartz, Shalom H., 1994, Beyond individualism/collectivism: New cultural dimen-
sions of values, in Uichol Kim, Harry C. Triandis, Çi§dem Kâ§itçiba³i, Sang-Chin
Choi, and Gene Yoon, ed.: Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Methods, and
Applications (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks).
XVI
Sekeley, William S., and J. Markham Collins, 1988, Cultural inﬂuences on interna-
tional capital structures, Journal of International Business Studies 19, 87100.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance,
Jounal of Finance 52, 737783.
Shyam-Sunder, Lakshmi, and Stewart C. Myers, 1999, Testing static tradeoﬀ against
pecking order models of capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 51,
219244.
Simon, Carl P., and Lawrence Blume, 1994, Mathematics for Economists (Norton:
New York).
Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo, 2005, Testing for weak instruments in linear
IV regression, in James H. Stock, and Donald W. K. Andrews, ed.: Identiﬁcation
and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas J. Rothenberg
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge).
Stokey, Nancy L., and Robert E. Lucas, 1989, Recursive Methods in Economic
Dynamics (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts).
Stulz, René M., and Rohan Williamson, 2003, Culture, openness, and ﬁnance,
Journal of Financial Economics 70, 313349.
Tabellini, Guido, 2010, Culture and institutions: Economic development in the
regions of Europe, Journal of the European Economic Association 8, 644716.
Tajlef, Henri, and John Turner, 1979, An integrated theory of intergroup conﬂict, in
William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel, ed.: The Social Psychology of Intergroup
Relations (Brooks/Cole Publications: Monterey).
Titman, S., 1984, The eﬀect of capital structure on a ﬁrm's liquidation decision,
Journal of Financial Economics 13, 137151.
XVII
Titman, Sheridan, and Roberto Wessels, 1988, The determinants of capital structure
choice, Journal of Finance 43, 119.
Wachtel, Paul, 2004, How much do we really know about growth and ﬁnance?, in
Michele Bagella, Leonardo Becchetti, Iftekhar Hasan, and William Curt Hunter,
ed.: Monetary Integration, Markets and Regulations: Research in Banking and
Finance (Elsevier: Oxford).
Williamson, Oliver E., 1988, Finance and corporate governance, Journal of Finance
43, 567591.
Wurgler, Jeﬀrey, 2000, Financial markets and the allocation of capital, Journal of
Financial Economics 58, 187214.
Zak, Paul J., and Stephen Knack, 2001, Trust and growth, Economic Journal 111,
295  321.
XVIII
Kurzlebenslauf - Susanne Ebert
2007-2010 Universität Mannheim
Tätigkeit als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Corporate
Finance (Professor Ernst Maug, Ph.D.)
Doktorandenstudium am Center for Doctoral Studies in Business
2006-2007 Yale University, New Haven (USA)
Doktorandenstudium an der Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
2004-2008 Universität Mannheim
Hauptstudium der Volkswirtschaftslehre
09.01.2008: Abschluss als Diplom-Volkswirtin
Hauptstudium der Betriebswirtschaftslehre
28.08.2006: Abschluss als Diplom-Kauﬀrau
2003-2004 Roosevelt University, Chicago (USA)
Studium am Walter E. Heller College of Business Administration
2001-2003 Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg
Grundstudium der Europäischen Wirtschaft
03.09.2003: Vordiplom
1992-2001 Frankenlandschulheim Schloss Gaibach, Volkach
29.06.2001: Abitur
